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ABSTRACT: INTERSECTORAL TERMS OF TRADE AND AGRICULTURAL TAX POLICY IN 
PAKISTAN
The study has two major objectives. Firstly it 
attempts to assess the direction of intersectoral resource 
flows in the Pakistan economy through the mechanisms of teims 
of trade and tax policy. Towards this objective empirical 
estimates of sectoral teims of trade and tax burdens are 
provided for the period from 1970/71 to 1977/78. The second 
main aim of this research is to interpret changes in the 
price and tax policies over the period in the context of a 
political economy framework. This part of the discussion deals 
with the relative political strength of the leading classes and 
their influence on government decision making, specially with 
respect to prices and taxation. The study also briefly examines 
the inplications of the policies pursued by the Bhutto govern­
ment on the level of output, savings and distribution in the 
economy.
The findings of the research indicate that during the 
period under study no serious attempt was made to appropriate 
an investible surplus frcm agriculture either through price 
shifts or through the revenue system. The series of agriculture's 
net barter teims of trade revealed a consistently positive 
trend during the seventies while the tax burden on the high 
incane groups in the rural sector was totally inadequate in 
terms of both equity and developmental objectives.
The study further links the failure to extract a 
surplus frcm the agricultural sector to the political 
dominance of the class of large landowners. The power of 
the landed elite is signed out as one of the principal 
reasons for the reluctance to reform the agrarian tax 
structure as well as for the policy of maintaining favourable 
relative prices of farm products.
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1INTRODUCTION
Historically the process of capital formation and industrial 
development has been based on the extraction of a surplus from 
the agricultural sector. Intersectoral relationships during 
the initial phases of development of European countries and more 
recently Japan are well documented.^ The literature shows that 
in each case the generation of an investible surplus in agriculture 
and its transfer to industry and other expanding sectors was a 
necessary condition for successful industrialisation.
Agriculture contributed to industry in the early phases of 
development by providing a flow of real and financial resources, 
both of which were vital to the process of structural change 
in the economy. The real surplus of agricultural products provided 
food, the major wage good of industrial labour, and raw materials 
for agrobased industry. The other aspect of the surplus was a 
flow of financial resources in the form of private savings, rent 
interest and taxes as well as the invisible transfer of funds 
through shifts in teims of trade.
Manipulation of terms of trade was a major device used for 
extracting the surplus from the farm sector. A cheapening of
1 E.g. Okhawa and Rosovsky (1960); Johnston and Mellor (1961); 
Nicholls (1964); Johnston and Kilby (1967).
2agricultural products relative to non-farm products forced
involuntary savings on the farm sector while diverting income to
the non-agricultural sector. A negative price policy was instrumental
in the transfer of real and financial resources to the industrial
sector in the early development of a number of socialist and
capitalist countries although it was implemented by different
means. In Russia"*"it involved the collectivization of farms and
compulsory delivery of agricultural output at very low prices, while
in England the repeal of com laws was aimed at keeping down the
2
price of food and raw materials. The other important mechanism 
for generating and diverting savings from agriculture into the 
investing sector was land taxation which was used most effectively 
in Meiji Japan.3
Development literature on intersectoral relationships has been 
greatly influenced by the economic history of the USSR and Japan.
4
According to the traditional view of Soviet development the 
extraction of a surplus from the agricultural sector was a major 
factor in making possible the rapid industrial expansion during the 
First Plan period from 1928-32. Collectivization of agriculture 
and maintaining terms of trade favourable to industry were the 
major policy variables employed by the state to enable a significant 
transfer of resources from the farm to the non-farm sector. The 
surplus out of agriculture was enlarged not through the attainment 
of a higher level of output, the measures did not succeed in 
raising agricultural productivity, but rather through the extraction 
of a greater proportion out of existing production levels.
1 Erlich (1960), pp, 119-22; Nove (1969), pp. 148-86.
2
Chambers and Mingay (1965), pp 148-169.
3
Ckhawa and Rosovsky (1960), pp. 61-62.
4
icn (I960), pp. 119-22; pove (4969), pp. 148-86.
3This picture of intersectoral relationships in the initial
period of rapid industrial growth has been questioned in recent
studies'1' of agriculture-industry linkages in the Soviet economy.
This reinterpretation of the Soviet experience is mainly based on
2
empirical work by Barsov. Barsov’s findings indicate that contrary 
to the widely held view agriculture's terns of trade, incorporating 
both the prices received by private and state farms, actually 
improved in the period frcm 1928 to 1932. The sharp rise in 
free market prices of farm products more than compensated for the 
steady level of procurement prices resulting in a shift in the 
terms of trade in favour of agriculture. Furthermore the findings 
of Barsov's study reveal that the contribution of agriculture to 
net investible resources was negative during the First Plan Period. 
Estimates of commodity flows between the farm and non-farm sector 
weighted by prices prevailing in 1928 show that there was a net 
inflow of resources into agriculture for each year with the 
exception of 1931.
However the validity of using 1927 prices to weight the 
resource flows between sectors has been questioned by Ellman in 
the following terms: "Given that it is suspected by many that
1928 prices were manipulated so as to extract a surplus via the 
price mechanism, the use of the 1928 prices to investigate the 
existence of the surplus is unsatisfactory. What is required for 
an analysis of this problem is a measure of value which is independent 
of prices which actually ruled in 1928."
^ Barsov (1969); Millar (1974); Ellman (1975), 
^ Barsov (1969).
^ Ellman (1975), p. 854.
Alternate estimates of sectoral resource flows derived by
Ellman*1' based on..1913 world prices reverse the results derived by
Barsov and reveal a positive contribution of agriculture to
industrialization during the First Plan period. However the results
also indicate that whereas there was a net outflow from the
agricultural sector the magnitude of this surplus did not increase
significantly with the introduction of collectivized farming.
Although collectivization was not associated with a dramatic
increase in the overall flow of resources from agriculture it
did lead to a sharp increase in the components of the resource
flow of crucial importance to the expansion of the state industrial
sector. Thus the procurement of grain - the basic wage good -
doubled over the period from 1926-28 and 1930-31.2 Furthermore 
there was a large increase in grain exports to pay for the heavy
3import requirements of the industrial program.
Finally as Ellman has pointed out the negative trend in 
teims of trade for the non-farm sector noted by Barsov reflected 
the disadvantageous position of a subsector of non-agriculture- 
the proleterian sector - which "sold its labour power to the 
state and buys agricultural products at a weighted average of
A
ration and free market prices.1'
From the point of view of the state industrial sector the 
price situation vis a vis farm products was still very favourable
1 Ibid., p. 852.
3 Karcz (1968), 241.
3 Ellman (1975), p. 846.
 ^ Ellman (1975), p. 850.
5in that their demand for agricultural products was met at the
stable official price while the prices of industrial products
sold to agriculture continued to rise. However according to this 
*
view the surplus for indistrialization was provided by squeezing 
the working class and not the farm sector.
-\
The conclusion derived on the basis of Bafsov's results that 
it was the working class and not the farm sector who had to bear 
the burden of state accumulation during the First Plan Period 
has been seriously challenged in a recent work by Morrison.^
The study through a rigorous examination of the empirical basis 
of Barsov's findings reveals that not only are the estimates 
based on crude and unreliable data but the method of measurement 
by using inflated prices of industrial products significantly 
understates the flow of resources out of agriculture. Hence the 
results derived by Barsov on intersectoral terms of trade of the 
balance of exchange between sectors cannot provide a valid basis 
for any generalization on the contribution of the farm sector 
to industrialization.
Thus although the standard version of intersectoral relationships 
during the First Five year plan needs to be modified to the extent 
that collectiveization did not result in an increase in the net 
flow of resources out of agriculture nevertheless it cannot be 
denied that the contribution of agriculture was positive and 
significant throughout the period. Whereas collectivization did
Morrison (1982), pp. 570-584.
not lead to the extraction of a larger surplus it did provide 
state industry with substantially larger quantities of the vital 
components of the marketed surplus at very favourable prices.
Whereas in the case of Russia agricultural growth preceded 
industrialisation, Japanese development was characterized by 
concurrent growth in the leading sectors. The strategy of 
agricultural development assigned the highest priority to the 
objective of maintaining a net outflow of resources from the sector. 
Agricultural productivity was raised through the adoption of 
yield increasing technology with very little demand on the scarce 
resources of capital and foreign exchange. Heavy land taxation was 
used to solve the dual problem of curbing consumption in the rural 
sector and ensuring that the gains in productivity were siphoned 
out to finance investment requirements for industry and infra­
structure. Estimates of sectoral tax burdens indicate that a 
disproportionately higher tax rate was imposed on agriculture as 
compared to the low rates for the non-farm sector. Hence, 
towards the end of the 19th Century, between 12% and 22% of 
agricultural income was paid out in direct taxes compared to the
corresponding proportions of between 2% and 3% for the non-
1
agricultural sector.
2The conventional view of Japanese economic history outlined
3above has been challenged mainly in the works of Nakamura and 
4Ishikawa. The contentious points are firstly the question of
 ^ Okhawa and Rosovsky (1960), pp. 61-62.
^ Okhawa and Rosovsky (1960); pp. 43-68; Ranis (1959), pp. 440-454; 
Johnston (1951), pp. 498-513.
^ Nakamura (1966).
^ Ishikawa (1967).
7concurrent growth in the two sectors and secondly the magnitude 
and direction of the flow of resources out of agriculture.
Nakamura has claimed that the frequently cited net agricultural 
growth rate of 2.3%^'for the period frcm 1878 to 1917 greatly 
overstates the actual rate of output increase in the farm sector.
The overestimation of agricultural growth is attributed by 
Nakamura to the fact the growth rate is based on official data 
which underestimates the level of agricultural production in the 
early Meiji period. Incomplete coverage as well as the fact that 
production statistics were initially collected for the purposes 
of land taxation and therefore incorporate various forms of 
concealment for tax avoidance purposes are the major reasons cited 
for the downward bias in official production figures for the early 
years of the Meiji government.
Adjusting for this bias in official statistics Nakamura has 
computed an alternate rate of agricultural growth. According to 
his estimate agricultural output, during the period under study, 
increased at a much lower rate of 1% which was barely equal to 
the rate of population increase. Consequently production per 
capita was, more or less, stagnant.
While denying the empirical basis of the concurrent sectoral 
growth thesis for Meiji Japan, Nakamura, however does not question
1 This estimate was derived in Okhawa et al (1968).
the importance of a transfer of resources out of agriculture 
in financing industrial expansion in Japan. The flow of resources 
out of agriculture was made possible due to a greater saving 
effort out of a higher initial surplus rather than through a 
simultaneous increase in agricultural productivity. The pre­
existing surplus was mobilized through changes in the fiscal- 
agrarian structure during the Meiji period.
Ishikawa also shares the view that the initial conditions in
Meiji Japan were exceptionally favourable but he differs from
Nakamura in that he is sceptical on the supposedly large saving
1transfer from the farm to the non-faim sector. However the
significant contribution of an outflow from agriculture in
financing industrial expansion is one aspect of Japanese growth
on which there is a near consensus although there is some
controversy regarding the principal mechanism used for channelizing
2
income out of the farm sector.
With respect to Nakamura's criticism of an upward bias in 
earlier estimates of agricultural growth, it is conceded that growth 
rates based on official data are: likely to overestimate the increase 
in output. At the same time, however, Nakamura's estimates are 
considered to err on the other extreme by overstating the base 
year production levels. Thus Hayami and Yamada have pointed out
1 Ishikawa (1967),pp.. 318 - 320.
2 Fei and Ranis (1966) emphasize the role of direct investment by 
private landlords in small scale industries whereas most other 
writers, including Okhawa and Rosovsky (1960), Johnston (1951), 
have singled out the Meiji land tax as the main instrument of 
resource transfer.
9that according to Nakamura’s estimates productivity in pre-Meiji
Japan was higher than that in Asian countries today. "It would
seem unlikely that Japan during her feudal era could have attained
a level of productivity that Korea and Taiwan under similar climatic
conditions and techniques of rice cultivation have not attained 
1 2to this day." Johnston has pointed out a further unrealistic 
implication of Nakamura's findings in that if agricultural output 
grew at a rate equal to or less than the rate of population growth 
the income elasticity of calories consumption of Meiji Japan was 
zero. Moreover there is no evidence of any drastic food shortages
3
or inflationary pressures in the economy till 1915.
The criticism of the more conventional interpretation of 
Japanese development discussed above, may qualify certain features 
of the growth experience but it does not invalidate the core of 
the thesis. Hence instead of exceptionally high growth from a 
low base there was moderate growth from a relatively higher base 
than previously supposed. Nevertheless the increase in agricultural 
output was rapid enough to cater to the food and exchange requirements 
of the non-agricultural sector as well as to contribute a surplus 
for financing industrial investment.
A similar strategy was adopted for the more recent trans­
formation of agriculture in Taiwan. The Taiwanese experience is 
specially pertinent to less developed countries since the development 
began under comparable conditions of overpopulation and technological 
backwardness. Once again rapid increases in agricultural
 ^ Hayami and Yamada (1969), p .Ill.
2 Johnston (1969), p.59.
3 Johnston (1969), p.59.
10
productivity were achieved through the adoption of yield 
increasing technology and were translated into a large net 
outflow of resources from the sector into non-agriculture. A 
detailed empirical study of intersectoral flows for the Taiwanese 
economy covering the period from 1895-1960 brings out the 
significant contribution of the net outflow of real and financial 
resources out of agriculture through the entire period from 
1911-1960. A heavy tax burden, increase in land rent, fanner's 
autonomous saving and a negative price policy were the major 
components of the outflow. While land taxation was the principal 
device used for extracting the surplus in the initial period of 
development, in the latter phase following WWII primary reliance 
was placed on a negative price policy. During these years 
unfavourable shift in agriculture's terms of trade accounted, 
on an average, for nearly 50% of the large capital transfers.^
The experience of these countries clearly points to the
stragetic role of resource flows out of agriculture in stepping
up the level of capital foimation concomitant with development.
As noted by Johnston and Mellor. "The conclusion suggested strongly
by historical experience is that in less developed countries where
agriculture accounts for seme 40%-60% of total national income
the transition from a level of savings and investment that spells
stagnation to one permitting a desirable rate of growth cannot be
achieved unless agriculture makes a significant net contribution to
2capital formation in the expanding sector." Thus the central
1 Lee (1968), pp.41-45.
^ Johnston and Mellor (1961), pp. 373.
problem facing planners in less developed countries is not 
only to raise the level of productivity in agriculture but 
also to ensure that the gains in productivity are channelized 
inte industrial and infrastructural investment through an 
effective capital transfer mechanism.
Recently the relationship between intersectoral resource
flows and development is being viewed from another angle. In
his study on the poverty of Third World countries, Lipton^ has
claimed that the major obstacle to agricultural development
and overall growth lies not in the difficulties of diverting
the requisite surplus from the farm sector but rather from the
fact that the agricultural sector is being squeezed too hard
with negative production and distributional consequences. On
the basis of a large sample of less developed countries the
author concludes that in most cases the flow of resources not
only in teims of private and public capital flows but also with
respect to-skilled manpower has been from the rural to the
urban sector. It is further argued that the squeeze on agriculture
has been affected deliberately by the state through the use of
various instruments at its disposal including taxation, credit
policy, manipulation of terms of trade. The latter is specially
significant. "It is above all by cheapening farm output with
private and public powers that transfers savings capacity from
2agriculture to the rest of the economy."
1 Lipton (1977).
2 Lipton (1977) p.293.
The rationale for this policy of extracting resources from 
agriculture does not lie in their greater productivity in the 
non-farm sector or any other economic motive. On the contrary, 
according to Lipton both the goals of efficiency and equity 
warrant that the surplus be utilized in the farm sector. By 
diverting the surplus to non-agriculture these policies "dry 
up the growth of specific farm outputs, of total farm products, 
and of marketed surpluses from agriculture, the very springs 
of industrialization. Their converse incentive effects on non­
farm outputs seem small. Meanwhile equity as well as efficiency 
is damaged."^ The only explanation for the adoption of these 
socially wasteful measures lies in the fact that the state .is 
dominated by urban groups who use the government machinery to 
further their economic position. "In less developed countries 
today far more than in now rich countries it is urban interests 
that are the more concentrated, articulate and powerful. It is 
these interests that bias resource allocation away from efficiency
(and I shall argue) equity as well in the direction of pushing
o
more resources towards the cities."
The urban bias thesis is significant ;not only because of its 
wide coverage which extends to a large number of countries and 
incorporates all elements of the resource transfer but also because 
of its influence on recent research on the problems of agricultural 
development in Third World countries. Hence the stagnation of
 ^ Lipton (1977), pp. 308
2 Lipton (1977), p e48s .
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agricultural productivity in these countries is conveniently 
attributed to urban biased policies. The most damaging of these 
is the negative price policy. Schultz points to the distortions 
in the price structure as the single most important cause for 
low levels of agricultural output. The potential of available 
scientific research and capital cannot be fully realized because 
low prices make it unprofitable to invest in modernizing investment. 
The limiting factor is not inadequate scientific research but lack 
of incentives which prevent the utilization of this research. 
Following Lipton's reasoning, Schultz attributes artifically low 
prices of farm products to direct government intervention in price 
setting which in turn is determined by the politically powerful 
urban interests. "Even though the rural population in low 
incane countries is much the larger the political market strongly 
favours the urban pupulation at the direct expense of rural 
people. Politically urban consumers and industry demand cheap 
food. " 2
The shortcanings of Lipton's urban bias thesis, both at the 
level of empirical analysis and the theory of political econany
3
have been pointed out in a detailed critique of the work by Byres.
It is shown that the claim of a substantial transfer of resources 
from the rural to the urban sector rests on very skimpy evidence.
1 Schultz (1978), pp 3-25.,
2 Schultz (1978) p. 10.
3 Byres (1978X
1*f
Even more damaging to the validity oi the hypothesis is the 
"Liptonian vice’’ of referring only to evidence which supports 
his arguments as a result of which a number of important works 
on various aspects of intersectoral flows are not even considered 
in the study. Byres has pointed out these flaws in the 
empirical analysis with detailed reference to available evidence 
on India. Contrary to Lipton's thesis it is shown that research 
on terms of trade, taxation policy and urban rural remittances 
for the Indian economy, by and large, indicates that the flow 
of resources through these mechanisms has been to the benefit 
rather than the detriment of the rural sector.
A similar tendency is noticeable in Lipton's assessment of
evidence for the Pakistan economy. Frequent references are made
to Pakistani data to show that the price and tax policy of the
government has been biased against agriculture. To substantiate
the claim that faim prices have been artifically low primary
reliance is placed on a study by Lewis comparing domestic and
world prices of agricultural commodities from the mid fifties
to the mid-sixties. However the far better-known and oft quoted
works by the same author on domestic teims of trade covering the
1period from 1950 to 1970are not mentioned. Needless to say the 
results of the study show a favourable trend in agriculture's 
terms of trade from the mid-fifties onwards. In the same way 
the argument that agriculture is overtaxed relative to non-
2
agriculture is based not on the few empirical writings on the subject,
 ^ Lewis and Hussain (1966); Lewis (1970). 
^ Hamid (1970); Chaudhury (1973).
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including a comprehensive report by the Pakistan Taxation
•i
Commission, but rather on a simple manipulation of sectoral 
estimates of incomes and tax shares. In a later part of this 
study it is shown that the results of the exercise are based on 
incorrect data and hence cannot even serve as rough approximations 
of sectoral tax burdens.
Policies for agricultural development adopted by various 
governments in Pakistan since the late fifties were certainly not 
designed with the objective of providing an outflow of resources 
from the sector. The system of high procurement prices and 
generous subsidies on inputs ensured a positive trend in 
agriculture’s terms of trade. Heavy subsidies on tractors 
further encouraged the tendency towards capital intensive 
techniques of production. Furthermore no serious attempt was 
made to mobilize the agricultural surplus through the tax system. 
Thus despite the recommendations of various tax commissions and 
the dramatic improvements in agricultural' productivity during the 
sixties, farm income continued to be exempt from income tax.
During the period the ratio of direct taxes to incane for the 
agricultural sector declined from 1.7% in 1959/60 to 1% in 
1969/70.
Evidence for both India and Pakistan points to the inability 
of these states to appropriate the investible surplus from 
agriculture either through price shifts or through the revenue 
system. As a result the gains in agricultural productivity
 ^ Government of Pakistan (1960).
instead of contributing to a net outflow of resources for 
financing industrial investment have been accompanied by an 
inflow of resources into the farm sector. A recent assessment 
of agricultural performance for a number of Asian countries 
concluded that "in South Asia both the change in the terms 
of trade in favour of agriculture and large government 
investment as well as seme private capital foimation have 
resulted in a net inflow of savings. The available studies 
show that both in India and Pakistan there has been a perceptible 
change in the last decade in comparison with the fifties.
Thus the direction of intersectoral resource flows for 
at least these two countries goes contrary to what would be 
ejected under urban biased policies. Lipton's generalization 
of the urban dominated state as typical of Third World countries 
is not based on any detailed examination of the power structure 
of these states. Furthemore the concept of a single rural class
o
in conflict with a single urban class has been rightly criticised 
as completely inaccurate since neither sector can be said to 
represent a homogeneity of interests. Lipton's justification for 
categorizing the rural and urban sector as classes rests mainly 
on the supposed common interest with respect to prices within 
each sector. The urban sector unanimously desires cheap food 
while the rural sector forms a common front in favour of higher 
prices of faim output. However in most cases the majority of
Asian Development Bank (1977), p. 123. 
2 Byres (1977), pp. 233-237.,
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the farmers operate holdings below the subsistence level and 
are net buyers of food. Thus the clash of interest over prices 
between surplus farmers who are net sellers of food on the one 
hand and the deficit farmers and landless labour on the other 
is present within the rural sector. Similarly the urban sector 
is even less likely to represent a harmony of interests due to 
the basic conflict between labour and capitalists.
Furthermore even if rural interests are identified with
those of surplus faimers and the industrialists are seen as
representatives of the urban sector, recent attempts^ at class
characterization of the Indian state point to an alliance, rather
than a conflict, between these two dominant classes with the
former playing an increasingly dominant role. The power of the
landed elite is singled out as the main reason for the inability
to refoim the agrarian tax structure as well as for the policy
of maintaining procurement prices at levels higher than those
2
reccmnended by the Prices Commission and thereby also an
3important factor in the poor saving effort in the public sector. 
The failure to squeeze agriculture is being clearly linked to 
the influence of the large farmer lobby on government policies 
with respect to prices, tax, credit,, etc.
1 Mitra (1977), pp. 170-183; Frankel (1978), pp. 187-201;
Byres (1981), pp. 443-449,
2 Rao (1974), p. 1288.
3 Shetty (1978), p. 221-222; Toye (1981), pp. 113, 238.
In this context the urban bias thesis totally misrepresents 
the nature of political influences on economic policy. A more 
relevant framework for interpreting government decision making 
is provided by Mitra^ in his recent study on terms of trade.
The focal point of the analysis is classes not sectors. The 
direction of government policy is a function of the class basis 
of the state reflecting the interests of the dominant classes.
In the context of India the leading classes are identified 
as the industrial bourgeoisie and the rural oligarchs.
The industrialists want control of the state machinery and 
the resources associated with it such as licenses, permits, 
loan decisiors and most important the ability to influence 
economic policy, specially trade policy, to their benefit.
Under the system of parliamentary democracy in the predominantly 
rural society access to the state apparatus is possible only 
through an alliance with the large landowners who hold sway 
over the countryside. In return for the rural votes the 
landed class demand various concessions and benefits such as 
higher prices, ineffective land reforms, low tax burdens etc. 
Hence agriculture's terms of trade have shown a positive trend 
from 1961 to 1974 while the contribution of the farm sector 
to revenues has declined consistently. The loss to the 
industrialists in terms of higher prices of raw materials is 
more than compensated by access to the state spoils system.
The alliance succeeds despite the basic conflict of interest 
over farm prices due to the mutual benefit made possible through 
the control of government resources.
1 Mitra (1977),
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In Pakistan, even more so than in India, the class of rich
landowners has dominated the political scene. However irrespective
of this fact Lipton's urban bias thesis has been eagerly adopted
by economists concerned with intersectoral relationships in the
Pakistan economy specially on the question of price policy.^
2
Two recent studies on agricultural price policies for the
early seventies blame-bias against agriculture for the prevalence
of artificially low prices of farm products during the period.
3
Burki's study on the economic performance of the Bhutto regime 
attributes the adoption of a whole host of policies from 
nationalization to prices to the urban bias in state decision­
making. A detailed critical evaluation of these studies 
is provided in a later section. At this point they are mentioned 
to illustrate the growing tendency to resort to urban bias as the 
final explanation of government policies. In most of this 
research it has not been considered necessary to substantiate 
the presence of urban bias with evidence on the sectoral 
backgrounds of the power holders in the state. Nor is there 
any attempt to spell out the mechanism which has led to urban 
control of the state apparatus in a predominantly rural 
economy like Pakistan.
Gotsch and Brown (1977); Brown (1978); World Bank (1979); Burki (1980). 
3 Gotsch and Brown (1977); World Bank (1979).
3 Burki (1980).
The picture of a homogenuous rural sector being helplessly 
exploited by the politically powerful urban sector totally 
distorts the political realities of the country. Firstly even 
if the underlying assumption of homogeneity of sectoral 
interests is accepted, the claim that the state has represented 
the urban sector is untenable. A very superficial look at the 
political history of the country is sufficient to disprove the 
thesis of a government monopolized by urban groups. On the 
contrary, evidence presented later in the study points to the 
tremendous political power of the rural elite. Secondly the 
approach ignores the highly differentiated agrarian structure 
of the country which is more likely to be conducive to intra­
sectoral conflict rather than a harmony of interests.
However, while on the one hand the urban bias thesis by 
depicting the state as the instrument of a single urban class 
completely misrepresented the power structure of the country, 
on the other hand by explicitly recognizing the political 
motives behind state decision making it broke away from the 
concept of the neutral state. The view of the state ruled by 
and working to the benefit of a particular group in society 
marked a distinct departure from previous analysis of govern­
ment policy. Development research in Pakistan has tended to 
concentrate on questions within the very narrow confines of 
a neoclassical framework. Hence in earlier interpretations the 
state was viewed as above class and sectional interests guided
only by the exigencies of growth in it's choice of policies.
The urban bias thesis brought to the forefront the link 
between government policies and the interests of the ruling 
elite, not only in connection with the question of agricultural 
taxation which was generally referred to in the context of 
political and institutional obstacles but also with respect 
to prices and the whole array of policies relating to the flow 
of resources between sectors.
The above discussion introduces the two major objectives 
of the present research, firstly the study aims to provide 
empirical estimates for terms of trade and sectoral tax burdens 
for the period from 1970/71 to 1977/78. Secondly an attempt 
will be made to analyse changes in these variables over the 
period in the context of a political economy framework.
The lack of data on private capital flows makes it impossible 
to estimate a comprehensive measure of resource transfers between 
sectors. However it is possible to generate a series of inter­
sectoral terms of trade and tax burdens for the seventies. The 
changes in these variables, the two major mechanisms for extracting 
the agricultural surplus, should provide an indirect assessment 
of the direction and rough magnitude of the intersectoral flow 
of resources.
At present the major work on domestic terms of trade for 
Pakistan has been done by Lewis and Hussain for the period from
1 2 
1950/51 to 1964 and later updated by Lewis up to 1970.
Ihe series has been further extended till 1974/75 by Gotsch
o
and Brown using Lewis' methodology. Lhe present study 
will generate an alternative series of net barter terms of 
trade for the period from 1970 to 1978 using a more rigorous 
methodology and a different data base to that employed 
by Lewis and thereby provide a more accurate and up to date 
set of estimates.
Empirical work on intersectoral tax burdens for
4Pakistan is limited to three studies, two of which pertain to 
the late sixties while the third empirical writing is for the 
year 1972/73. An attempt will be made in this study to provide 
est 'urates of tax capacity and tax burdens for the farm and 
non-farm sector for the period from 1972/73 to 1976/77. These 
estimates in conjunction with available data on inter class 
tax burdens in the rural and urban sector are used to examine 
the issue as to whether the agricultural sector is over-taxed 
vis a vis non-agriculture and the even more important question 
of whether income classes in the agricultural sector are over­
taxed vis a vis corresponding income classes in the non-farm 
sector.
 ^ Lewis and Hussain (1966).
3 Lewis (1970).
3 Gotsch & Brown (1977).
^ Hamid (1970); Chaudhury (1973); Jeetun (1978)
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The other principal objective of the study will be to 
analyse changes in government price and tax policy in the context 
of the politico-economic background of the period. As mentioned 
earlier the interpretation of government policy in terms of 
political motives has only recently come into the mainstream 
of development literature in Pakistan via the urban bias thesis. 
The replacement of a neutral state with an urban dominated state 
may have focussed interest on non-econcmic determinants of 
government policy yet the political picture implied in the 
model totally misrepresents the power structure of the country.
It is felt that a more relevant frame of analysis of economic 
policies would be provided if political influence was assessed 
in terms of the power of various classes, rather than sectors, 
along the lines suggested by Mitra’s study. Hence an attempt 
is made in this study to assess the influence of the relative 
political strength of the leading classes on government decision 
making specially with respect to prices and taxes. Towards this 
objective the research will focus on the role of various classes 
in the political history of Pakistan - the pre-military period 
of 1947-1958, Ayub’s regime 1958-1968, and the Bhutto government 
1971-77. The discussion will focus on the influence of changes 
in the power structure on the economic policies of the different 
regimes.
The final part of the study will be concerned with tracing 
the detailed implications of government policies on the economic 
performance of agriculture, industry, balance of payments, and the 
rate of capital formation for the period from 1970 to 1977. The
analysis will begin with an examination of the factors 
determining the pattern and rate of agricultural growth.
An attempt will be made to assess the extent to which 
government policies were successful with respect to output 
and distributional objectives.
The discussion of changes in the agricultural sector will be 
followed by an inquiry into factors influencing the level 
of industrial activity and investment with special emphasis 
on the impact of changes in output and prices of farms 
products on manufacturing activity. An attempt will be made 
to provide answers to questions such as the following: To
what extent were high foodgrain prices translated into higher 
wages? Did the slow down in agricultural output constrain 
industrial production through it’s effect on foreign exchange 
earnings or through the negative effect on profit margins?
Lastly the study will analyse the reasons behind the 
poor saving effort of the economy. The failure to extract an 
investible surplus from the largest sector of the economy will 
be shown to be an important factor in explaining the low level 
of domestic resource mobilization.
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CHAPTER I
POLITICAL AND ECONOMIC BACKGROUND OF THE PRE-BHUTTO
PERIOD
THE PRE-MILITARY PERIOD 
Political Background
The large weight of agriculture in the economy and 
the highly differentiated ownership pattern within agri­
culture has ensured the class of large landowners a dominant 
place in the country' s power structure.
Unlike India, which at the time of independence already
had a substantial industrial base and a well entrenched capitalist
class, large scale industry was virtually non-existent in
Pakistan comprising only 1.4% of national income (see Table
1.4.). On the other hand agriculture accounted for over 60%
of national product, provided almost all major exports and
was responsible for the livelihood directly or indirectly
1
of 8C% of the population.
Within the rural sector the landlords were dominant 
as a result of an extremely skewed land ownership pattern 
and a high tenancy ratio. The earliest evidence of the 
extent of inequality in land distribution was provided by the 
West Pakistan Land Reforms Ccaimission in 1959. The data
Government of Pakistan, Planning Board, First. Five Year Plan 
(Draft), Vol. II, 1958, p. 19.
Table 1.1
Distribution of Landowenership in Pakistan and Provinces, 1950-55
Pakistan Pubjab
Farm Size NO. of Owners Area Owned No. of Owners Area Owned
(acres) (acres)
All Sizes 5,068,376 48,642,530 3,555,457 28,309,744
5 acres of
(100.0) (100.0) (100.0) (100.0)
less 3,266,137 7,425,614 2,358,119 4,438,517
(64.4) (15.3) (66.3) (15.7)
5-25 acres 1,452,421 15,438,138 1,029,108 11,041,708
(28.7) (31.7) (28.9) (39.0)
25-100 acres 286,470 10,616,308 146,893 6,198,128
(5.7) (21.8) (4.1) (21.9)
100-500 acres 57,287 7,671,537 19,401 3,842,986
500 acres and
(1.1) (15.8) (0.6) (13.6)
over 6,061 7,490,933 1,936 2,788,405
(0.1) (15.4) (0.1) (9.9)
Sind
Farm Size No. of Owners Area Owned
(acres)
All Sizes 337,665 10,285,021
5 acres or
(100.0) (100.0)
less 100,601 365,817
(29.8) (3.6)
5-25 acres 155,163 1,937,073
(46.0) (18.8)
25-100 acres 54,792 2,390,358
(16.2) (23.2)
100-500 acres 24,064 2,600,123
500 acres and
(7.1) (25.3)
over 3,045 2,991,650
(0.9) (29.1)
Source: Government of Pakistan, Report of the Land Reforms Comnission 
for West Pakistan, 1959.
Appendix V.
Data for Punjab is for 1954-55 
Data for Sind is for 1946-47
(see Table 1.1) show high concentration of land in the 
top classes as well as a prevalence of marginal owners 
with holdings of less than five acres. The very large 
landowners with holdings of 500 acres or more comprising 
.1% of all owners controlled 15.4% of the land. At the 
other end 64.4% of the farmers owned holdings below the 
subsistence level.^ There was considerable inter-regional 
variation in the ownership pattern. The province of Sind 
had the most inequitable ownership of land resources where 
less than 1% of farmers with holdings of 500 acres or more 
possessed nearly 30% of the land. In Punjab although there 
was less concentration at the top, there was. a far larger 
proportion of marginal owners —  66% of the total as compared 
to the corresponding figure of 30% for Sind.
The tenancy ratio was also highest in Sind. At the time 
of partition 80% of cultivated holdings were under tenancy of
9
some sort compared to 56% in the Punjab and 50% in NWIP.
Tenants were mostly share-croppers trading their own and 
their family’s labour for a share in output. Their position 
vis a vis the landlord was one of total dependency. The 
landlord not only controlled his means of livelihood but 
usually also assumed the role of money lender. Hence the
 ^ An IBRD survey in 1966 estimated the size of holding necessary 
to provide a minimum level of subsistence at 5 acres. The 
figure would vary with family size and several other consider­
ations such as soil quality but is useful in serving as a 
rough approximation (World Bank, no date, Vol. 5).
2
Government of Pakistan, Planning Board, First Five Year Plan, 
Vol II, 1958, pp. 117-118.
28
economic dependency of the tenant was further reinforced
by bends of debt. The mechanisms to ensure the authority
of the landlord were not limited to purely economic instruments
but also included illegal violence and intimidation.^ In
such a milieu the landlords had complete monopoly of the
2
political support of their tenants.
The translation of this power at the village level into 
national level politics is described by Alvi in the following 
teims: 3
Political power in a village is typically 
organised by factions. The faction leader, 
typically a big landowner organises support 
by a variety of means. Such landowners rely 
on a core of supporters, namely their economically 
dependent sharecroppers, who have little option 
but to follow their master. The faction leader 
enters into alliances with fellow landlords 
who bring their economic dependents. ..
Rival local factions are integrated with other 
villages and foim larger factions at successive 
higher levels. Individuals and political parties 
with ambitions in district, provincial and 
national politics seek grass roots support with 
local faction leaders. Participation of faction 
leaders in party political competition institut­
ionalizes alliances of factions into political 
parties... However because factions are based on 
the power of the landowning class at all levels 
of their organisation all factions stand for 
carmen goals on social and economic policy that 
embody the interests of the rural elites. At 
the level of national policy making it is such 
a leadership that participates in legislative 
institutions...
* Masud (1949), pp. 3-8; Herring (1980), p. 600; Alavi (1974), p. 15.
2 Alavi (1976), pp. 353-345.
3 Ibid.
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The representation of landlords in the first elected 
provincial assemblies reflects the efficiency with which 
links were established between local, provincial and 
national power structures. In the Punjab 80% of the seats 
in the provincial assembly in 1951 were captured by large 
landowners while the results of the Sind elections, 1955, 
revealed an even more complete dominance of the feudals.
Ninety percent of the assembly seats were won by landlords.
At the national level in the interim Pakistan assembly of 
1955, out of the total of 310 members 200 belonged to this 
class. ^
2
Furthermore an investigation into the social composition 
of the members of the Muslim League showed that the rural elite 
were the major class interest represented in the party. Their 
importance in the party hierarchy was reflected in the control 
of key position such as that of secretary of the party and 
president of provincial committees.
The political establishment in the fifties was totally 
identified with landed interests. The frequent changes in 
the government during the period were a result of infighting
 ^ Shahid Alam, "Economics of the Landed Interests," Pakistan 
Economic and Social Review, 1974, p. 16.
2 Sayeed (1966), p. 206.
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among the feudals and a rearrangement of alliances.
The increase in factional conflicts was motivated by the 
pursuit of power and did not signify any differences on 
issues that errtoodied their common interests.4
With landlords in central place in the power structure 
it is not surprising that there was no enactment of any 
form of ceiling legislation for the first ten years. Although 
as far back as 1949 the Agrarian Reform Committee of the 
Muslim league had expressed concern over the extreme concen­
tration of land resources and stressed the importance of
2instituting land reforms. The committee made several
3
recommendations with respect to land ceiling, redistribution 
of land to small peasants, taxation of agricultural income 
etc. These proposals were shelved. Whatever little hope 
there was of any land redistribution in favour of the 
poor peasants was crushed by the government policy of 
allocating land in the newly irrigated barrage areas in
4
the Punjab and Sind to civil and military officers. The 
position of Haris (tenants at will) was further weakened 
by distribution in large parcels of evacuee property in
5
Sind to refugees from India. Seme reforms were enacted
4 Maniruzzaman (1966), p. 7.
2 . Pakistan Muslim League (1949), p. 6.
*3
The recommended ceiling was 150 acres for irrigated land, 
300 acres for semi-irrigated land, and 450 acres for 
wholly rainfed land. The limit to land ownership was 
considerably less than what was implemented ten years 
later by the military regime.
4 Khan (1981), p . 149.
5 Alavi (1976), p. 333.
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by the provincial governments during the period with the 
objective of regulating tenurial relations.^  Given the 
social and political environment, these refoims only 
served to heighten tensions between landlords and tenants 
while at the same time stimulating preventive action by
2the owners against the possibility of any further reforms.
Economic Performance
At the time of independence the agricultural sector 
of the economy more than provided for the domestic require­
ments of food and raw materials. Thus in the initial years
3
the country was a net exporter of foodgrains. Similarly 
with respect to caimercial crops, supply was considerably 
greater than demand as a result of the very limited 
manufacturing activity in the country. While Pakistan's
share of cotton mills of undivided India was less than 5%
_  4
it produced 40% of the raw cotton crop. Hence in the
early years the most urgent objective of government policy
was to overcome the industrial backwardness of the
 ^ These were the Punjab Tenancy Act (1950); Protection and 
Restoration of Tenancy Right Act of the Punjab (1950);
Sind Tenancy Act (1947); Tenancy Act of Northwest Frontier 
Provence (1950); Protection and Restoration of Tenancy Right 
Act of NWFP (1950); and the Punjab Abolition of Jagirs Act 
(1952).
2 Khan (1981), p. 142; Hirashima (1978), p. 60.
3 Government of Pakistan, Central Statistical Office (1972), 
pp. 402, 404.
^ Bhatia (1979), p. 31.
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country. ^ Industrialization was to proceed under the
impetus of private initiative. The role of the public
sector was limited to enhancing the attractiveness of
private investment through the provision of infrastructureal
facilities and through policies aimed at raising the
o
returns to manufacturing activity.
Primary I reliance was placed on trade policy for
3
enhancing profits to industry. Thus the decision not to
devalue in 1949 reduced industrial cost on imported
machinery and intermediate goods as well as agricultural
raw material. The imposition of quantitative controls on
imports in 1952, following the collapse of the Korean
War Boom, further tilted relative prices in favour of
manufactured goods and created the condition for a flow
4of resources to industry. Agriculture's terms of trade
deteriorated shaiply from 1951/52 to 1954/55 (Table 1.2).
Other incentive measures aimed at attracting private
investment included fiscal rebates, cheap credit facilities,
and nominal tariffs on imports of machinery and raw material.
As a result of these policies profits in the initial years
5were ias high as 50%-100% in sane cases.
1
Statement of Industrial Policy, April 2, 1948; Report of 
the Economic Appraisal Comnittee, Karachi (1963), No. 16,p. 50.
2
Government of Pakistan, Planning Board, First Five Year Plan, 
(1958), pp. 91-92.
^ lewis (1969), p. 13.
4 Ibid.
^ Stem and Falcon (1970), p. 50.
Table 1.2
Domestic Terms of Trade for West Pakistan 1951-69, 
(3 year moving average)
1951-54 97.39
1952-55 91.14
1953-56 87.36
1954-57 91.41
1955-58 96.03
1956-59 98.76
1957-60 99.43
1958-61 103.13
1959-62 106.39
1960-63 108.28
1961-69 107.17
1962-65 109.15
1963-66 110.01
1964-67 112.10
1965-68 108.46
1966-69 106.55
Source: 1951/54 to 1960/63 from Lewis and Hussain (1967); 
1961/64 to 1966/69 from Lewis (1970)
The policy succeeded in achieving spectacularly 
high growth rates in the manufacturing sector. Large 
scale industry grew at an annual rate of over 15% during 
the decade from 1949/50 to 1959/60 (Table 1.3 ). The 
exceptionally high growth, while partly reflecting the 
smallness of the initial base, indicated the rapid response 
to the very lucrative investment possibilities created 
by government policies. Most of the investment was 
concentrated in consumer good industries based on agricul­
tural raw materials. Textiles predominated contributing 
nearly 42% of value added in manufacturing in 1954/55 
(Table 1.5). There was also a sharp increase in the share 
of market supplied by domestic production in the case of 
other consumer goods specially food, beverages, footwear, 
clothing, printing and publishing. However the performance 
with respect to investment and intermediate goods industries 
such as rubber products, chemicals, basic metals was poor 
and imports continued to provide the bulk of domestic 
supply.
In contrast to the accelerated development in the 
industrial sector agricultural production stagnated during 
the period. Farm output failed to keep pace with population
lewis has convincingly argued that during the initial years 
government policy was mainly responsible for the transfer of 
income to industry whereas the composition of industrial 
output was determined by non-policy factors such as the 
availability of domestic raw materials, simple technology 
and markets^ (Lewis, 1969, pp. 154-155).
Table 1.3
Annual Ccmpond Growth Rates by Sector at 1959/60 Factor Cost (per cent,
per year) 1949/50 to 1959/60
Agriculture 
Non-agr iculture 
(Large-scale manufacturing) 
GNP
GNP per capita
Pre-Plan
Period
1949/50-
1954/55
1.3
(23.6)
2.6
0.2
First
Plan
1954/55-
1959/60
1.4
(9.3)
2.4
0
1949/50-
1959/60
1.2
(16.3)
2.4
0
Source: T.M.Khan and A.Bergan, "Measurement of Structural Change 
in The Pakistan Economy: A Review of the National Income 
Estimates, 1949/50 to 1963/64",Pakistan Development Review, 
Sumner 1967.
Table 1.4
Percentage Composition of GNP in Pakistan at 1959-60 Constant Factor
Cost
Sectors 1949-50 1954-55 1959-60
Agriculture 60.0 56.0 53.2
Manufacturing 5.8 8.0 9.3
(Large-scale) (1.4) (3.6) (5.0)
(Small-scale) (4.4) (4.4) (4.3)
All Others 34.2 36.0 37.4
Total 100.0 100.0 100.0
Source: Government of Pakistan , Planning Ccmmission,The 
Third Five Five Year Plan, 1965-1970.
36
growth resulting in a decline in agricultural production
per capita. Given the preoccupation with rapid industrial
growth the question of a concerted development effort in
agriculture had been largely neglected. The public sector
allocation to agriculture in the first five year plan
comprising only 7% of the total compared unfavourably to
31% of total development expenditure assigned to industry.^
However substantial amounts were provided for expansion
of irrigation facilities (Water and Power comprised 17%
of development spending in the First Plan) mostly large
2scale, long gestation projects. The increase in irrigated
acreage did not result in a corresponding increase in
cultivated area. Whereas canaj. irrigated land increased
at an annual rate of over 2% in the first decade, cultivated
3
area increased by only 1.22% annually. Yields of all
4crops were stagnant or declining during the period.
The stagnation in agricultural output during the period 
cannot be entirely attributed to unrenumerative prices.
As can be seen from Table 1.2 although relative prices 
of farm products fell dramatically in the early fifties, 
there was a marked rise in the farm/non-farm price ratio
between 1954/55 and 1958. However the improvement in terms
^ Stem and Falcon (1970), p. 68.
3 Stem and Falcon (1970) , p . 68.
3 Hirashima (1969), p. 69.
4 Government of Pakistan, Finance Division, Pakistan Economic 
Survey 1977/78, p. 26.
Table 1.5
Distribution of Value-Added in the Large-scale Manufacturing Sector,
Average of 1954 and 1955
Industry Name % of Gross Value
Sugar manufacturing
Added
4.6
Edible oils 1.7
Tea manufacturing 0.1
Food manufacturing, NEC 1.3
Beverages 1.5
Tobacco manufacturing 5.3
Cotton and other textiles 42.0
Jute textiles 5.6
Silk and artificial silk textiles 2.8
Footwear 2.7
Wood and Furniture 0.2
Paper Manufacturing 1.8
Printing and publishing 3.0
Leather manufacturing 1.6
Rubber and rubber goods 0.8
Fertilizer —
Soaps, perfumes etc. 1.2
Matches 2.7
Chemicals and pharmaceuticals 2.3
Petroleum and coal manufacturing 4.5
Non-metallic mineral manufacturing 4.2
Basic metal industries 2.0
Metal Products 2.7
Machinery except electrical 1.1
Electrical machinery and equipment 0.1
Transport equipment 1.2
Miscellaneous 1.6
Sources S.R.Lewis and R.Soligo, "Growth and Structure Changes in 
Pakistanis Manufacturing Industry, 1954-64", Pakistan 
Development Review , spring 1965.
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trade did not lead to a positive supply response.
The continued low levels of productivity reflected 
to a large extent the absence of any refom of the land 
distribution and tenure system. The agrarian structure 
certainly contained no incentive for yield raising investment 
either on the part of the tenant or the landlord who could 
receive high rents on his vast tracts of land without any 
effort. This fact was officially recognised in the First 
Plan document which singled out the land situation as the 
major obstacle to growth in the farm sector. "The most 
important cause in our view is the uncertainty which 
sorrounds the problem of land tenure as a result of which 
neither the landowners nor the cultivators feel that deep 
attachment to the land which derives from confidence in 
guaranteed possession and in exclusive and continued 
rights to the fruits of investment and labour."^
Thus over the decade while large scale industry 
grew at annual rates of over 16% the yearly growth rate 
in agriculture was only 1.2% (Table 1.3). However the 
dramatic disparity in sectoral growth did not have a 
dampening inpact on the economy till the mid-fifties.
Despite the large weight of agro-processing industry
 ^ Government of Pakistan, Planning Board (1958), p. 19.
and the increase in industrial investment and 
employment, the stagnation in agricultural output did 
not act as a constraint on industrial investment in the 
early fifties. As can be seen from Table 1.6 investment 
in large scale industry in constant prices of 1959/60 
more than tripled between the five year period from 
1950/51 to 1954/55.
Although production was stagnant an increasing
share of the output of cornier cial crops which was
previously processed by the manufacturing sector in
India was now diverted to the requirements of dcreestic 
1industry. Overvaluation of domestic currency along 
with export duty prevented an increase in the price of 
agricultural raw materials, the most important of which 
was cotton (Table 1.7.). Foodgrain prices were kept 
down by the system of compulsory de livery at low control 
prices (Table 1.7.) while at the same time prices of 
manufactured goods rose as a result of the policy of 
strict import controls. Despite the low levels of 
production agriculture was transferring resources to 
industry by an increasing squeeze applied through 
unfavourable terms of trade.
1 Lewis (1967), P- 1155.
Table 1.6
Gross Investment in Large Scale Industry - 1948/49-1958/59 (Constant 
1959-60 prices) (million of rupees)
1948-49 180
1949-50 240
1950-51 300
1951-52 440
1952-53 470
1953-54 720
1954-55 960
1955-56 650
1956-57 500
1957-58 590
1958-59 630
Source: Papanek (1964), p.31.
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Table 1.7
Domestic Wholesale price Indices of Cotton and Wheat in west Pakistan
1951/52-1963/64
(1959/60=100)
1951/52
1952/53
1953/54
1954/55
1955/56
1956/57
1957/58
1958/59
1959/60
1960/61
1961/62
1962/63
1963/64
(1)
Cotton
184.3
84.7 
84.3
87.0 
99.5
98.2
96.8
86.1 
100.0 
108.8 
100.0
96.8
97.2
(2)
Wheat
79.6
115.4
89.7 
69.2 
79.5
94.9
94.9
94.9 
100.0
115.4
107.7 
102.6
112.8
(3)
Manufactured
goods
86.91
92.38
100.97
87.14
86.89
92.16
98.83
95.51
100.0
98.31
99.74
101.29
102.22
*Value added weights
Source: Lewis and Hussain (1967) 
Col. 1 and 2 pp. 44-45; 
Col. 3 p. 64.
However in the raid and late fifties the continued 
structural imbalance in growth, was reflected in a rising 
trend in agriculture’s terras of trade (Table 1.2) and 
a shortage of foreign exchange resources (Table!.20). It 
was the last factor which by limiting the capacity to 
import brought industrial investment to a standstill 
in the late fifties.
Higher foodgrain prices did not lead to a conmensurate 
increase in money wages and thereby to an erosion of industrial 
profits. The infoiraation on wages presented in Table 1.8 
shows that during the four years from 1954 to 1958 there was 
hardly any change in money wages. The average monthly 
money wage for all industries was Rs. 80.52 in 1954 and 
Rs. 84.96 in 1958. While in the case of cotton textiles, 
which in 1958 employed nearly half the total workers in 
large scale industry, ^ the change in monthly money wage 
was even more insignificant increasing from Rs.80.97 
in 1954 to Rs. 81.67 in 1958. The failure of money wages 
to keep pace with the rising price level is reflected in 
the fact that real wages which fell markedly in 1955 never 
recovered to their 1954 level till the end of the decade.
The negative impact of low rates of agricultural 
growth on industrial investment operated through the foreign
1
Government of Pakistan, Central Statistical Office, Census 
of Manufacturing Industry 1958.
Table 1.8
Real Wages, Money Wages and Gross Value Added per Worker 1954^1969/70
Year
Index of 
Real Wages
Monthly Money 
Wages (Rs.)
All Industries
Monthly Money 
Wages (Rs.) 
Cotton Textile 
Industry
Index
Gross
Added
Workei
1954 103.53 80.52 80.87 -
1955 97.30 73.53 80.33 -
1957 97.12 81.32 81.08 -
1958 99.64 84.96 81.67 -
1959/60 100.00 89.23 86.47 100.0
1962/63 91.21 86.29 88.03 101.8
1963/64 92.94 92.43 97.17 110.4
1964/65 105.42 109.66 101.37 132.7
1965/66 109.30 116.25 105.08 148.8
1966/67 104.85 123.67 107.51 146.6
1967/68 105.73 128.58 106.95 158.9
1969/70 116.17 150.59 139.49 167.9
Source: N.Hamid, "The Burden of Captalist Growth", in R.Ahmed 
et al.(eds), Inccsne Inequalities in Pakistan, Lahore, 
1976, p.151.
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exchange constraint. Stagnating farm output reduced 
the argicultural surplus available for export while 
inports of foodgrain to meet domestic consumption 
requirements shot up dramatically. Foodgrain inports 
which were negligible till 1955 comprised nearly one- 
fourth of total imports for the period from 1956 to 
1958 (Table 1.9.). The increased domestic consumption 
of raw cotton caused export receipts to drop from 104.6 
million dollars in 1954/55 to 44.7 million dollars in 
1958/59.1
Although the share of foreign trade in national 
income was low, the level of exchange earnings was of 
crucial importance to the rate of capital foimation due 
to the high import quotient of investment goods. The 
inability to convert rupee resources into foreign machinery 
led to a dramatic deceleration in industrial investment.
Table 1.6 shows that investment in large scale industry 
in contant prices of 1959 /60 fell fran Rs. 96 crores 
in 1954/55 to Rs. 63 crores in 1859/60. In the face of continued 
high profits the reduction in capital foimation was the 
result of supply forces whereby potential investment demand 
was frustrated due to lack of foreign exchange.
* Hasan (1962), p. 51.
Year
1956
1957
1958
Table 1.9
Foodgrain Imports 1956-58 (million Rs.)
Foodgrain Total (1) as percent
Imports Imports of (2)
390 1,986 19.7
546 2,096 26.0
437 1,888 23.1
Source: P.Hasan, Defecit Financing and Capital Formation, Karachi, 
1962.
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THE AYUB MILITARY REGIME 1958-1968 
Power Structure
In contrast to the preceding regime Ayub Khan 
appointed a Land Reioim Commission within four days of the 
military takeover in October *58 and enacted ceiling 
legislation less than three months later in January 1959. 4 
Furthermore certain influential landlords were dis­
qualified from political activity under the Elective Bodies
2
Disqualification Order (EBDO) in August 1959. These 
actions were taken by many observers to indicate a shift 
in the class basis of the state. It was claimed that the 
feudal aristocracy had been shunted out of the political 
arena. The civil-military oligarchy was viewed as primarily
3
representing the interests of the monopoly capitalist,
while in the countryside the locus of power had been shifted
4
to the middle farmers.
The military regime's development strategy assigned
1 West Pakistan Land Reform Regulation, February 7, 1959. 
q
v Under the Elective Bodies Disqualification Order (EBDO) 
any politician found guilty of misconduct, defined loosely 
to incorporate offenses ranging for subversive activity to 
corruption, was disqualified from holding elective office 
until Decentoer 31, 1966. The accused had the option of 
being tried for "misconduct" or disqualifying themselves 
from political activity (the Gazette of Pakistan, 7 August 
1959). The great majority chose the latter option (Ziring, 
1971, p. 14.).
3 Amjad, (1976), pp. 254^255; Rashid (1978), p. 170; Hussain 
(1980), pp. 36, 141.
4 Burki (1976), pp. 307-308; Joshi (1974), p. 171.
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high priority to growth through industrialisation.'1'
However the industrial policy did not derive from the
greater political power of the industrialists during
2
the period. As Sayeed has pointed out political power 
in the absence of governmental position is dependent on 
a social base. The business class were mainly irrmigrants 
from India and had no social base in Pakistan. Hence 
despite the tremendous increase in their economic power 
during the fifties, the industrialists had not produced 
a single politician of note. Their access to the power 
structure was through an alliance with the military 
bureaucratic oligarchy. An alliance in which the military 
was very much the senior partner.
The power of the regime stemmed, first and foremost, 
from the military which assured it a more dominant and
3
autonomous role in the formulation of government policy. 
The military had become extremely powerful by the late 
fifties as a result of a "special relationship" with 
the United States which led to massive doses of technical 
and financial aid. According to Sayeed, the pattern 
of capitalist development was the institutional 
framework favoured by the military elite. However there
 ^ Government of Pakistan, Planning Commission, (1960), p. 14. 
^ Sayeed (1981), p. 5.1.
^ Ibid.
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is no question that US economic assistance and advice, 
at it’s peak during the early years of the Ayub regime, 
greatly facilitated the pattern of development that 
emerged. ^
In the discussion that follows it will be shown 
2
that the claim that the Ayub government significantly 
reduced the political and economic hold of the landed 
elite is not borne out either by an examination of the 
political system adopted by the government or by the 
conservative nature of the land refoim legislation. It 
will also be argued that the argicultural policies pursued 
by the government placed primary reliance on the large 
landowner as the vehicle for the mobilization of the 
productivity potential in the sector.
Ayub fully realized the political expediency of
establishing links between the government and the rural
sector where the majority of Pakistanis lived. Political
power in the countryside was the domain of the landlords.
Ayub introduced a system of indirect elections, Basic 
3
Democracy, with the objective of accommodating this 
group into the political establishment. "It was felt
Laporte (1975), p. 168; Sayeed (1981), p. 51.
2 Amjad (1976), pp. 254-255; Joshi (1974), p. 171.
3
For a detailed account of the Basic Democracy System 
see Sayeed (1961).
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that by mobilizing support from this traditionally 
priviledged section of rural society the regime could 
entrench itself for a long time to come."
2
Murdal has pointed out how the system of Basic
Democracies' further strengthened the position of the local
landlord. Firstly, the smaller electorate was easier to
manipulate. Secondly, the condition that the candidate
had to reside in the locality eliminated any possibility
3
of alternative leadership frcm outside. Evidence on the 
social composition of the Basic Democrats showed .that 62% 
were from the traditional landlord class. In areas where 
the large landlords had been disqualified it was their 
agents who were elected. "Thus in certain areas of West 
Pakistan where large landlords or ex-military officers
4
dominate it has been difficult to find alternate leadership."
5
Maniruzzaman has compared the social backgrounds of members 
of national and provincial assemblies in 1962 and 1965 
with that of assembly members in the pre-military period.
The proportion of landlords in the legislature was 58% as 
compared to 6 8% in the earlier period considered to be the 
heyday of landlord rule.
1 Ayoob (1971), p. 201.
2 Myrdal (1968), p. 11.
3 Khan (1981), p. 168.
^ Sayeed (1961), p. 257.
5 Muniruzzaman (1971), p. 226.
50
These results do not support the thesis of a major 
restructuring of power relations in the country. As Alavi'*' 
aptly points out the system did not bring about a shift in 
political power but a change in it's mode of articulation.
Instead of exercising influence on policy making at the 
national level, the landed elite now affected administration 
locally through elected chairmen who had links with the 
administrative structure as well as the political faction 
at the village level.
Even before any attempts to introduce the elective principle
the conservative character of the land reform enacted by the
government indicated clearly that the objective was to establish
the legitimacy of the military regime rather than to curtail the
2
land monopoly of the rural elite. The generous ceiling of 
500 acres of irrigated land and 1 0 0 0 acres of unirrigated land
3
was applicable on an individual rather than on a family basis.
The ceiling was also fixed in terms of produce index units 
which were based on revenue settlements conducted before 
1947 and thereby considerably underestimated the current 
productivity of land. Allowance of transfer to heirs, gifts
1 Alavi (1976), p. 343.
o , .
The view that the ' 59 land reform made no significant impact
on the distribution of land resources is supported by most 
observers including Sanderatne (1974), pp. 127-128; Hirashima 
(1978), p. 61; Khan (1981), pp. 161-170.
3
Details of the 1959 land reform are provided in West Pakistan 
Land Reforms Regulation, Febuary 7, 1959.
Table 1.10
Appropriation and Distribution of Land by th 1959 Land Reform: West
Pakistan (December 1964)
1. Total Number of Declared Landlords 5,218
a. Affected Landlords 755
b. Unaffected Landlords 4,463
2. Total area Declared (acres) 7,313,940
a. Declared by Affected Landlords 3,986,286
b. Retained by Affected Landlords 1,458,973
c. Alienated to Heirs 309,728
d. Given to Female Dependents 22,281
3. Total Area Appropriated (acres) 2,195,304
a. Produce Index Units 29,131,824
b. Under Cultivation 939,450
c. Not Being Cultivated 1,225,854
i. Culturable Waste 699,438
ii. Forest 196,675
iii. Hill 131,170
iv. River 100,080
v. Other 128,491
4. Total Area Distributed 762,539
a. Sold to Tenants 654,411
b. Sold to Small Owners 25,708
c. Auctioned 85,420
5. Total Number of Beneficiaries 59,468
a. Tenants 56,906
b. Smaller Owner Farmers 2,562
Source: S.Hirashime, Structure of Disparity in Developing 
Agriculture, Tokyo, 1978.
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various exemptions for orchards, mechanized farming were 
also fixed both in terms of acres and produce index units.
It has been estimated that the effective ceiling taking 
advantage of the various exemptions in the PIU's was between 
two thousand to three thousand irrigated acres.^
The ineffectiveness of these land reforms can be judged
by the fact that out of the total of 5218 landlords who
declared land in excess of the ceiling, only 14% actually
surrendered land (Table 1.10).The average holding of the affected
landlords after the transfer of land was estimated at 2372 
2
acres. These figures indicate that the land reforms had a 
negligible impact on the vast land-holdings of the feudals.
Agricultural Policy and Performance
Recognising the structural bottlenecks imposed by a 
stagnating agriculture, the Ayub regime gave high priority to 
the problem of raising farm productivity. The allocation to the 
agricultural sector was increased considerably frcm 7% in the 
first Plan to 13% of total development expenditure in the Second
3
Plan. Primary reliance was placed on a system of incentives, 
comprising of high support prices and input subsidies, to
 ^ Khan (1981), p. 159.
^ Hirashima (1978), p. 61.
3 'Government of Pakistan, Planning Commission, Second Five Year Plan,
(1960), p. 12. ,
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stimulate investment and production in the sector.'1' Prior
to 1959 the foodgrain market was characterized by restrictions
on foodgrain movement, compulsory procurement and price
controls. The Ayub government abolished restrictions on
foodgrain movements and replacement controls by a minimum
2
guaranteed price of Rs. 13.50 per maund of wheat. The 
export tax on cotton was reduced from Rs. 115 per bale in 
1958 to Rs. 25 in 1964/65.^ In addition subsidies were 
provided on nearly all inputs including irrigation water, 
fertilizers and seeds while plant protection was provided 
free of charge.
The performance in the agricultural sector was 
impressive. Compared to a growth rate of 1.2% in the 
previous decade gross product in agriculture increased at 
an annual rate of 3,7% over the period from 1960/61 to 
1969/70 (Table 1.11 ). In the latter half of the sixties 
(1965-70, the Third Plan period) the rate of agricultural 
growth accelerated further, rising as high as 6.5% in the case 
of major crops.
An official assessment of determinants of growth in the
1 Ibid. , P. 404. 
o
Government of Pakistan, Finance Division, Economic Survey, 1961/62, 
pp. 143-144.
Government of Pakistan, Finance Division, Economic Survey, 1964/65, 
p. 15.
5 * f
Table 1.11
Annual Growth Rate of Gross Agricultural Product (GAP): West Pakistan, 
1960/61-1969/70 <1059/60 Constant Prices)
1960/61-
1969/70
1960/61-
1964/65
1965/66-
1969/70
GAP 3.7 3.4 5.5
GAP per capita 1.1 0.9 2.8
Major Crops 4.2 3.9 6.5
Minor Crops 4.3 3.6 7.0
Source: Government Of Pakistan, Pakistan Economic Survey, 
1970/71 and 1971/72
Note: Estimted by log Y=a+bt.
Table 1.12
Source of Increased Output During the Second Plan Period, 1960-65
Groundwater Development
percent
9
Additional Surface Water 4
Fertilizer 5
Plant Protection 4
New Seed 3
Other Factors JL
Total Increase in Output 26
Source: Government of Pakistan, Planning Commission, The 
Third Five Year Plan, 1965.
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period frcm 1960-1965 (Table 1.12.) attributes nearly half
the improvement in farm output to increase in water availability
with tubewell irrigation contributing nearly 70% of the
additional water supply. It is widely agreed that^ tubewell
irrigation, an element not even considered in the official
strategy, was the "leading input" which triggered off the
spurt in agricultural growth in the sixties. There are
various explanations as to what initiated the phenomenal
2
increase in tubewell installations. Hirashima cites the 
desire to escape land refoims legislation as the main
3
motivating factor while Mohammed lays greater emphasis
on the provision of electricity to the rural areas. Whatever
the reason for the initial move, once the landowners
discovered their tremendous productive potential the use
of tubewll irrigation spread dramatically. The purchase
of private tubewdlls increased frcm 3400 in the period 1955-
59 to 25450 in the years frcm 1965-68 (Table 1.14). The abundant and
controlled water supply permitted higher cropping intensities
and greater flexibility with regard to the crops that could
be grown. The timely availability of water was also an
1 The importance of tubewell irrigation as a catalyst in the 
agricultural breakthrough in the sixties was first pointed out 
in the empirical work by Ghulam Mohammed (1965) on the spread 
and productivity potential of tubewells. Other economists 
who have emphasised the crucial role of tubewells as the leading 
input include Alavi (1976); Nulty (1972); Burki (1976).
o
Hirashima (1978), p. 73.
^ Mohammed (1965), p. 43.
^ Ibid., p. 44, Kaneda and Ghaffar (1969), p. 8 .
5 6
Table 1.13
Source of Irrigation in West Pakistan 1948/49-1968/69 (**000 acres)
1948/49 % 1958/59 % 1968/69 %
Government Canal 17,430 82.3 20,911 82.6 21,069 68.1
Private Canal 572 2.7 494 2.0 850 2.7
Tank 21 0.1 146 0.6 29 0.1
Well 2,260 10.7 1,923 7.6 2,204 7.1
Tubewell - - 303 1.2 2,857 9.2
Other 1,531 7.2 1,543 6.1 3,936 12.7
21,171 100 25,320 100 30,945 100
Source: Government of Pakistan, Yearbook of Agriculture Statistics, 
1969.
Table 1.14
Number of Tubewells Purchased in the Four Provinces: West Pakistan
1947-68
1947-54 1955-59 1960-64 1965-68 Total
Punjab 1,030 2,800 23,900 41,300 69,030
NWFP 160 300 710 1,390 2,560
Sind 500 250 580 1,290 2,620
Baluchistan 90 50 260 1,110 1,510
Total 1,780 3,400 25,450 45,090 75,720
Source: Government of Pakistan, A Report on Farm Mechanization Survey, 
1969.
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essential prerequisite to the application of chemical 
fertilizers and high yielding seed varieties.
Thus although seeds and fertilizers were highly
divisible inputs they required supporting tubewells technology.
Furthermore it has been demonstrated that complementarity
of inputs was an essential pre-requisite to realising the
yield potential of the bio-chemical technology. Yields and
income were maximised at higher doses of water and fertilizers
as compared to traditional methods.^ Given these conditions
and the highly skewed access structure of the Pakistani rural
sector it was inevitable that a disproportionate share of the
gains from the technological breakthrough would accrue
2
to the dominant class of large farmers. The superior resource
Nulty (1978), p. 70; Hirashima (1978), p. 78.
2 A contrary view has been put forward by Burki (1976, pp. 307- 311). 
He maintains that it was the middle farmer, defined as owning 
between 50 and 100 acres of land, who responded and benefited 
most frcm the technological developments during the period.
It is further argued that the agricultural policy was a 
response to the growing political power of this group and was 
aimed at strengthening their economic position. While the 
system of Basic Democracies was the vehicle designed for 
their political emancipation.
The question arises as to why the larger, wealthier landowners 
did not respond equally, if not more so, to the very lucrative 
opportunities for agricultural investment at the time. They 
certainly had the capital and influence to ensure easy access 
to modem inputs. The answer, according to Burki, lay in the 
distinctly different objectives of the two class of faimers.
"The rural middle class constituted a social strata different 
from that of the landed aristocracy and it's economic, social 
and political goals and the nature of the constraints facing 
it are not the same as those of the big landlord." The large 
landowner was a "political maximizer" motivated mainly with 
bringing more area under his control and social influence as 
compared to the middle farmer whose objective was to 
maximize economic returns through more intensive cultivation 
of land?
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endowments of this group not only enabled a greater
Burki's claim of the greater productivity of middle sized farms 
rests on two empirical exercises. The first of these is based on 
time series data on rent per acre by size class for 27 villages 
covering the period from 1948/49 to 1968/69. The rent series for 
the size category between 25 to 50 acres registered the largest 
increase over the period followed by size holdings of between 
50-100 acres. On the other hand rent accruing to the largest 
size group between 250-500 acres did not show any significant 
increase after 1959. Using rent as a proxy for land productivity 
Burki concludes that the data substantiates the thesis of the 
greater productivity of middle sized farmers as compared to the 
large landowners.
The second exercise consists of regression analysis based again 
on time series data for the 27 villages. The dependent variable 
is the average per annum rate of growth of crop output while 
percentage of land owned for a specific size class is the 
independent variable. A separate regression was estimated for each 
of the following size categories of farms: 11-25 acres, 26-50 acres, 
101-500 acres, 25-100 acres. The model had the greatest explanatory 
power when the independent variable was the area under size class 
of 25-100 acres. This specification explained more than 8 8% of 
the rate of growth of crop production.
Hussain in a recent study (1980, pp. 142-146), has pointed out 
conceptual and statistical errors in Burki’s empirical work which 
render his conclusions invalid. Firstly he points out that 
Burki !s use of rent as an index of increasing land productivity 
would be valid only under the condition if the increase in rent 
was the result of increased profitability and not due to the 
greater bargaining power of the landlords. Secondly Burki 
derives rent by multiplying physical output received by landlord 
with current average price. Since wholesale food price increased 
by 34% in the sixties, the steady level of money rent for the 
largest size group during the period indicates a decline in 
physical output for which there is no rational reason. Finally 
Burki's data refer to operated holdings and not ownership size 
groups. There is no reason for the two to coincide. On the 
contrary, as Hussain has noted, a landlord owning avoiding of 
50-100 acres is more likely to rent it out in the conventionally 
smaller parcels of 12.5 acres or 25 acres depending on whether 
the tenant owns one or two pair of bullocks.
The limited research on size and productivity in the farm sector 
for Pakistan reveals either a positive association between productivity 
and size (Khan, 1979, p. 76; Hussain, 1980, pp. 270,273) or a U 
shaped land productivity curve where productivity is highest for the 
smallest and largest size groups (Mahmood and Haq, 1980, p. 186). 
However large farms are classified as holdings of 25 acres or more 
in the Khan study and as holdings of greater than 50 acres in the 
Mahmood and Haq paper whereas Burki defines middle farmers as owning 
land between 50 to 100 acres. The findings of the only work with 
roughly similar classification (Hussain, 1980, pp. 270-273) show 
that both use of modem inputs and gross yield per acre are positively 
related to farm size.
Finally the suggestion that the indirect elections resulted in a 
restructuring of the power in the countryside in favour of the middle 
farmers is disproved by evidence provided earlier on the continued 
representation of the landed aristocracy in the political arena.
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capacity to take risks but also to combine the inputs in 
amounts necessary to optimize returns.
Evidence about the diffusion of technology for Pakistan
reveals a fairly widespread adoption of inproved seeds and
fertilizers although the intensity of fertilizer use per acre
1was significantly higher for large farms. Even more important
was the differential in access to tubewell irrigation by farm size.
2
The Farm Mechanization Survey of 1968 shows a large concentration 
of tubewells in farms of 25 acres or more. Nearly 69% of the 
total belonged to this category while only 4% were owned by 
farms of less than 13 acres (Table 1.15 ) . The distribution of 
tractors was even more skewed with 74% of the total concentrated 
in farms of fifty acres or more.
The negative distributive effects of the technology derived 
from the initial inequality in distribution of resources was 
further accentuated by the agricultural policies pursued by the 
Ayub regime. Public resources in the agricultural sector were 
mainly concentrated in maintaining high procurement prices, low 
rates of institutional credit, and subsidies on inputs such
3
as fertilizers, canal water, tubewells etc. Although there 
was no direct subsidy on tractor purchase, duty free imports 
at the official exchange rate meant that cost per tractor horsepower
Khan (1975), pp, 112-115; Ercelawn (1979), p.23IACA-IBRD (1966), 
pp. 84, 105.
2
Government of Pakistan, Central Statistical Office (1968),
3 Government of Pakistan, Planning Coirmission (1960), p. 404.
Table 1.15
Distribution of Tubewells and Tractors by Size of Holdings: West
Pakistan 1968
Size of Holdings 
(acres)
Number of 
Tractors %
Number of 
Tubewells %
0 574 3 4,680 7
-13 450 3 3,320 4
14-25 1,025 6 15,240 20
26-50 2,326 14 18,050 24
51-100 3,407 21 14,240 19
101-200 3,094 19 9,120 12
201-500 3,238 19 5,550 7
500- 2,469 15 5,520 7
16,583 100 75,720 100
Source: Government of Pakistan, A Report on Farm Mechanization 
Survey, 1969.
Table 1.16
Number of Tractors Working in Irrigated and Unirrigated Area: West
Pakistan 1968
Irrigated Area Tractors % Unirrigated Area Tractors %
Canal & Tubewell 10,323 62 Barani 239 2.0
Tubewell 1,685 10 Salabi 24 0.5
Well 114 1 Others 161 1.0
Karez 76 0.5
Perennial Canal 3,338 20
Inundation Canal 623 4
Source: Government of Pakistan, Report on Farm Mechanization Survey, 
1969.
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was less in Pakistan than in the country of origin.'*' Access
to these subsidised inputs and thereby the benefits of the
incentive strategy was directly determined by the influence
and financial position of the farmer which in turn was strongly
o
related to the control of land resources.
Evidence on the distribution of credit indicates that
access to the subsidised credit provided by the government
sponsored Agricultural Development Bank during the period was
3
limited to farms of 25 acres or more. The various modifications 
in collateral requirements were not effective in ensuring a 
wider; dispersion of credit. The highly discriminating attitude 
of credit agencies against small farms, specially with respect 
to loans for durable goods, has been noted by Yousaf and Gotsch.
"Eor years Pakistani cultivators who owned less than 25 acres 
could not obtain funds to purchase a tubewell. This despite 
the fact that the collateral represented by their land-holdings 
was more than that required to guarantee the costs of the 
well. The reasoning of officials who were responsible for 
the regulation was that a tubewell obviously had the capacity 
to irrigate two or three times that much land and thus the 25
Base and Clark (1969), p. 284,
2
The negative distributional inpact of the incentive strategy 
and technological developments in the sixties have been stressed 
by Yousaf and Gotsch (1975); Amjad (1972); Alavi (1976); Gotsch 
(1976); Ealcon (1970); Nulty (1972); Kaneda (1969); and Khan (1975).
3 Gotsch (1976), p. 372.
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acre holding was clearly too small."'*'
Large fanners were also the main beneficiaries of the
policy of high procurement prices and subsidised inputs.
2
Studies on the distribution of fertilizers confirm that in a 
situation of excess demand at the low price the influential 
upper strata are able to appropriate the bulk of supply.
High support prices also confer disproportionate benefits to 
large farmers who on the basis of available evidence market 
a far greater proportion of their output as compared to their 
smaller counterparts, finally the large farmer bias is most 
obvious in the policy of maintaining artifically low prices 
of tractors whose use is almost entirely confined to farms 
of 50 acres or more. As can be seen in Table 1.15., 74% 
of the tractors were owned by holdings in this size group.
The developments during the sixties, in certain ways, 
increased the dependence of small faimers and tenants on the 
wealthy landowners. The resumption of land for self cultivation 
and increase in the size of the mechanized farm sector led to 
increased vulnerability of the lower strata of rural society.
1
Yousaf and Gotsch (1975), p. 97.
2 Dalrymple (1975), pp. 3-17.
3
Ercelawn (1980), pp. 236-237; Government of Pakistan, Ministry 
of Food and Agriculture (1976), p. 6 ; Raquibuzzaman (1966), p. 381.
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1
Evidence for the Punjab based on a comparison of Census 
data for 1962 and 1972 shows a shaip rise in landlessness 
and marginal farms. Also the tenants and small owners became 
more dependent on the influence of large landowners for 
procuring modern inputs in supply scare conditions. The 
latter's direct control of inputs such as water further 
strengthened their hold on the less priviledged groups.
The landlords emerged economically stronger with 
their power undiminished by the institutional changes and 
technological developments in the sixties. They continued to 
exert strong influence on government and administration and 
were successfully able to resist any pressure which would 
affect their interests.
The reversal of the government attitude towards tractor-
isation serves to illustrate the ability of the rural elite
to manipulate public policy to their advantage. The Pakistan
2
Agricultural Enquiry report of 1951/52 had cautioned against 
the widespread inports of tractors because of their labour 
displacing and foreign exchange using qualities. By 1960
3
the Food and Agriculture Corrmission re-examined the case
Hussain (1980), pp. 203-209.
2
Ministry of Food and Agriculture (1952), p. 1 1 .
3
Food and Agriculture Commission (1960), p . 106-108.
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for tractor mechanization. This time the response was 
favourable and the output increasing effects were emphasized. 
ffom 1952 tractors could only be imported under the ccmnercial 
license scheme through established agents. By 1961, however, 
there was a change in this policy tractors could now be imported 
on Open General License whereby anyone wanting to import them 
was alloted foreign exchange.4 The cost of imports was 20-30% 
less under this scheme as compared to the ccmnercial license 
scheme.^
Ihe availability of institutional credit at very low 
interest rates also played a major role in the spread of 
tractors. In 1964/65 a third of all loans granted by the 
government sponsored Agricultural Development Bank were for
3
purchases of tractors and other mechanical equipment.
The number of tractors purchased increased from 667 in the
period frcm 1955-59 to 4031 in the four years from 1960-1964
(Table 1.17-.). Heavy subsidy on tractor use was directed
towards the landed elite. Trie concentration of tractor ownership
can be guaged fran the fact that holdings of 100 acres or more
4represented 86.5% of the total area in the mechanized sector.
4 Government of Pakistan, finance Division, Economic Survey 1961/62, 
p. 29.
^ Hirashima (1978) , p . 75.
3
Government of Pakistan, Ministry of Food and Agriculture, 
Agricultural Statistics 1967, p. 202,
4 Alavi (1976), p. 339.
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Table 1.17
Number of Tractors Purchased in Four Provinces: West Pakistan 1947-1968
Province 1947-54 1955-59 1960-64 1965-68 Total
Punjab 233 472 2,949 11,369 15,023
NWFP 31 49 184 755 1,019
Sind 69 122 849 1,519 2,559
Baluchistan 11 24 49 224 308
Total 344 667 4,031 13,867 18,909
Source: Government of Pakistan, A Report on Farm Mechanization 
Survey, 1969.
Table 1.18
Direct Agriculture Taxes 1959/60-1968/69
Proportion of Proportion
Agricultural of Provincial
Income Taxes
Years
1959/60 2.2 -
1960/61 2.0 60.8
1961/62 1.8 50.5
1962/63 1.7 46.7
1963/64 1.6 44.3
1964/65 1.5 41.0
1965/66 1.6 39.8
1966/67 1.2 36.2
1967/68 1.2 37.3
1968/69 1.2 46.4
Source: J.Hamid "Suggested Approach to Agriculture Taxation Policy 
in West Pakistan",Pakistan Development Review, 1974.
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Similarly the influence of the landlord lobby on
the setting of procurement prices has been noted by a number
of observers.^ Hence the support price of wheat was raised
frcm Rs. 13-50 per maund to Rs. 17 in 1967 despite the
unanimous opposition by economists and planners who felt that
a much lower price of Rs. 15 would have been more than sufficient
to maintain incentives for the spread of the new technology.
In the words of a then member of the Planning Commission
"providing these windfall gains to essentially prosperous
farmers was totally unjustified socially, particularly
because mobilization of the additional income in the foxm
2
of a tax on agriculture proved very difficult."
Despite the tremdous gains accruing to the landed elite 
the government was unwilling to tax agricultural income on 
some feeble pretext or the other —  whether it was administrative 
inconvenience or the disincentive effect on production. The 
report of the Taxation Enquiry Committee presented to the Ayub 
government in 1960 clearly stated that the burden of direct
3
taxes on the agricultural sector was inadequate. The committee 
strongly recommended that the present system of levy surcharges
1 Gotsch (1976), p. 259; Nulty (1972), p. 96; Hasan (1976), p. 236.
2 Hasan (1976), p. 236.
2 Government of Pakistan (1960), p. 39.
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on land revenue be abolished and replaced by an effective 
tax on agricultural income subject to a progressively rising 
rate.1 In spite of the urgent emphasis on this proposal and 
the subsequent sharp increases in agricultural output and 
prices, no attempt was made to refoim the system of 
agricultural taxation. Ihe ratio of direct taxes to income 
in the agricultural sector continued to decline during the 
sixties falling from a low level of 2.2% in 1959/60 to 
1.2% by the end of the decade (Table 1.18
A more detailed discussion of the determinants of public 
policy with respect to prices and taxes in the farm sector is 
presented in chapters 4 and 5 of this thesis.
Development Strategy, Industrial Growth, Savings and Capital 
fbimation
The approach to agricultural development reflected the
overall development strategy of the government which was to
create a favourable environment for private investment through
a system of concessions and subsidies. Direct investment in
industry by the public sector was to be undertaken "only in those
activities which are not ordinarily developed with private
capital and where on present indication private investment was not 
2
forthcoming'1 . Industrialisation was to proceed under private
Government of Pakistan (1960), pp. 112-115.
2
Government of Pakistan, Planning Commission (1960), p.8.
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initiative with the state providing "maximum encouragement."
The approach was essentially a continuation of the 
strategy initiated in the fifties whereby industrial growth, 
savings and capital formation were to be achieved by a transfer 
of income to the capitalist class through a host of government 
policies. In the Ayub period these incentive measures included 
protection from foreign competition, an overvalued currency, 
nominal tariffs on imports of industrial raw materials and 
machinery, low rates of direct taxes, liberal depreciation 
allowances, low interest loans frcm government sponsored credit 
agencies and the absence of any anti-monopoly legislation.^
furthermore in contrast to the fifties when stagnation 
in agriculture had a constraining effect on industrial investment, 
the sixties were characterized by a tremendous improvement in 
farm productivity. However the high growth rates in agricultural 
output did not lead to favourable relative prices for 
manufactured products. The intersectoral teims of trade which 
had started moving against industry in the mid-fifties continued 
to shift in favour of agriculture (Table 1. 2 ).
High food prices were not translated into higher wages 
and thereby an erosion of industrial profits. Infoimation on 
real wages, money wages and labour productivity is provided
^ Griffin and Khan (1972), pp. 13-14.
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in Table 1.8. The data show that there was little change in 
money wages and a continued deterioration in real wages in the 
early sixties. Following increased labour unrest'*' and 
substantial improvements in labour productivity, money wages 
were raised in 1965 by 19% for all industries. The resulting 
positive trend in real wages was reversed in the subsequent 
period when money wages again lagged behind price changes 
leading to declining real wages till 1968. The decreasing 
share of wages in industrial income can be gauged frcm the 
fact that over the period from 1959/60 to 1967/68 the index 
of real gross value-added per worker increased by 59% while 
monthly real wages went up by only 6%.
Moreover the shortage of foreign exchange, a major
bottleneck to the expansion of industrial investment in the
late fifties, was no longer a limiting factor due partly to
rapid agricultural growth and subsequent increase in export
earlings but mainly due to the massive inflow of foreign
assistance during the period. Foreign aid increased threefold
between 1960 and 1964 rising from 3.4% of GNP to 7.5% (Table 1^21).
Export earnings registered an annual growth rate of 7% during
2
the Second Plan period exceeding the plan target. The main 
boost to earnings came from agricultural commodities with
According to information compiled by CSO (Pakistan-Twenty Five Years 
in Statistics, 1972, pp. 38-39) the number of industrial disputes 
increased from 45 in 1961 to 87 and 153 in 1963 and 1964.
2
Government of Pakistan, Planning Commission (1965), p. 81.
Table 1.19
West Pakistan Exports,1955-68
Value in Rs. 
figures in brackets are 
percentages.
Annual Growth 
Rate
1955 1959 1964/65 1967/68 1955-67/68
Rice 59 52 119 149 7.7
(9) (9.7) (10.4) (9)
Raw and waste Cotton 406 127 316 442 .7
(64) (24) (28) (27)
Raw Wool and Other
Raw Wool and Other
Animal Hair 67 62 70 43 -3.5
(10.6) (11.6) (6.1) (2.6)
Fish Fresh Dried
Proccessed 5 6 41 45 19.2
(.7) (1) (4) (2.7)
Other Primary
Goods 38 46 137 176 13.1
(6) (8.7) (12) (11)
Primary Commodities 575 303 638 855 3.2
(91) (57) (60) (52)
Cotton Textiles 8 146 271 422 37.2
(1) (27) (24) (30)
Other Textiles 5 12 34 128 29.6
(.7) (2.2) (3) (6.8)
Tanned Leather and
Leather Goods 17 38 73 113 16.4
(3) (7) (6) (7)
Metal Goods 10 11 28 32 9.8
(1.5) (3.1) (2) (2)
Cement and Cement
Manufactures 1 - - 10 20.2
(.1) (.6)
Other Manufactured
Goods 14 21 51 85 15.5
(2.2) (4) (4.4) (5)
Manufactured
commodities 55 228 457 790 23.8
(8.7) (43) (40) (48)
Total Exports 630 531 1140 1645
Source: G.C.Hufbauer, "West Pakistan Export: Effective Taxation
Policy, Protection and Sectoral Discrimation" in W.P.Falcon 
and G.F.Papanek (eds.), Development Policy II The Pakistan 
Experience.
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manufacturing sector contributing little to the expansion 
in exports. The contribution of primary commodities to exchange 
earnings increased from 57% in 1959/60 to 60% in 1964/65 while 
foodgrain imports declined (Table 1.19).
Despite the exceptional export performance, the balance of 
payments gap widened dramatically over the period as a result 
of the sharp increase in imports (Table 1.20 ). The rapid 
increase in imports, conconmitant of the ambitious development 
program, was made possible due to a large inflow of foreign
assistance. Table 1 . 2 D -reveal s the increasing dependence of the 
economy on foreign aid. Thus while foreign aid financed 18.6% 
of total imports and 34.8% of development expenditure in 1956, 
the corresponding proportions for 1964 were 55.8% and 42.2% 
respectively.
The relaxation of the foreign exchange constraint and 
the continuing high rates of profits, largely attributable 
to government policies, gave a powerful impetus to industrial 
investment. In teims of 1959/60 prices private investment 
nearly doubled from Rs. 1720 in 1959/60 to Rs. 3320 in 1964/65 
(Table 1.23 ) overshooting the Second Plan target. Public 
investment also increased significantly over the period. Total 
gross investment reached it's highest ever level in 1964/64 
when it was 23.2% of OSIP (Table 1.24).
Table 1.20 
Balance of Trade 1959/60-1969/70
(million Rs.)
Year Imports Exports Balance
1958/59 1,024.6 444.4 -580.2
1959/60 1,805.7 763.1 -1,042.6
1960/61 2,173.2 540.2 -1,633.0
1961/62 2,236.3 542.9 -1,693.4
1962/63 2,800.1 998.1 -1,802.0
1963/64 2,981.6 1,075.0 -1,906.6
1964/65 3,672.4 1,139.6 -2,532.8
1965/66 2,880.3 1,203.6 -1,676.7
1966/67 3,625.7 1,297.3 -2,328.4
1967/68 3,327.2 1,644.8 -1,682.4
1968/69 3,046.6 1,699.9 -1,346.7
1969/70 3,285.1 1,608.6 -1,676.5
Source: Government of Pakistan, Economic Survey, 1976/77.
Table 1.21
Foreign Aid Compared with Incane, Development Expenditure and Imports
1952 1956 1960 1964 1968
Foreign Aid (Rs.million) 5 472 1068 3105 3577
Proportion of GNP (%) .02 2.1 3.4 7.5 5.8
Proportion of Development 
Expenditure (%) .5 34.8 38.1 42.2 34.0
Proportion of Inports (%) .1 18.6 31.1 55.8 49.8
Source: B.M.Bhatia, Pakistan Economic Development, New Delhi, 1979
Table 1.22
Foreign Economic Assistance (dollars millions),1950-1968
Period Total Grants Loans
Pre-plan (1950-1955) 371 67% 33%
First Plan (July 1955-
June 1960) 990 58% 42%
Second Plan (July 1960-
June 1965) 2,377 14% 86%
Third Plan (July 1965-
December 1968) 1,770 6% 94%
Source: Government of Pakistan,Economic Survey, 1968/69.
Table 1.23
Relative Share of Public and Private Fixed Investment 
(Million Rs) (1959-60 prices)
Annual Compound 
Rate of Growth
Type of Investment 1949-50 1954-55 1059-60 1964-65
(Million Rs. : 1959-60 prices)
Public Investment 310 610 1,710 3,070 16.5
Private Investment 810 1,590 1,720 3,320 9.9
Total Investment 1,120 2,200 3,430 6,390 12.3
Public Investment as 
percent of Total In­
vestment 28 28 50 48
Source: Government of Pakistan, Third Five YEar Plan, 1965.
Large scale industry recorded growth rates of 16.9% 
over the plan period despite the much greater value of the base. 
Although output of Intermediate and Investment goods sectors 
increased at higher than average rates during the early sixties, 
the manufacturing sector continued to be dominated by consumer 
gpods industries. Hence by 1964/65, despite the tremendous 
expansion in industrial output, domestic production provided 
only 22% of the total supply of machinery (including electrical), 
24% of transport equipment and 44% of basic metals and metal 
products.^
The economic performance in the Second Plan was widely 
acclaimed as a tremendous achievement despite the failure to 
develop a balanced industrial structure. The capacity to 
import continued to be a limiting factor to capital formation.
The easy availability of aid made it possible to avoid politically 
difficult issues which were crucial to any long teim sustained 
development effort. Thus there was no rigorous attempt at 
mobilizing domestic resources or to move beyond the consumer 
gpods oriented industrial structure.
The fragile base of the "spectacular growth" was exposed 
at the end of the Second Plan period when following the ' 65 War 
the flow of foreign aid was sharply curtailed. The rate of
Lewis (1969), p. 124.
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investment dropped dramatically from 23.2% of the GNP in 
1964/65 to 17.7% in the following year. As a result of a marked 
fall in faim output in the two successive drought years of 
1965/66 and 1966/67, there was a steep increase in the import 
of foodgrains. In 1966/67 the share of foodgrains in total 
imports was second only to that of machinery.'1' The ratio of 
gross investment to GNP continued to decline throughout the 
Third Plan period (Table 1.24 ). Whereas private fixed 
investment in current prices increased at an annual rate 
of less than 1%, the overall price index rose by more than 
20% over the period implying a significant decrease in 
investment in real terms.^
The deceleration in the pace of industrial growth was less 
marked. Value-added in industry increased at the rate of 10.1% 
per annum as compared to 16.9% over the Second Plan. However, 
at a more disaggregared level, the progress of intermediate and 
investment good industries was considerably below average.
Thus for the period from 1963/64 to 1970/71 while the growth 
rate in the consumer goods sector was 11% (compared to the 
overall average of 9%), the output of intermediate goods 
increased at an annual rate of 5.7% while the investment goods 
sector grew at the rate of only 1.7% per annum (Table 1.-25 ).
1
Government of Pakistan, Economic Survey 1967/68, p. 135,
2
Government of Pakistan, Planning Commission, Fourth Five Year Plan,
(1970)? p. 79.
Table 1.24
Investment and Savings Fatia - 1960/61-1969/70 
(Current prices)
(percent)
Gross Domestic Savings
Year Gross I/GNP /GDP
1960/61 16.1 8.5
1961/62 18.7 10.5
1962/63 21.7 13.9
1963/64 20.6 12.9
1964/65 23.2 12.8
1965/66 17.7 11.9
1966/67 17.9 11.8
1967/68 17.0 11.4
1968/69 16.8 13.5
1969/70 15.9 12.7
Source: S.M.Naseem, Underdevelopment, Poverty and Inequality 
in Pakistan, Lahore, 1982.
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Hence, in 1970 out of the total value-added in the manufacturing 
sector 80% was attributable to consumer goods, 7% to inter­
mediate goods and 13% to investment goods (Table 1.26 ). As much 
as 82% of the total availability of machinery and transport 
equpiment continued to be supplied by imports.^ After twenty 
years of "spectacular1' industrial growth the country had not 
proceeded far beyond import substitution in consumer goods.
Power, in an article written in the early sixties, had
warned against exactly this difficulty of moving automatically
frcm a strategy of consumer oriented inport substitution to a
more diversified expansion of industry. "There is no natural,
spontaneous evolution from the kind of ’hot house’ industrial
growth induced by shutting out imports to this kind of
2permanent, self-sustained growth."
However the government did not take any concrete measures 
to channelize investment into the production of capital goods, 
despite the emphasis on paper on the necessity to develop this 
sub-sector. In the words of the Second Plan: "Industrial policy 
must take into account and alleviate the present shortage of 
goods required to meet immediate needs, the ground must also be 
prepared now for production of all types of machinery, tools
 ^ Guisinger (1977), p. 17. 
^ Power (1963), p. 15.
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Table 1.25
Anuual Rates of Growth for Manufacturing and its Principal Subsectors:
West Pakistan 1963/64-1970/71
* *
1964/64-1070/71 1959/60- 1964/65-
1964/65 1969/70
Sectors Current prices Constan prices
Consumer Goods 14.5 11.0
Intermediate Goods 11.2 5.7
Investment Goods 7.2 1.7
Total Large-scale
Manufacturing 12.9 9.0 16.9 10.1
Source: Growth rates for the period from 1963/64 are taken from 
S.Guisinger, "Patterns of Industrial Growth", Pakistan 
Development Review, 1977; growth rates for the periods 
from 1959/60-1964/65 and from 1964/65 to 1969/70 are taken 
from S.Haq, "Patterns of Industrialization in Pakistan", 
in E.A.G. Robinson and M.Kidron (eds.), Economic Development 
in South Asia, 1970.
*figures refer to Pakistan and are in 1959/60 constant prices.
Table 1.26
Structure of West Pakistan's Manufacturing Sector: 1970
Sector Share in Value Added Import as share
of total supplies
% %
Consumer Goods 80 6
Intermediate Goods 7 58
Investment Goods 13 63
Source: S.Guisinger, "Patterns of Industrial Growth",Pakistan 
Development Review, 1977.
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and equipments and of basic metals needed as raw materials
1for producer goods."
The Third Plan stressed the importance of raising the
level of investment and production in the capital goods sector
in stronger terms. Thus one of the principal objectives of
the plan was to "develop basic industries for the manufacture
of producer goods so that the requirements of further
industrialization can be met mainly from the country's own 
q
capacity.''
In practice nothing tangible was done to achieve a more 
diversified industrial structure. The differentiated tariff 
structure, initiated in the early fifties, gave greater protection 
to consumer goods relative to the production of intermediate and 
investment goods. rIhe bias in tariff policy against investment 
gpods became even more pronounced during the sixties. Moreover 
although it was claimed in plan documents that "the first 
important element in the strategy of industrialisation is to
4shift emphasis from consumer goods to capital goods industry",
 ^ Ihe Second Plan (1960), p. 220.
2 The Third Plan (1965), p. 39.
2 lewis (1969), p . 75.
4
Government of Pakistan, Planning Commission (1965), p. 447.
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the public sector allocations to heavy industry were not 
only modest but the implementation was even more half­
hearted. In the private sector, allocations under this 
head were meant to serve as rough guidelines the actual 
sanctions were determined by market priorities, and profits.
Thus in the Third Plan ^ ile the initial allocation for 
capital goods was nearly 30% of the planned expenditure on 
industry, this share was reduced to 20% in the revised 
estimates of spending following the cut in foreign aid.
At the final stage, the proportion of actual investment in 
the capital gpods sub-sector to total investment sanctioned
1to industry in the first four years of the plan was only 5.8%.
The industrial structure at the end of the sixties was 
not only grossly lopsided but was also characterized by 
excess capacity and highly capital intensive techniques.
These inefficiencies are widely agreed to be the result of 
the government policy of maintaining artificially low price of 
capital through measures such as cheap credit, overvalued
a. 2currency etc.
Government of Pakistan, Planning Commission (1970), p. 35.
^ Soligp and Stem (1965); Islam (1967).:
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The highly inefficient industrialisation was achieved 
at a great social cost in terras of a tremendous increase in the 
concentration of resources in the sector. In the words of the 
Fourth Five Year Plan document: "the cost of development under
this strategy for the private sector continued to rise. The 
cost is to be measured in terms of maldistribution of income 
in the economy, concentration of ownership and economic power 
and growing social tensions."'*' Evidence on the increased 
concentration of wealth in the industrial sector provided
2by the Chief Economist of the Planning Oonmission in 1968
revealed that twenty two families owned 8C% of the banking
business and 6 6% of the industrial assets of the country.
The basis of Haq's estimates although never clearly specified,
was supposed to be a report of a study group on monopolies
in 1964. An alternate estimate based on data for 1970 also
indicates a high degree of concentration though not as high
as Haq's figures. According to the study, the twenty largest
industrial families controlled 36% of all Pakistani manufacturing
assets and more than half of all manufacturing assets listed on
3the stock exchange. The monopoly power of this' group was 
further buttressed by their control of three of the four largest 
banks in the country accounting for over three-fourths of total
1 Fourth Plan (1970), p. 8 .
2
Business Recorder (1968), p. 1.
3 White (1974), p. 65.
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deposits.'*'
The inequities inherent in the development strategy
had been anticipated by the planning body and had been
justified as an inevitable cost of growth. The official
view has been put forward by Haq, the then chief economist
and a major proponent of the growth strategy, as follows:
1 'Underdeveloped countries must consciously accept a philosophy
of growth and shelve for the distant future all ideas of
equitable distribution and welfare state. It should be
recognized that these are luxiries which only developed
2countries can afford." Ihe basic premise of the strategy 
was that only by transferring income to the saving sector, 
in this case the industrialists and the rural elite, could 
the level of capital formation be raised to a level 
concomitant with development.
In this context public savings could only have a subsidiary 
role. The policy required that direct taxes be kept at low 
level so as not to dampen private initiative while the revenue 
needs of the government had to be met mainly through indirect 
taxes. Ihe Second Plan document justified the openly regressive 
tax policy in terms of the objective of raising the rate of savings.
Ibid., p . 74.
2 Haq (1963), p. 30.
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"In order to achieve the high rate of marginal savings 
required for the plan reliance will be placed on indirect 
taxes, particularly consumption taxes which should capture 
a significant proportion of the increasing average incomes 
in the country.. .direct taxes cannot be made more progressive 
without affecting the incentive to work and save."'*'
The strategy, however failed in terms of it's own criteria 
since it did not succeed in achieving any significant acceler­
ation in the rate of domestic savings. Gross domestic savings 
as a proportion of GNP increased fran 8.5% in 1959/60 to 
13.9% in 1962/63 (Table It24 ). Thereafter there was a 
steadily declining trend till 1968/69. Hence even during 
the early sixties while investment had increased appreciably 
the ratio of savings to GNP had been more or less stagnant at 
12%. Even this low figure overstated the actual rate. As 
Griffin and Khan have pointed out the procedure of computing 
domestic savings as the difference between investment and 
foreign assistance, the latter being assessed at the
artificially low official exchange rate, biased upwards the
2estimate of domestic savings. Griffin has shown further that 
the annual private savings rate in directly productive activities
3
was little moie than 3.3% during the Second Plan.
■*■ Second Plan (1960) , p . 49.
2 Griffin and Khan (1972), p. 192.
2 Griffin (1965), p. 43.
8*f
Hence the development strategy did not lead to either 
.an industrial structure capable of providing the foundation 
for long term sustained growth or to an adequate level of 
savings, while the benefits of the higher income generated 
during the period have been mainly confined to the large 
landowners in the rural areas and the industrialists in the 
urban sector. Real wages of industrial workers were either 
stagnant or falling.'*' With respect to changes in the distri­
bution of income, the available research does not provide
2
any conclusive answers. At any rate these studies are based 
on survey data which is known to substantially under-estimate 
the income of the upper income brackets. Ihe use of income 
tax returns in conjunction with survey data to compensate 
for this tinder-representation of high income groups, still 
does not solve the problem of agricultural incomes and tax 
evasion.
Given this short caning, recent research on distributional 
questions based on survey data has been concerned with determining 
the changes in living standard of the poorest strata of society 
rather than a comparison of relative incane changes between the 
higher and lower incane groups. Naseem's study, the pioneering 
work on the measurement of poverty for Pakistan, confirms the 
expectation that the rapid growth in aggregate income during the 
sixties did not lead to any significant alleviation in the extent
1 Khan (1967), p. 236; Hamid (1976), pp. 151-152.
2 Azfar (1973), pp. 43-69; Khandker (1973), pp. 70-100; Suleman (1 9 7 3) j
pp. 101-118.
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of poverty.^- With respect to the rural sector, the
results of the work are summarized as follows by the author:
"About 25-40 per cent of the people in the 1960's - the
decade of development - lived in abject poverty and another
25-30 per cent, perhaps, lived a little better, but not much
above the subsistence level. As to the trends over time,
our results say that the percentage, declined from 43.1 to
26.0; so did the absolute number of people living under
conditions of abysmal poverty from 16.7 million in 1963/64
to 11.5 million in 1969/70. But if a little more liberal
interpretation of poverty were given, then although the
proportion of the poor in total population remained stable,
the numbers increased from 23.46 million in 1963/64 to 26.51
million in 1969/70. These figures do vividly convey the
2
extent of rural poverty in Pakistan". The trend in poverty
in the urban sector was roughly similar and was also very
3
sensitive to the choice of a poverty line. There was a
reduction in the number of people falling below the poverty
line in the early sixties followed by an increase in the 
incidence of poverty in the late sixties.
Evidence on changes in the agrarian structure provides
 ^ Naseem (1973), p. 125.
^ Naseem (1973), pp. 125-126.
3
The poverty line denotes some minimum level of income required 
to cover basic needs such as housing, clothing as well as sane 
minimum dietary intake.
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further support to the thesis of a deterioration in the
relative economic position of the poor strata in the rural
sector. The structural changes in operational holdings during
the sixties have been analysed in seme recent studies^ based on
a comparison of the Agricultural Censuses of 1960 and 1972.
The findings of the research show an increase in concentration
of land use. Resumption of lands from tenants and renting
in of land frcm small owners have been the main factors
responsible for the increased skewedness of the distribution
of operational holdings. The growing inequality in the access
structure of land resources was manifested in the dramatic
growth in the incidence of landlessness over the inter-
censal period. It has been estimated, on the basis of Census
data, that the number of landless households increased by 168%,
with nearly 43% of the increase coming from other sectors of
2
the rural population. An alternative source places the estimated 
increase in landless labour households even higher at 384% 
raising the share of this group to nearly one-third of total
3
rural households.
Given the fact that the propertied classes in both the 
sectors were the main beneficiaries of Ayub's development
 ^ Hussain (1980) ; Khan (1981); Naseem (1982). 
^ Hussain (1980), p. 183.
Naseem (1982), p. 175.
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1
program, there seems no valid basis for the suggestion
that the alliance between the landlords and the bourgeoisie
was breaking down. It has been further claimed that the
"disenchanged" landlords were joining the anti-government
party, Bhutto’s PPP, in large numbers towards the end of 
2
Ayub's era. However as the above discussion has made 
clear the rural and urban elites were thriving under Ayub’s 
regime. While the monopoly industrialists were reaping high 
profits the large landowners were gaining from the combined 
effect of technology, public subsidies and inadequate 
taxation. Government policies were channelizing resources 
to the upper stratum of the two sectors, there was no conflict 
between the leading classes as to who should bear the greater 
cost of growth. The burden of development, in terms of current 
deprivation, was borne by the underpriviledged sections of 
society.
3
Moreover, it has been pointed out that policies during 
the period brought the ruling classes into closer links with 
each other and the civi 1-mi lit ary oligarchy, firstly, inter­
marriages between these three powerful groups became very 
comnon. Secondly, members of the bureaucratic and military 
elite had acquired substantial lands under concessionary rates.
^ Hussain (1980), p. 35.
2 Eashid (1978), p. 170.
3 Alam (1974), p. 18.
Thirdly, due to enhanced and tax free profits in agriculture, 
the urban industrialists invested part of their profit into 
acquisition of vast tracts of land for commercial farming or 
symbolic (status purposes).
Bhutto's rhetoric by highlighting the problems of income
distribution and social justice further united the propertied
classes by the threat against their priviledged position.
Only member's of Bhutto's landlord faction in Sind and lesser
known middle-sized landowners joined the PPP during the Anti-
Ayub movement.^ It was only after the Election victory in
1970 that Punjab's feudal aristocracy joined the party in
large numbers thereby continuing their tradition of supporting
the government in power. "The elites cooperated with Ayub
almost to a man —  as indeed they had with the Mughal, Sikh,
2
British and pre-Ayub Pakistani regimes."
1 Lodhi (1980), p. 394.
^ Laporte (1975), p. 127.
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CHAPTER II 
POLITICAL ECONOMY OF THE BHUTK) PERIOD
The principal aim of this chapter is to evaluate major 
economic measures undertaken by the Bhutto government within a 
polotical economy framework. Towards this objective an attanpt 
will be made to examine the class composition of the Bhutto 
regime and to see whether the ascendancy of the Peoples Party 
to power represented a change in the relative influence of the 
economically dominant classes of the large landowners and 
industrialists. Ihe discussion will also assess to what extent 
shifts in the relative bargaining strength of the large farmers 
and industrialists were reflected in the direction of government 
policies pertaining to intersectoral distribution of resources.
The scope of this chapter is limited to providing a brief overview 
of the link between economic decision making and the nature of the 
power relationships in the state during the seventies as a background 
to the more detailed analysis of the impact of these policies 
presented in subsequent chapters.
As has been discussed in greater detail in the preceding 
chapter, rapid economic growth achieved under Ayub's government 
had led to increasing income inequalities in the rural and 
urban sectors. Thus the industrial sector was characterized 
by a tremendous increase in the concentration of assets while
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the real wages of industrial labour either declined or 
were stagnant. In agriculture the "green revolution resulted 
in rapid growth but also led to the deterioration of the relative 
position of the small farmers and tenants vis a vis the large 
farmers who were the main beneficiaries of the technological 
developments and the incentive stratety of the sixties. The 
perception by the large majority of the population that they had 
been deprived of any benefits of the much heralded economic 
progress in the sixties was a major factor sparking off the 
widespread dissatisfaction with the Ayub government which eventually 
culminated in its downfall.^
Bhutto was quick to sense the mood of the country and
launched his campaign on the promise of sweeping economic and
social refoim. He offered the people a better standard of living,
in terms of better housing, cheaper food and clothing, through
2
direct addresses at mass rallies.
This approach marked a significant departure fran the 
traditional means of campaigning in the country whereby primary 
reliance was placed on gaining the political support of the landed 
elite who through their tremendous power and influence had control
3
over the rural votes of their tenants as well as of small farmers.
For a detailed analysis of this and other factors in the movement 
against the military see Laporte (1975); Lodhi (1980); Burki (1980); 
Ali (1970).
2 Khan (1981), p. 171.
3 Alavi (1976), pp. 343-347.
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In this environment little need was felt to establish direct
contact with the masses. However it was only in the Punjab,
where the large feudal landlords had chosen not to join the
Peoples Party, that Bhutto relied on the mass mobilization method. 4
In Sind he relied on the conventional election strategy of forging
2
alliances with landlords.
The progesssive platform of Bhutto's party with its emphasis
on a more equitable distribution of wealth, mationalization of
industries, curbing of monopolies and agrarian reform attracted
a diverse group of people. These included industrial, students,
3
urban professionals, the rural poor and small farmers. At the 
same time the party's radical stand did not preclude the entry of
4
feudal landlords from Sind who were a part of Bhutto's faction.
On the other hand the opposition parties continued to rely
5
entirely on the landed elite to deliver the votes. Ihe feudal 
artistocracy of the Punjab belonged largely to the various factions 
of the Muslim league. Their campaign was based on obscure Islamic 
slogans skirting all issues of a socio-economic character.
Despite the fact that the largest landlords, the most 
influential of the rural elite, were represented in the opposition
1 Lodhi (1980), p.394.
2 Ibid., p.203.
2 Burki (1980), pp. 45-48.
4 Lodhi (1980), p.203.
^ Sanderatne (1974), p.130; Burki (1980), p.55.
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parties Bhutto won a resounding victory. Out of the 137 seats
allocated to West Pakistan he won eighty-one7^ The Peoples Party
was specially successful in areas which had undergone rapid
industrialization where it’s campaign of socio-economic reforms
mobilized support of urban groups like labour, middle class
2
professionals, students and the poor strata. In the rural 
constituencies the party by gaining the vote of the middle and 
small landowners managed to overccme the traditional voting pattern
3
in the Punjab. Ihe rural elite won only nine out of the eighty- 
two seats allocated to the pronvince, "slumping to the lowest level
4
ever." The election results were hailed as marking the end of
feudal social power. In the words of one observer "the December
1970 election was a disaster for the elites. With the exception
of the districts along the Indus river i.e. the least developed
districts, the rural families were trounced by all but unknown
new entrants into the political system who campaigned under the
banner of the Peoples Party and were attached to the coattails
of Zulfiqar Ali Bhutto Even along the Indus in many cases
the candidates who defeated Bhutto's men were not of the landed
rural aristocracy but representatives of narrow sectarian
religious groups. In a few cases renegade members of aristocratic
5families were successful as Peoples Party candidates."
1 Baxter (1971), p.221.
^ Ibid., p.214; Baxter and Burki (1975), pp. 924-925.
^ Erankel and Von Vorys (1972), pp.25-26.
^ Baxter (1974), p.25.
^ Laporte*(1975), pp.127-128.
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However other social scientists were more sceptical
about the claims of a change in the political relationship in the
countryside. It was felt^ that the feudal influence was not
o
as badly beaten as the results implied. Baxter cites disunity
among the landlord faction leading to a splitting of the opposition
vote as the main reason for their poor showing in the elections.
Whereas the PPP had won 61% of the seats it had only won one-third
of the total votes cast in West Pakistan. In the Western districts
the party won less votes than the combined votes of the opponents.
Ihe opposition party and independent candidates who won seats were
mostly landlords. Also as Baxter points out the elite perform
better in limited and controlled elections like Ayub's Basic 
3
Democracy system. Finally Bhutto himself belonged to a very
powerful landlord family in Sind and the feudals from his Sind
faction were members of the Peoples Party since its inception in
1967. Conceding :his study on feudal influence on Punjab politics,
Baxter states: "One might conclude that the day of the rural elite
control of government in the Punjab had ended but one caution must
be noted only another election held on the lines of those in 1970
can determine the future of the landed aristocracy and whether the
4PPP has redeemed it’s pledge to end feudal power in politics.”
In the next elections held in 1977 the leading Punjab 
families were well represented in the list of party nominees.
1 Lodhi (1980), p.227; Baxter (1974), p.28.
^ Baxter (1974), p.28.
^ Baxter (1974), p.28.
4* Ibid.
9 ^
By 1976, twenty eight out of the thirty three families listed 
by Baxter as having played a dominant role in Punjab politics 
since the beginning of the twentieth century had at least one 
member in the Peoples Party by 1976. Ihe extent of the landlord 
domination of the party is further revealed by an examination of 
the class backgrounds of the top fifty leaders of the party 
chosen on the basis of importance of offices and political 
influence. The results show that twenty seven out of the fifty 
belonged to the traditional landlord class.
The feudals after the setback of the '70 election started 
joining the PPP in large numbers with the primary objective of 
gaining access to policy makers and thereby the potential benefits 
of favourable government policies. Ihe question, however, is 
why Bhutto after having changed the whole nature of campaigning 
fell back to the traditional means of eliciting support through 
alliances with landed notables? Why did he allow the erosion of 
the progressive image he had maintained in the pre-election 
phase by allowing the feudals to dominate the party machine?
It has been suggested that Bhutto was not averse to
feudal support right from the beginning. "In the eyes of certain
leftist radicals in the party, Bhutto was willing to curb
capitalism but was somewhat averse to the idea of curbing landlordism
2unduly and particularly the influence of the landlords in politics."
1 Lodhi (1982), p.413. 
^ Sayeed (1981), p.8 8 .
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His militant rhetoric was directed against monopoly capitalists. 
Capitalism not feudalism was viewed as an ally of imperialism.
It was only after he failed to woo the Punjab landed aristocracy 
that he adopted the anti-feudal tone in his campaign speeches in 
the province to mobilize the support of the poor strata of rural 
society —  the small peasants and landless labour. This was more 
a tactical response determined by the necessity of winning an 
electoral majority in the country side rather than an ideological 
commitment. ^ Even then he was careful not to alienate the 
support of his faction of Sindhi feudals. Thus despite his 
socialist stance his position on land ceiling was very vague and 
no exact limit was specified in the PPP manifesto.
Hence Bhutto had always envisaged the landlords as the major
support base of his party. It was the feudals who had refused to
join in the early phase. However once the Peoples Party was
installed in power they flocked to it for opportunistic reasons.
At the same time the PPP once in power found it increasingly
difficult to control the expectations it had aroused in the mass
component of it’s social support. Bhutto, more than any politician
before him,,relied on mass mobilization through direct appeals
to the people to win an electoral majority. But he was always
aware of the problems inherent in controlling mass movements once
initiated in contrast to the more dependable and less volatile
2
reservoir of support provided by the landed elite.
1 Lodhi (1980), p.394.
2 Lodhi (1980), p.389.
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The expectations he had aroused during the election
campaign did set off a momentum which was very difficult to
control. The occupation of factories and land seizures continued
after Bhutto came into power and after the announcement of the
labour policy which, fell short of the workers' expectations.^"
finally the PPP government resorted to police and paramilitary
forces to curb labour militancy. On October 1972 in a confrontation
with the police forces fifteen workers were killed and four 
2
thousand arrested. Ahmed has commented on the inevitability of 
the showdown between Bhutto and his major constituency in the 
following teims. "The repression was of course at variance with 
the posture but most assuredly not with the essence of social 
democracy especially in it's third workd variant, for, it is 
the essence of this social democracy that whenever the people's 
democratic movement directly threatens the existing class structure 
and or the (bourgeois) state the social democratic government must 
do whatever is necessary to preserve the essentials of the class
3
structure and reassert the supremacy of the state."
The adoption of tough measures against labour alienated the
4 5radical left and led to the exit of two major representatives
of this group. It also signalled the beginning of the change
^ Shaheed (1983), p.282.
^ Outlook, 4 November, 1972.
3 A. Ahmed (.1978), p.486.
5
Even earlier during the election campaign differences with the 
leftist faction of the party had emerged over the question of 
setting a specific ceiling on landholdings and on the desirability 
of giving party tickets to the Sindhi landlords (Lodhi, 1980, p. 185 i ) .
6 Mukhtar Rana and Mairaj Mohammad Khan both of whom had strong links 
with labour unions.
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in the class composition^" of the party in favour of the landed 
elite. By the time of the party conference in 1972 the number 
of feudals in the party shot up significantly. The landed notables 
from Punjab's leading families now joined the party. Ihe change 
in the class composition of the party is viewed by Ahmed as a 
necessary adjunct of the shift in party position fran the pre­
election phase to that of control of the government. He states 
that "changes in the internal class composition of the PPP were 
objectively determined by the changed position of the party in 
relation to the state. In other words the PPP had to be an 
apparatus predominantly of the radical petty bourgeoisie in 
the pre-election phase when the main objective was to secure 
a mass base and an electoral majority, particularly in the 
countryside. Once, however, the PPP had formed the government 
on the social democratic premise of seeking reform within the 
predicates of the state as already constituted, thereby becoming 
the political apparatus of the reactionary state, it’s Left 
Wing was faced with the objective choice of either accepting
the exigencies of the state or getting liquidated. In the event
2
the Left was of course liquidated."
^ By 1974 various other members of the Left were purged fran 
key positions in the party or the cabinet. Most notable among 
these was Mubashar Hasan who had been in charge of the crucial 
ministry of Finance, Planning and Economic Development. Ihe 
only remaining representative of the Left in the cabinet was 
Sheikh Rashid who was assigned the ministry of agriculture 
(Burki, 1980, p. 143.),
^ Ahmed (1978), p.481.
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While Bhutto actively started to shift the balance of
forces in favour of the landlords he also wanted to maintain
his progressive image as the champion of the poor. The land
reforms enacted in 1972, however, show that the desire to establish
links with the Punjabi feudals was the stronger of the contending
pressures. Hence despite the militancy of his rhetoric, Bhutto's
1land reforms stopped far short of a radical land distribution.
2
As a matter of fact certain features of his reforms displayed a 
striking continuity with those of Ayub's reforms. Ihe 
ceiling had to be set much lower to maintain political identity 
as a progressive and not to totally disillusion the constituency 
of the rural under-priviledged. Unlike his predecessor, Bhutto 
had depended on this stratum for political support and thereby 
had to make greater concession on paper, at least. Thus on the 
surf act there was a significant reduction in land ceilings from 
500 to 150 acres for irrigated lands and from 1000 to 500 for 
unirrigated holdings. No compensation was to be paid for 
the land acquired which was to be distributed to poor peasants 
free of charge. Furthermore exemptions for orchards, stud faxms 
etc., were no longer allowed.
In his March 1972 address on land refoims Bhutto declared 
that "the reform will effectively break up the iniquitous 
concentration of landed wealth, reduce income disparities, 
increase production..
However most observers felt that the reforms stopped far 
short of any serious attempt to break the concentration of 
lanu resources. See for example Herring (1980), pp. 605-607;
Sanderatne (1974), p. 133; Alam (1974), p. 33.
The main provisions of the land reform are listed in the 
Economic Survey 1972-73, p. 10.
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However in keeping with the earlier reforms the ceiling
was applicable to individuals rather than family holdings.
Alternate ceilings were set in terms of produce index units.
As mentioned earlier these units greatly underestimated the
current productivity of land. Exemptions for mechanized farming
and allowances for inheritance were also defined in produce
index units. It has been estimated that if full advantage is
taken of various exemptions and transfers the effective ceiling
was 932 irrigated acres in Sind and 1120 acres in the Punjab.'*'
Estimates, from an alternative source, of irrigated land which
could be retained by a family of five set the effective ceiling
2
even higher with considerable variation across regions.
Due to various loopholes and the fact that the largest 
landowners had distributed land as widely as possible after the 
’ 59 reform, a very small percentage of the landlords were
3
actually affected by the ceiling legislation. Out of 
declarants in the Punjab only 17% lost land. In Sind an 
even smaller proportion 10% of the landlords who declared lands 
were affected. Of the total area in holdings of 150 acres or 
more only 12% was resumed in the Punjab and 19% in Sind.
Resumed area was 1% of the total area of 36.4 million acres in 
the Punjab and less than 3% of 11.4 million acres in Sind. Out 
of the total area of 567,499 acres resumed only 308,390 acres
1 Khan (1981), p. 177.
2 Sayeed (1981), p.92,
3 ,
Figures quoted in this paragraph on the effect of the land 
reform have been estimated by Khan (1981, pp. 179-180, ).
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was alloted by fall 1978. The rest consisted mostly of 
uncultivated land. Finally it has been estimated that the 
maximum number of tenants who could have benefited from 
distribution of land was 73000, not more than 1% of the 
population of landless tenants and small owners.
The impact of the measure, although extremely limited, 
was still considerably greater than that of the earlier reforms. 
The area appropriated was about 60% higher, the area redistributed 
46% higher and the number of households benefiting was double 
that under Ayub's reforms.^
Nevertheless the land reform of 1972 was very much in 
keeping with the tradition of going through the motions of land 
reform to maintain social legitimacy whereas a number of loopholes 
and exemptions ensured that the control of land resources remained 
largely unaffected. As an observer of Bhutto’s reform has aptly 
commented: "Land reform as other agrarian measures was not 
intended to eradicate the feudals so much as to nudge them 
into the fold." They were "tempted to throwing their considerable 
weight behind the regime in order to protect their priviledges 
and ward off future perhaps more serious attempts at their 
eradication.
 ^ Naseem (1982), p . 196.
^ Herring (.1980), p. 610.
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Bhutto's land reforms indicated clearly that he wanted
to maintain the priviledged position of the large landowners
in the power structure. As an observer has noted. 'Bhutto
merely tinkered with the system in the countryside. In the
process he consolidated the position of the landlord at the
expense of the urban industrialist." Bhutto's government
while not introducing any radical change in the socio-economic
structure did signify a shift in the power balance in favour
2
of the land-owning classes. On the other hand the industrialists
who had been fostered by the development policies of the previous
regime suffered a major setback. Although they never had been
a part of the political elite, the monopoly industrialists
exercised considerable pressure on government decision making
through their contacts with the civil-military elite. With the
ascendancy of the Peoples Party, they lost their contact with the
3
government and their influence was considerably reduced.
Even in the election period Bhutto, who was careful not
to alienate any power bloc, saved his most militant rhetoric for
the monopoly industrialists. Soon after coming into power he 
announced the nationalization of thirty one firms in ten basic 
industries.4 The growing concentration of industrial assets 
had been the source of great public discontent with the Ayub
1 Ali (1983), p. 105.
^ Gardezi and Rashid (1983), p. 12; Ali (1983), p. 105.
^ Laporte (1975), p. 122.
4
These include iron and steel, basic metal, heavy engineering, 
heavy electrical machinery, assembly and manufacture of motor 
vehicles, tractor plants, heavy and basic chemical, petro-chemical 
industries (Economic Survey 1972/73, pp. 13-14.)
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government. Domination of industry and finance by " 2 2  
families” had ccme to epitomize the disparities created 
by the regime's gravth oriented policies. Curbing the 
economic power of the capitalist class was a major election 
promise of the Peoples Party. In this context nationalization 
had tremendous symbolic significance and was necessary to 
establish social legitimacy. In addition, widening the 
sphere of state activity was needed to develop a more balanced 
industrial sector on the one hand while providing a source of 
patronage in terms of jobs on the other. However, the 
nationalization program was certainly not aimed at social 
reorganization of production leading eventually to a complete 
socialization of the industrial sector. As noted by Sayeed: 
"One could see that the kind of socialism introduced under 
Bhutto was designed not so much to usher in a socialist 
society as it was to bring in state capitalism. State 
capitalism would obviously enhance the power of the Bonaparte 
and would not lead to any structural changes either in the 
economy or the society."^
Although the industrialists were given assurances of
no further nationalization, they never quite recovered from
q
the initial setback. The industrial structure that had 
developed under Ayub's regime was economically and technically 
inefficient. High profits were made possible through various
 ^ Sayeed (1981), p. 97.
2 Alavi (1983), p. 51; Burki (1980), p. 118; Sayeed (1981), p. 96.
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fiscal and monetary concessions. The Bhutto regime removed 
most of these economic props such as the bonus voucher scheme, 
and various fiscal and monetary subsidies.^
Furthermore the position of the industrialists vis a
vis labour weakened considerably during this period. Whereas
under Ayub's military government union activity was kept under
tight control, the bargaining power of labour, a major
constituency of the Peoples Party, increased dramatically in
the seventies. Industrial wages more than doubled between the
period from 1970 to 1975 whereas the real wage index went up
2
from 123 in 1970 to 160 in 1975. The increase in the index 
over the five year period was greater than the change over 
the previous twenty years. It has been estimated that the 
increase in wages led to a tripling of labour costs between
3
1972 and 1977 for most factories.
Industrial profits were further eroded by rising raw 
material costs attributable to the devaluation of the rupee 
and relatively higher prices of farm products. Domestic 
terms of trade moved sharply in favour of the farm sector 
during the seventies (see Table 3.1). The bottom fell out 
of the industrial sector which was used to a specially 
favourable environment created by public policy. Private
1 Government of Pakistan, Finance Division, Budget in Brief 
1972/73, pp. 34-37.
2 Guisinger and Hicks (1978), p. 1275.
3 World Bank (1978), p. 38.
10*f
Table 2.1
Private Industrial Investment in Current Prices 1969/70-1976/77 (million
rupees)
Large and Medium 
Scale
Small
Scale Total
1969/70 1208.2 187.7 1395.9
1970/71 1224.0 201.7 1425.7
1971/72 1016.3 219.1 1235.4
1972/73 763.1 255.9 1019.0
1973/74 697.3 325.5 1023.3
1974/75 990.4 446.5 1436.9
1975/76 1309.0 509.5 1818.5
1976/77 1209.7 585.3 1795.0
Source: Government of Pakistan, Economic Survey, 1978.
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industrial investment fell sharply from Rs. 112.4 million 
in 1970/71 to Rs. 64.5 million in 1973/74 (see table 2.1.).
The bargaining strength of the landed elite was 
stronger in a system of parliamentary democracy where power 
stemmed from a spcial base. The greater power and influence 
of the landed elite under Bhutto's regime is borne out by 
the markedly pro-agricultural thrust of the policies under­
taken during the period beginning with .the devaluation of 
the rupee in 1972.^ The move was seen as a major loss to
the industrialists. Prior to this period Pakistan had a
o
system of multiple exchange rates. Exporters, mostly of 
agricultural commodities, received their earnings in terms 
of the official exchange rate. Manufacturers, on the other 
hand, were entitled to a more favourable exchange rate for 
their exports while they could import their machinery 
requirements at the cheap official rate. The devaluation 
removed this discrimination against agricultural ccmnodities 
resulting in the increase in prj ces of farm goods which were 
not totally negated by the simultaneous increase in export taxes.
3
The nationalization of commercial banks dealt a 
further blow to the monopoly houses. The close interconnection 
between the financial and industrial sector played an important
Government of Pakistan, finance Division, Economic Survey 
1972/73, p. 17.
2
Government of Pakistan., finance Division, Economic Survey 
1972/73. p. 17.
3
Government of Pakistan, finance Division, Economic Survey 
1974/75, p. 83.
1
part in the growth of the industrial houses in the sixties.
During the Third Plan period the industrialists controlled
80% of the assets of commercial banks while credit
institutions contributed nearly 50% of the industrial 
2
finance. The nationalization gave the government significant 
control over investment priorities, creation and disbursement 
of credit in circulation. It enabled the government to not 
only use conmercial banks for it's own deficit financing 
but to divert an increasing amount of bank credit to the
3
farm sector. The credit disbursed to agriculture shows a 
marked jump in the post nationalization period. Loans 
advanced by various organizations to agriculturists increased 
frcm Rs. 32.90 crores in 1972/73 to Rs. 108 crores in 1973/74 
and Rs. 179 crores in 1976/77 while credit frcm commercial banks 
increased nearly threefold from Rs. 28 crores in 1972/73 to 
Rs. 80 crores in 1975/76 (Table 2.2).
Finally terms of trade moved sharply against industry 
reflecting, partly the impact of the devaluation of the rupee 
as well as the sharp increases in procurement prices during 
the period. Price incentives were a crucial ingredient^ 
of the government strategy for agricultural development. As 
a matter of fact the approach to agrarian policy adopted by 
Bhutto's government essentially replicated the strategy 
followed by Ayub. The growth in agricultural output was to
 ^ Amjad (1976), pp. 232-242.
2 Ibid., p. 235.
2 Ahmed (1978), p.492 ; Gardezi and Rashid (1983), p. 12.
4
Government of Pakistan, Planning Commission, Pricing Policy 
Packages 1972/73 to 1977/7 ; Government of Pakistan, Finance 
Division, Economic Survey, various issues.
Table 2.2
Loans Advanced to Farmers by Agricultural Development Bank (ADB) and
Commercial Banks
( million rupees)
ADB Ccnmercial
1970/71 92.7 -
1971/72 80.0 -
1972/73 168.8 85.7
1973/74 415.2 286.4
1974/75 395.5 520.9
1975/76 532.2 808.1
1976/77 637.9 970.0
1977/78 429.8 1290.9
Source: Government of Pakistan, Ministry of Food, Agriculture, 
and Co-cperatives, Agricultural Statistics of Pakistan 
1978.
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be achieved by a system of economic incentives within the 
given institutional framework. Hence the land reforms fell 
far short of any drastic land redistribution. Ihe Peoples 
Party government opted for a continued reliance on a policy 
of price supports and input"*' subsidies despite the fact that 
the socio-economic milieu in the countryside this would 
inevitably lead to a further concentration of resources in 
the hands of the landed elite.
The policy with respect to mechanization was, once
again, indicative of the extent to which the state was
serving the interests of the upper strata of the rural sector
notwithstanding the initial socialist rhetoric. The
devaluation significantly increased tractorprices and kept
imports at a low level the following year. In 1973/74
the government although not directly subsidizing tractor
2purchase undertook some measures which made them more 
accessible and cheaper. Most important among these was the 
increased availability of credit from the Agricultural 
Development Bank (ADB) for purchase of tractors and other 
machinery at very favourable rates. AEB loans for tractors 
shot up from 430.65 million rupees in 1972/73 to Rs. 1800 
million in the following year (Table 2.3.) . Furtheimore
1 Ibid.
Government of Pakistan, Finance Division, Economic Survey 
1974-75, p. 22.
Table 2.3
Agriculure Development Bank Loans-Itermwise Breakdown
(million rupees)
1971/72 1972/73 1973/74 1974/75 1975/76
Tractors 330.41 430.65 1800.30 1390.54 2200.40
Tubewells 180.41 260.42 510.33 860.67 -
Other Farm Needs 130.53 470.25 1230.46 830.38 _
Source: Government of Pakistan, Ministry of Food, Agriculture, and 
Co-operatives, Agricultural Statistics of Pakistan, 1978.
Table 2.4 
Tractor Imports
Total (number)
1970/71 4021
1971/72 3571
1972/73 2679
1973/74 5216
1974/75 7190
1975/76 10916
1976/77 15098
1977/78 15213
Source: Government of Pakistan, Ministry of Food, Agriculture, 
and Co-cperatives, Agricultural Statistics of Pakistan, 
1978.
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Pakistanis living abroad were allowed to send tractors 
as gilts to relatives free of duty. Also, a nuntoer of 
government operated centres were set up to provide 
maintenance facilities at nominal charges. Finally a 
substantial subsidy was granted on diesel fuel used by 
tractors. The Agriculture Enquiry Committee Report, 1975,^ 
ignoring the distributional implications of widespread 
mechanization recommended not only a further liberalization 
of import policy with respect to tractors but also their 
manufacture domestically. By 1976/77 annual import of 
tractors was reported at 15034 as compared to 7190 two 
years earlier. (Table 2.4.) Ihe tremendous increase in 
tractors can also be assessed by the fact that the total 
number of tractors in the country in 1968 was 16500 as 
compared to annual imports of over fifteen thousand in 
the late seventies.
However, Bhutto enacted two reforms which marked a
total break from the policies of previous governments. He
2
imposed an agricultural income tax for the first time in
Pakistan's history and announced a second round of land 
3reforms. Ihe '77 Reform reduced the ceiling frcm 150 
acres to 100 acres for irrigated areas and from 300 acres 
to 200 acres for unirrigaged land. Compensation was to
1 Government of Pakistan, Ministry of Food and Agriculture, 1975, p. 25
2 Land Reform Act 1977, Pakistan Legal Decisions, Vol. 29, pp. 126-133
3
Finance Supplementary Act, 1977, Pakistan Legal Decisions,
Vol. 29, pp. 118-125.
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to be paid for the surrendered land at the rate of Rs. 30 
per PIU. Still there was a confiscatory element involved 
as the market price was much higher than the terms of 
compensation. These new land reforms according to one 
view "would have surely destroyed the basis of semi-feudal 
ownership in Pakistan.
Herring, one the other hand, is far more sceptical
of the impact of the ceiling legislation. On the basis of
seme preliminary calculations he concludes that even if the
new law was effectively implemented very little cultivable
2
land could be redistributed. The loopholes in the legislation 
such as fixing the ceiling on a family rather than on an 
individual basis and in teims of produce index units as well 
as acres provided the landowners ample opportunities to get 
around the ceiling. In any case Bhutto's position on further
3
reforms had been so ambiguous, vacillating from assurances 
of no more refoims to statements implying future reductions 
in ceilings, that the landlords had already taken preventive 
action in teims of redistribution of land under various names.
The second major departure from previous policies was
4the imposition of an income tax on the agricultural sector.
1 Ahmed (1978), p. 489.
^ Herring (1980), p. 60.
3 Ibid,, pp. 607-608.
4
Finance Supplementary Act, 1977, Pakistan Legal Decisions,
Vol. 29, pp. 118-125.
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The land revenue system was abolished. All landholders 
with holdings up to 25 acres or less were entirely exempt 
from direct taxation. For the rest of the landowning 
population the rate of taxation applicable to agricultural 
income were the same as applied to the urban areas. However 
generous deductions were allowed for working capital and 
agricultural machinery. These various deductions provided 
considerable incentive for the modernization of agriculture.
As an observer coiimented the feudals "were being nudged 
into the role of agrarian entrepreneurs."
The timing of the announcement of the reforms just
two months before the March elections is a clear indicator
that Bhutto wanted to ensure the support of his rural
constituency of the poorer strata of the sector. Ihe exemption
of landowners with holdings under 25 acres from payment of
2
direct taxes would, according to Ahmed, confer benefits
to 91% of the country’s peasantry owning over half of the
cultivable area in Pakistan. Not to mention the fact that the
decision removed the peasants from under the influence of the 
corrupt local revenue officers.
Even more important for political purposes was the 
symbolic impact of these refoims? Bhutto's dramatic 
announcement was meant to regain the credibility of his
^ Herring (1980), p. 608.
^ Ahmed (.1978), p . 4 3 9
^ Khan (1981), pp. 183-184; Herring (1980), p. 607;
Ahmed (1978), p.4*8 9 . ,
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image as the champion of the poor, downtrodden strata
of society. The inpact of the second round of land reforms
on the rural poor is described by Ahmed. "The mere
announcement of it in fact raised the aspiration of the
peasantry, refurbished Bhutto's agrarian electoral base
and provided for the militant peasants a platform for
organising for the future.”  ^Furtheimore despite the
deductions and exemptions allowed the agricultural income tax
was considered a direct encroachment on the priviledges of
the landed elite. Bhutto, himself, while discussing the
details of his tax reform pointed out that the failure of
earlier regimes to tax agriculture was due to their
subservience to the powerful landlord lobby. In contrast
he presented himself as above the influence of vested interest.
"This measure is final proof that there is no question of
your government giving preferential treatment to any vocation
over another. We have no favourites. We see no reason why a
zamindar should not contribute to public exchequer in the same
2
way as a rich trader or an industrialist."
The question arises as to why Bhutto by taking these 
steps, was going against the interests of the feudals who
1 Ahmed (1978) p.498.
2
Pakistan Economist (.1977), p. 4.
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with full encouragement from him had come to dominate 
the political machine of the PPP. The answer to the question 
lies in Bhutto's approach to various power blocs in the society 
including the propertied classes. Social scientists have 
described his system of government as "Bonapartist" as 
well as "patrimonial." Sayeed applies Marx's concept of 
Bonapartism^ to analyse the relationship between the dominant 
classes and the state in the following terms:
By this is meant not just the rule of an 
arbitrary dictator but the rule of a leader 
who derived his power and authority from a 
well-established institution like the army 
in the case of Ayub, or from a political
movement in the case of Bhutto. However the
movement does not fully explain the nature of 
such a Bonapartist state. Ihe effectiveness 
of such a state depends upon how the leader 
manipulates or brings under control certain 
institutions like the bureaucracy and the 
army and mobilizes and controls the economy, 
and sane of the nascent classes represented 
in it by altering or modifying the dominant 
modes of production like the capitalist mode 
in the case of industry andgthe feudal mode
in the case of agriculture.
While undermining the influence of various power groups the
Bonaparte also confers benefits which are supposed to emanate
directly from him as "the supreme benefactor." Although
Sayeed classifies both the Ayub and Bhutto regimes as
Bonapartist the state under Bhutto represents a more advanced
form of Bonapartism displaying a greater autonomy fran
1 Marx (1972), p. 106.
2 Sayeed (1981), p. 109.
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propertied interests and greater political control 
of institutions like the aimy and civil services.
Alternatively some social scientists like Lodhi'1'
2
and Heeger analyse the power structure of the Bhutto period 
in the framework of a patrimonial state. Ihe main features 
of a patrimonial state are very similar to the Bonapartist 
model - the concentration of power, the personalized- 
supervision over major power groups, the curtailment of their 
influence, and the delegation of benefits as an act of 
personal benovolence of the leader. The objective in each 
case is to create a personal dependency first, by weakening 
the various power blocs and then bringing them under control 
and protecting their interests. The discussion that follows 
is essentially a summary of Lodhi and Sayeed1 s account of 
Bhutto's dealings with the major power blocs.
Thus the influence of the military and civil services 
was weakened by a purge of some high ranking officials followed 
by structural refoims which further undermined their power. 
Refoims in the civil service included the withdrawal of 
constitutional guarantees safeguarding the rights of civil 
servants in office. Entry into the civil services was no 
longer limited to those # 1 0 qualified in the competetive 
exams and age restrictions were also relaxed. These reforms not
^ Lodhi (1980).
2
Heeger (1977).
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only broke up the exclusiveness of the cadres but at the 
same time opened up further avenues of patronage in teims 
of administrative jobs as rewards for supporters. In the 
army he enacted changes which dispersed the power of the 
conmander in over three or four high powered posts in the 
hope of avoiding another coup. In keeping with the 
description of the Bonapartist regime the weakening of the 
influence of these blocs was accompanied by the conferment of 
benefits. There was a substantial increase in expenditure 
on defence. By 1974/75 military spending comprised 55% of 
the budget allocations.
In the case of labour strong measures were taken to 
control strikes. Paramilitary forces such as the Federal 
Security Force were used to ruthlessly suppress labour 
militancy. However at the same time the labour policy 
of the government conferred considerable benefits to this 
class specially to workers in the nationalised sector. Also 
trade union merrbership increased very rapidly during this 
period in sharp contrast to earlier governments.
There was a dramatic showdown with the industrialists 
in the initial months of the PPP government. Iirmediately 
after caning into power passports belonging to the twenty 
leading industrial families were seized and two of the most 
prominent industrialists were placed under house arrest.
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This news was followed by the announcement of the 
nationalization of basic industries. Ihe nationalization 
of commercial banks further undermined the influence of 
this group. However, the initial show of strength was 
followed by some counciliatory moves. Arrested members 
were released and travel restrictions were lifted. Ihe 
minister for finance and economic affairs and a chief 
proponent of the nationalization scheme, Mubashar Hasan, who 
was specially unpopular with the business community was 
removed from the cabinet. Moreover for the first time 
a member of the industrial elite was appointed in the 
prestiguous post of managing director of the national 
airlines. Despite these moves the relationship between 
the government and the business class remained tinged with 
mutual suspicion and hostility.
Ihe most detailed treatment of the nature of the 
relationship between Bhutto and the landowning classes is 
provided in Lodhi1 s study.'1' It is pointedjout that Bhutto 
actively sought the support of the landed elite right from 
the beginning of his period in power. The relationship with 
them, however, was not that of an equal ally. Thus "those 
who view Bhutto as representative of the landlord interests 
miss the point altogether. It was an asymetrical patron- 
client relationship. The landlord looked towards him for
1 Lodhi (1980), pp. 457-462.
118
protection (land re four measures and other favours) and 
they themselves with their patron-client network would 
provide building bloc in the countryside."'*' Parallel to 
his strategy with respect to other power blocs, he first 
undermined their independent influence through the 
enactment of land reforms. Thereby he created a situation 
where the landlords were vulnerable to his personal 
benevolence in the stringency with which the reforms 
were implemented,
The land reforms were the major instrument Bhutto
used to make the landlords dependent on his favours. The
relative leniency with which these refoims were implemented
depended on the political loyalties of the landlord. The
importance that was placed on this instrument as a means of
bringing the rural elite under control can be assessed from
the fact that files on land reform cases were kept in Bhutto's
2
personal secretariat. The landlords could save their lands 
only through Bhutto's personal intercession. Rewards for 
joining the Peoples Party meant that no action would be taken 
for concealed holdings. It was following the land reform 
regulation that the feudal aristocracy of the Punjab flocked 
to the Peoples Party.
Bhutto wanted to use the landowning class as a support
■*■ Ibid,, p. 396.
2 lodhi (1980), p. 458.
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base but not to be dominated by them. Furthermore his 
reliance on feudal support did not preclude his attempt 
to woo the constituency of the smaller peasants and 
landless labour. A fact which is evident from the 
announcement of the second round of land refoims and the 
imposition of the income tax on agriculture. However 
once having asserted his position of power and independence 
fran landed interests he was willing to grant them further 
benefits. There were enough loopholes in both legislations 
to ensure that loyal elements would still not be too badly 
off. According to Herring the '77 Refoims would hit hardest 
landowners of Baluchistan and NWFP, a group by and large 
hostile to the PPP government. Whereas the Sind and Punjabi 
landlords would be marginally affected. "The regionally 
skewed impact of the new ceiling offered potential to attack 
feudal political enemies in the two rebellious provinces 
while simultaneously avoiding serious confrontation with the 
politically important gentry of Punjab and Sind.'1’1' Furtheimore 
there were other favours which would ensure that they would 
be well rewarded. These included input subsidies, credit at 
low rates of interest and higher prices for their products 
vis a vis manufactured goods, i.e. favourable terms of trade.
 ^ Herring (1980), p . 608.
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MOVEMENTS IN THE INTERSECTORAL TERMS OF TRADE
Changes in the intersectoral terms of trade are among the 
most important determinants of the pace of growth and distribution 
in the economy. Thus a shift in terms of trade in favour of 
agriculture redistributes income to the sellers of agricultural 
output at the expense of urban and rural consumers of food and 
users of agricultural raw materials. This redistribution of 
income has Important consequences for the growth performance 
of the economy. Changes in the relative price of farm output 
vis a vis manufactured goods not only influence the incentives 
to produce in the agricultural sector but also have repercussions 
on the rate of industrial expansion. A relatively faster rate 
of increase in the prices of farm products cuts into industrial 
profits directly through raising the cost of agricultural 
intermediate inputs and indirectly, higher prices of foodgrains, 
the basic wage good, generate pressure for increase in wages 
of industrial labour.
Movements in the intersectoral terms of trade can be 
caused by changes in the relative scarcities of sectoral outputs 
or may be the outcome of deliberate government policy. In early 
stages of development demand for food output grows rapidly 
under the combined impact of population growth and the high 
income elasticity of demand while supply is constrained by 
various techo-organisational bottlenecks. . The resulting 
supply demand imbalance is reflected in the improvement of the 
sectoral price ratio facing agriculture.
1
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Alternatively terms of trade can be manipulated through 
various government policies. Imposition of tariffs on manufactured 
goods purchased by agriculturists is one such method of tilting 
relative price ratio in favour of industry. Overvaluation of 
domestic currency can achieve the same objective where, as is 
usually the case, agriculture provides the bulk of exports 
while the major share of inports go to meet the requirements 
of the non-agricultural sector. Direct participation of the 
state in the market of faim products through export corporations 
or grain procurement programs is another means by which the 
government can influence the direction of changes in the 
domestic terms of trade.
Historically negative price policy by providing cheap food
and raw materials played a crucial role in facilitating the
initial stages of industrialization of a number of developed 
1countries. However recently the relationship between terms
of trade and growth is being viewed from another perspective.
The failure of agricultural output to keep pace with demand
in most developing countries is attributed to the disincentive
2effect of unfavourable relative prices for the farm sector.
According to this view even if industry is the priority sector 
a positive price policy would be preferable to a negative one 
which is not capable of bringing forward adequate supplies 
of marketed surplus from agriculture, the basic requisite of 
a successful industrialization .strategy,. . A  positive shift in
■*" This point has been discussed in detail in the Introduction of this thesis 
2 Proponents of this approach include Lipton (1977), Schultz (1978),
Krishna (1967),
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agriculture's terms of trade, it is argued, would lead to an 
increase in output and marketed supply providing incentives 
for a more intensive use of land, labour and modern inputs 
like fertilizer and high yielding varities of seed.
In the context of the Indian economy some economists^
have blamed the inadequate growth of agricultural output and
marketed surplus on the negative effects of deliberate government
policy of maintaining unfavourable relative prices for agriculture.
o
However statistical evidence provided by Thamarajikshi for 
the period fran 1951 to 1973 shows a secular trend in terms 
of trade in favour of the agricultural sector. In the same 
study a time series analysis of factors determining the marketable 
surplus of farm products points to output as the crucial variable 
while the impact of terms of trade is negligible and statistically 
insignificant. With regard to the responsiveness of aggregate 
output to prices, the findings indicate that increase in output 
was mainly determined by technology with the terms of trade 
effect again being unimportant.
The major work on the measurement of terms of trade for
3
Pakistan has been done by Lewis and Hussain for the period
41950-51 to 1964 and later updated by Lewis up to 1970. Their 
estimates for Pakistan reveal a trend very similar to that found
Mason (1966); Schultz (1964).’
^ Thamarajikshi (1969); (1977).
o
Lewis and Hussain (1966).
^ Lewis (1970).
in India - a fall in agriculture’s terms of trade till the 
mid fifties followed by an increasing trend tapering off in the 
late sixties. For the seventies,Gotsch and Brown have further 
extended the Lewis series up to 1974/75. On the basis of their 
results, which will be discussed in greater detail later, the 
authors conclude that the overall trend in relative prices 
moved against the farm sector during the period.
The positive trend in agriculture's terms of trade in the
sixties coincided with a breakthrough in agricultural production
whereas the supposedly unfavourable shift in relative sectoral
prices in the seventies was accompanied by a marked deceleration
in the growth rate of farm output. This positive corelation
between prices and farm output has been interpreted by some 
2economists as evidence of the sensitivity of agricultural 
production to changes in prices. Positive price incentives 
reflected in a favourable shift in agriculture's terms of 
trade are considered a major factor behind the high rates of 
agricultural growth achieved in the sixties while the subsequent 
stagnation of production in the seventies is attributed to the 
deterioration of the relative price ratio. It is argued 
further that the unfavourable turn in agriculture's teims of 
trade during the seventies was the result of government policy 
of maintaining artificially low prices of farm products.
 ^ Gotsch and Brown (1977).
2
Lewis and Hussain (1966), pp. 415-416; Bose and Clark (1966), pp. 273-308; 
Falcon and Cotsch (1966), pp. 25-26.
^ Brown (1978), p. 84; Gotsch and Brown (1977), p. 101.
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Before assessing the relevance of the hypothesis of 
high supply responsiveness of agricultural production to price 
incentives, it is necessary to ascertain the direction of changes 
in the intersectoral terms of trade in the seventies. The Gotsch 
and Brown series covers only the period from 1969/70 to 1974/75 
and is based on Lewis' methodology which, as will be discussed 
later, does not utilise the most efficient method of estimating 
the terms of trade index given the available data.
The main objective of this chapter is to provide a sounder 
empirical basis to the debate on sectoral price movements in 
the seventies by deriving a series of intersectoral terms of 
trade for the period from 1970 to 1977/78. The estimates 
presented in this study will not only cover a longer time period 
but will also be based on a more accurate methodology.
The analysis that follows is divided into three parts.
Details on the methodology used to estimate the terms of trade 
series are provided in the first section. This is followed by 
an evaluation of the statistical results and their comparison 
with other available estimates for the seventies. The third 
section is concerned with tracing the implications of movements 
in terms of trade on the level and composition of farm output.
An attempt is made to see to what extent the hypothesis of high 
supply responsiveness of farm output to changes in the sectoral 
price ratio is borne..out by the experience of the agricultural 
sector in Pakistan. Finally, a statistical examination of the 
influence of economic variables such as supply demand factors on the
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determination of price movements in the foodgrain section 
is presented in the appendix.
Methodology
Before proceeding to the problems of statistical
measurement it would be useful to provide a rigorous definition
of the various concepts of terms of trade generally referred to
1in development and foreign trade literature. Broadly inter­
sectoral terms of trade measure the ratio of exchange of
o
commodities traded between sectors or countries. Within this 
general definition several more specific concepts can be 
identified. The gross barter terms of trade (Q^/^) measure the 
ratio of the volume of exports of the sector to the volume of 
Imports. Under the conditions when the balance of payment, is 
balanced a fall in the gross barter terms of trade indicates 
an advantageous change for the exporting sector since a 
smaller quantity of exports is being exchanged for a larger 
amount of imports.
Net barter terms of trade (Px/Pm )» the most widely used 
measure, are defined as the ratio of the index of export prices 
of one sector/country to the index of import prices of the other
1
See for instance Mieir (1968); pp 41-65; Kindleberger (1956),
2 More sophisticated measures of terms of trade have also been 
devised__which relate not only to changes in the price and 
quantity of traded goods but also include the effect of 
productivity changes in the exporting sector (single factoral 
terms of trade) as well as both the exporting and importing 
sector (double factoral texms of trade) (Viner, 1937, pp 558-564).
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sector/ country (P /P ). This measure shows a favourable/ x in
unfavourable shift if the price level of exports has increased/ 
decreased relative to the price level of imports. Improvement 
in the net barter terms of trade indicates an increase in the 
purchasing power of a unit of exports, which in the absence 
of any dramatic change in efficiency in the two sectors or in 
the quantity and composition of traded goods, can be taken 
to imply a transfer of income from the importing to the exporting; 
sector.
Finally the income terms of trade incorporate the effect
of changes in the volume of the sector's exports as well as
prices and are defined as the ratio of the value index of
exports to the price of imports (I* Q^/P ). To the extent 
that an increase/decrease in the price of exports is accompanied
by a proportionately greater fall/rise in the volume of exports, 
the income terms of trade would be a more accurate index than 
the net barter terms of trade of the relative change in the 
purchasing power of the exporting sector.
Lack of adequate data on the time series of marketed
farm output has precluded any attempts to measure income terms
of trade for the Pakistan economy. However, as mentioned earlier,
estimates of net barter terms of trade have been provided by 
1 2Lewis and Hussain and by Lewis covering the period from 1950/51
3
to 1970. More recently Gotsch and Brown have used Lewis
 ^ Lewis and Hussain (1966). 
^ Lewis (1970).
3
Gotsch and Brown (1977)*
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methodology to extend the series up to the mid-seventies.
The main problem in the construction of a terms of trade 
index is related to the choice of appropriate prices and 
weights. Ideally all major items traded between sectors should 
be included in the index. Prices used should reflect the prices 
received and prices paid by the agriculturist for the sale of 
his products and the purchase of non-agricultural commodities 
respectively. Furtheimore the price of each commodity should 
be weighted by the quantities bought from or sold to the non- 
agricultural sector.
Data on intersectoral transactions is not available for 
the Pakistan economy therefore weights have to be computed 
by seme indirect method. Lewis derived the value of intersectoral 
sales and purchases by estimating the total availability of 
various commodities and then apportioning it between the 
agricultural and non-agricultural sector on the basis of 
certain assumptions about the consumption pattern of the two 
sectors. The net availability of each cormiodity was calculated 
by adding the value of imports to the value of domestic supply 
less the value of exports. Alternative sets of weights were 
derived on the basis of different assumptions about consumption 
behaviour of the population of the two sectors (these included 
equal per capita expenditure in the sectors; 10%, 25% amd 40% 
less per capita expenditure on non-agricultural consumption goods 
in the rural sector). Similarly for manufactured intermediate
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and investment goods a smaller per capita share was assigned 
to the agricultural sector but the exact proportions were not 
specified.
Apart from the fact that the value of intersectoral sales 
and purchases was based on arbitrary assumptions, the accuracy 
of Lewis weighting scheme was further reduced by the inclusion 
of commodities in the index which did not enter in the trade 
between sectors. All commodities produced in the large scale 
manufacturing sector were incorporated in the composite index 
of non-agricultural items. Weights were assigned to items like 
basic metals, non metallic minerals which were hardly likely to 
feature in the purchases of farmers from the non-agricultural 
sector. Thus the weight of machinery except electrical was greater 
than the combined share of tea, sugar and edible oils while the 
share of basic metals in the weighting scheme was larger than
'■nuu ft* 2
that of sugar (see "Table A.2). Furthermore Commodities purchased 
from the non-agricultural sector but not produced by large scale 
industry such as expenditure on electricity and gas were excluced.
Information available on per capita consumption expenditure 
in the rural and urban sectors makes it possible to estimate more 
accurate weights by employing an alternate methodology used 
by Thamarajikshi'*' in her study on sectoral prices in India. Using
Thamarajikshi (1969).
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this method, an attempt is made to generate a time series 
of net barter teims of trade for the period fran 1969/70 
to 1978/79.
The construction of weights for consumption goods by 
this method entails the following steps:
1. The Household Income and Expenditure Survey published by 
Central Statistical Office (CSO) gives the pattern of 
monthly consumption expenditure per household for both 
urban and rural areas classified by major items of food, 
clothing, footwear, fuel and lighting and other miscellaneous 
expenditure. The sub-division of these items into agricultural 
and non-agricultural commodities is as follows:
Agricultural^ Non-agricultural
1. Foodgrains 1. Edible Oils
2 . Pulses 2 . Condiments and spices
3. Milk and milk products 3. Sugar and sugar products
4. Meat and fish 4. Tobacco and chewing products
5. Poultry 5. Tea
6 . Vegetables 6 . Clothing and footwear
7. Firewood 7. Gas and electricity
2. The next step is to derive total expenditure on purchases
The agricultural sector is defined to include crop 
rearing, fishing, livestock and forestry.
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and sales of various commodities by the agricultural and 
non-agricultural sector by using sectoral, population data 
to blow up per capita expenditure on individual items.
Thamarajikshi in her study assumed that the rural
pattern of consumption applied to the agricultural population
and the less organised sub-sectors of non-agriculture (i.e.
forestry, fishery, small enterprises and construction),
whereas the urban pattern applied to the rest of the non-
2
agricultural sector. Mundle has derived a simple method 
which does away with the need to rely on assumption on 
consumption patterns to estimate expenditure on agricultural 
and non-agricultural goods by the agricultural and non- 
agricultural population. He simply decomposes the rural 
and urban population into their agricultural and non-agricultural 
components. Hence the value of sales of individual agricultural 
products to non-agriculture is obtained by multiplying the per 
capita expenditure on each item in the rural and urban areas 
by the rural non-agricultural and urban non-agricultural 
populations respectively and summing the totals. A similar 
procedure is applied to derive the value of purchases of 
non-agricultural products by the agricultural sector.
 ^ Thamaraj ikshi (1969), 
2 Mundle (1975\
iy]
For Pakistan, although information is not available on 
the division of population by different economic categories, 
the Labour Force Survey published by the CSO provides data on 
self supporting persons in various economic categories as a 
proportion of the rural and urban totals. This information can 
be used to estimate agricultural and non-agricultural population 
in the two sectors on the assumption that population is distributed 
in different economic categories in the same ratio as self 
supporting persons. Estimates of urban and rural population for 
1969/70 have been taken from a World Bank Report.^
3. Usually household survey totals when blown up are less than
o
the national accounts total of private consumption expenditure.
The estimate of total private consumption expenditure based on
survey data is 82% of the national income estimates of the
corresponding figure. The lower value of consumption estimates
may be partly due to the inadequate representation of the higher
3
income groups in the sample. Furthermore the national account 
consumption figure also included consumptions of various non-profit 
organisations such as religious institutions, private schools, 
private hospitals and co-operatives etc.
To adjust the the discrepancy in the two estimates, the 
ratio of expenditure on individual items to the total consumer
^ World Bank (1978), Appendix Table 1.3, p. 152
2 Oshima (1970), p. 16
3
This inadequacy of the survey data has been pointed out by 
Azfar (1973), p.47; Naseem(1973), p. 120
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expenditure based on survey data is applied to the consumption 
expenditure given by the National Income statistics.^
4. Imports are deducted from the adjusted estimates to derive 
final values to be used as weights. Following the approach 
adopted by Thamarajikshi, imports of non-agricultural 
commodities are assumed to be divided between the two sectors 
in proportion to their share in total consumption whereas 
agricultural commodities for final use are assumed to be 
inported only for the consumption of the non-agricultural 
sector. Detailed data on imports by commodities was 
available from the Statistical Bulletin published by the CSO.
With respect to agricultural commodities for intermediate 
use it is assumed that the entire value of production is purchased 
by non-agriculture. No allowance has been made for seed and wastage. 
Exports are not deducted on the assumption that agricultural raw 
materials exported come to the non-agricultural sector. Data on 
value of production of agricultural intermediate products is 
provided in the National Income Accounts published by the CSO. This 
publication also provides information on the value of non- 
agricultural intermediate inputs used by agriculture such as 
fertilizers, pesticides, water charges etc. Data on electricity 
and diesel oil used for farm production is given in the Energy
X
Here it should be mentioned that in the national accounts figures 
private consumption expenditure is not an independent estimate but 
is derived as a residual of NNP at factor cost after making 
adjustment for all other flows and hence includes an indeterminate 
statistical discrepancy.
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Year Book of 1979.^
The index was assigned base year weights in accordance with 
the Laspeyre formula. Base year weights were considered appropriate 
as the period of time was short enough for there not to have been 
any major shifts in the composition of sectoral trade. The choice 
of 1969/70 as base year was guided by several considerations.
Firstly it was a relatively normal year in a period characterized 
by wide fluctuations in;:prices. Prices had stabilized after the 
sharp increases in the drought years of 1966/67 and 1967/68. ’While 
1970/71 was characterized by somewhat lower prices due to the record 
breaking harvest of the preceding year. Finally a new series of 
wholesale price index numbers was provided by the CSO with 1969/70 
as base period which had wider coverage and more detailed class­
ification of commodities.
Wholesale prices were used in the construction of terms of
trade indices. More appropriate prices would have been harvest
prices at which the farmers sells his product and retail prices
which he pays for purchases fran the non-agricultural sector.
However in the case of Pakistan, the harvest prices used by
the Central Statistical Office are a fixed proportion of wholesale
2
prices and are not an independent measure. Wholesale prices are 
also believed to be more reliable than retail prices since fewer 
outlets are involved.
 ^ Government of Pakistan (1979).p
Government of Pakistan, Statistics Division (1977), p. (i)„
1 3 * *
Statistical Results
Estimates of terms of trade, based on the alternate method, 
for final goods, intermediate goods and all conmodities traded 
are presented in Tables .1 . The results for the overall index of 
terms of trade reveal a shift in favour of the agricultural 
sector. Terms of trade at a more disaggregated level in the 
case of conmodities for final and intermediate use also point 
to a greater rate of increase in farm prices as compared to 
those for non-agricultural goods. The improvement in agriculture's 
terms of trade was most pronounced in the case of intermediate 
goods. Whereas net barter terms of trade for all commodities 
moved from 103.31 in 1970/71 to 112.7 in 1978/79, the change 
was more dramatic in the case of intermediate goods with the 
index increasing by nearly 50% from 107.19 in 1970/71 to 157.54 in 
1977/78.
The faster growth in the relative price ratio for the 
intermediate goods sector was not attributable to differences 
in the rate of price increase within the agricultural sector 
between consumption and intermediate goods. On the contrary 
the rate of increase of the price index for agricultural products 
for final use was 16% while the corresponding figure for
agricultural commodities for intermediate use was lower at 14.9%(see Table 3. 
The greater improvement in agriculture's terms of trade for 
intermediate goods reflected the slow rate of price increase of
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Table 3.1
Agriculture's Terms of Trade - Alternate Method
Base 1969/1970
Final
goods
Intermediate
goods
Final and In 
goods
1970/71 101.7 107.19 103.3
1971/72 101.4 110.7 103.3
1972/73 104.0 144.63 1 1 0 .6
1973/74 113.0 142.30 114.3
1974/75 107.3 115.92 103.3
1975/76 1 1 0 .6 125.49 109.1
1976/77 1 1 0 .1 145.79 1 1 0 .1
1977/78 107.2 157.84 108.7
1978/79 108.8 152.58 112.7
Table 3.2
Index of Prices -Received by Agriculture-r Alternate Method
Base 1969/70
Final
goods
Intermediate
goods
Final and : 
goods
1970/71 108.48 112.34 109.11
1971/72 114.08 117.34 114.04
1972/73 127.82 143.48 132.48
1973/74 192.58 187.66 188.2
1974/75 238.78 199.7 218.45
1975/76 256.43 233.91 240.35
1976/77 285.88 265.92 272.45
1977/78 305.92 289.95 294.21
1978/79 317.13 332.16 313.38
1 3 6
Table 3.3
Index of Prices Received by Nqn-Agriculture-Alternate Method
Base 1960/70
Final
goods
Intermediate
goods
Final and Intermediate 
goods
1970/71 106.7 104.8 106.5
1971/72 112.5 106 1 1 1 .8 6
1972/73 1 2 2 .8 6 99.2 1 2 0 .8
1973/74 170.4 131.87 167.07
1974/75 2 2 2 .6 172.27 218.51
1975/76 231.8 186.4 228.36
1976/77 259.77 182.4 253.36
1977/78 285.46 183.7 276.59
1978/79 291.43 217.7 285.31
Table 3.4
Compound Rates of Growth of Indices based on Alternate Method 
Agriculture
Prices received for final goods. 16.0%
Prices received for intermediate goods. 14.9%
Prices received for final and intermediate goods. 15.7%
Non-Agr iculture
Prices received for final goods. 14.8%
prices received for intermediate goods. 1 0 .0 %
Prices received for final and intermediate goods. 14.5%
Net Barter Terms of Trade
Goods for final use. 1.0%
Goods for Intermediate use. 4.5%
Goods for final and Intermediate use. 0.9%
non-agricultural intermediate inputs. Non-faim 
intermediate products registered the lowest rate of 
price increase of only 10% as compared to 14.8% 
for non-agricultural consumption conmodities.
The below average increase in the price of 
fertilizers which comprised nearly one-third 
of non-agricultural inputs purchased by the 
farm sector was a major reason for the relatively 
slower rising trend of prices in the subsector 
(see Table A.5)
Trends in growth rates hide the wide fluctuations 
in prices which marked the period specially the years 
from 1972 to 1975. The favourable shift in agriculture's 
teims of trade in 1972/73 was largely ■ a result of 
the dramatic price increase in the export crops (rice, 
cotton) following the devaluation of the rupee in May 
1972 and the inflation in international prices of 
primary conmodities (see Tables A.4 and A.5).
Prices of non-traded crops were unaffected - wheat
prices increased by a mere 3%. Inflationary pressures in the
economy reached a peak in, 1973/74,. prices? of non-agricultural
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products increased by 38% over the previous year while the 
corresponding figure for the agricultural sector was even higher 
at 50% and was reflected in a further jump in the terms of 
trade for the farm sector. This time the main impetus for higher 
prices came from the final goods component of agriculture.
The following year, 1974/75, agriculture’s terms of trade 
declined sharply as a result of a slump in the international 
price of cotton. The terms of trade for intermediate goods 
dropped by nearly thirty points from 142,30 to 115.92. The 
deterioration in terms of trade in the final goods sector 
was not so drastic and foodgrain prices continued to show 
substantial increase over the previous years - 54% in the case 
of wheat, 90% in the case of maize, and 118% in the case of 
bajra. The latter half of the seventies was marked by a 
considerable reduction in the rate of inflation in the economy. 
However terms of trade continued to move in favour of 
agriculture due to a steady increase in the price of products 
for intermediate use mainly cotton.
Comparisons with the Gotsch and Brown Estimates
The results of a continued favourable trend in agriculture’s 
terms of trade during the seventies go contrary to the findings 
of the only other empirical work on sectoral price trends for 
the period. The estimates derived by Gotsch and Brown,^ based on
 ^ The estimates derived by Gotsch and Brown are presented in graph 
form only.
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Lewis weights, reveal a sharp increase in the terras of
trade index up.,to 1973/74 followed by a sharp decline in
1974/75. On the basis of these findings the authors claim
that there was a "steep decline in the terms of trade ratio
1
in the post '6 8  period.
The diametrically opposite conclusion to the results 
derived earlier in this chapter is simply attributable to the 
fact that the Gotsch and Brown series extends only up to 
1974/5, a year marked by a sharp downward fluctuation in the 
sectoral price ratio facing agriculture. A further extension 
of Lewis series up to 1978/79 has been computed in this study 
and is presented in Table 3,5. The estimates bring out clearly 
that the fall in terms of trade inll974/75 was not the beginning 
of a declining trend but rather fluctuations around an increasing 
trend.
The cause of the slump in the teims of trade was a clear 
indicator of it's transitory nature. Gotsch and Brown 
attributed the drop in relative prices to a sharp increase in 
the prices of manufactured consumer goods but although the 
prices of these commodities were'-rising they were not responsible 
for the downward movement in the teims of trade. This is clear 
from the fact that estimates of terms of trade for consumption 
goods based on Lewis weights (Table 3.5). show an improvement rather 
than a fall. Hence the index for this sub-sector rose from
Gotsch and Brcwn (1977) p. 39..
Table 3.5
Agriculture"^ Terms of Trade-Lewis Weights
Base 1969/70
Final Intermediate 
goods goods
Final and Intermediate 
goods
1979/71 98.87 106.06 101.38
1971/72 98.75 103.96 100.5
1972/73 104.17 126.78 112.43
1973/74 102.36 128.32 1 1 1 .6
1974/75 107.44 104.94 106.43
1975/76 108.08 115.31 110.62
1976/77 106.19 133.85 115.72
1977/78 102.37 143.16 115.58
1978/79 103.26 158.12 121.24
Table 3.6
Index of Prices Received by Agriculture-Lew:
Base 1969/70
Final Intermediate Final and Ii
goods goods goods
1979/71 105.28 111.57 107.41
1971/72 112.81 116.67 113.97
1972/73 130.46 147.55 136.71
1973/74 177.06 192.4 182.48
1974/75 228.87 202.47 217.94
1975/76 242.15 236.06 239.06
1976/77 267.85 269.43 267.66
1977/78 290.84 290.52 289.84
1978/79 297.77 337.86 312.43
Table 3.7
Index Prices Received by Non-Agriculture-Lewis weights
Base 1969/70
Final
goods
Intermediate
goods
Final and Intermediate 
goods
1970/71 106.48 105.19 105.95
1971/72 114.23 1 1 2 .2 2 113.4
1972/73 125.24 116.38 1 2 1 .6
1973/74 172.97 149.94 163.51
1974/75 213.01 192.94 204.77
1975/76 224.04 204.72 216.11
1976/77 252.23 201.28 231.3
1977/78 284.11 202.94 250.77
1978/79 288.37 213.67 257.69
Table 3.8
Compound Rates of Growth of Indices Based on Lewis weights
Base 1969/70
Agriculture
Prices received for final Goods 15.2%
Prices received for Intermediate Goods 15.2%
Prices received for all Commodities 15.2%
Non-Agr iculture
Prices received for final Goods 14.5%
Prices received for Intermediate Goods 10.4%
Prices received for Final and Intermediate Goods 12.9%
Net Barter Terms of Trade
Goods for Final use 6.0%
Goods for Intermediate use 4.3%
Goods for Final and Intermediate use 1.9%
102.36 in 1973/74 to 107.44 in 1974/75 while the overall index 
based on Lewis weights fell from 111.6 to 106..4 in 1974/75.
A disaggregated analysis of prices reveals that the deterioration 
was a result of the sharp fall in cotton prices due to a recession 
in international demand.
Net barter terms of trade derived on the basis of Lewis weights 
show an even faster rate of increase than the series estimated by 
the alternate method. Thus from 1970/71 to 1978/79 the Lewis 
series grew at an annual rate of 1.9% which was more than double 
the trend computed for the alternate series (Table 3.10): The
difference in the rate of change in the two sets of terms of trade 
series reflects the differences in the weights used. Whereas the 
weights used for agricultural commodities are roughly comparable, 
there are considerable divergences between the two sets of weights 
used to compute the price index of non-agricultural commodities 
purchased by agriculture. Intermediate manufactured goods, which 
registered the lowest rate of price increase for the period, 
comprise 50% of total purchases in the Lewis scheme while their 
share is only 9.3% in the weights for non-agricultural goods 
derived by the alternate method;(see table A.2). Thus while the index 
of prices of agricultural commodities revealed a fairly similar 
trend for both methods, the rate of increase in the index of 
prices received by non-agriculture was much lower for the Lewis 
series at 12.9% as compared to 14.5% for the alternate series
1V5
Trends and Phases in Movement of Terms of Trade - 1950/51 to 
1978/79
1 2Estimates of terms of trade by Lewis and Hussain and by Lewis 
for the period from 1951 to 1969 and the further extension of 
the series up to 1978/79, computed in this study, provide a time 
series over the longest period. This data can be used to 
establish trends and trace out the different phases in the 
movements of the sectoral price ratio.
As can be seen from Table 3.9 the first phase from 1951/52 
to 1954/55 is marked by a decline in prices of farm vis a vis 
non-agricultural goods. This is followed by a period of 
continuous, improvement in terms of trade in favour of agriculture 
from the mid-fifties to 1967/68 tapering off till 1970/71. The 
final phase till the late seventies is characterised by wide 
fluctuations in the series along a sharply increasing trend.
Annual growth rate for the price indices of agricultural 
products, non-agricultural products and net barter terms of trade 
for the period from 1958 to 1969 and from 1969/70 to 1978/79 as 
well as for the entire period are presented in Table 3.10. The 
results reveal a much higher level of price increase in the 
inflationary situation in the seventies compared to the relative 
price stability of the sixties. Although agriculture's net 
barter terms of trade registered a positive trend in both periods,
* Lewis & Hussain (1966). 
^ Lewis (1970).
Table 3.9
Intersectoral Terms of Trade 1951-1978 
(3 Year moving average) Base 1959/60
1951-54 97.39
1952-55 91.14
1953-56 87.36
1954-57 91.41
1955-58 96.03
1956-59 98.76
1957-60 99.43
1958-61 103.13
1959-62 106.39
1960-63 108.28
1961-69 107.17
1962-65 109.15
1963-66 1 1 0 .0 1
1964-67 1 1 2 .1 0
1965-68 108.46
1966-69 106.55
1969-70 103.2
1968-71 104.0
1969-72 104.9
1970-73 109.8
1971-74 118.2
1972-75 1 2 1 .8
1973-76 118.6
1974-77 115.5
1975-78 118.0
Source: 1951/54 to 1960/63 from Lewis and Hussain (1967); 
1961/64 to 1966/69 from Lewis (1970)
1969/70 to 1977/78 calculated in this thesis; 
Weights were taken from Lewis and Hussain(1966); 
data on price indices taken from Government of 
Pakistan, central Statistical Office, Statistical 
Bulletin, 1978/79.
1 ^ 5
Table 3.10
Ccnpound Rates of Growth 
Indices based on Lewis"* Weights, 1958-1978 
{3 years moving avarage)
1959/60 = 100
58/61-75/78 58/61-66/69 69/70-75/7
Prices received by Agriculture 12.0% 2.4% 14.6%
Prices received by Non-Agriculture 8.04% 1.7% 12.3%
Terms of Trade 4.19% *996- 2.0%
1A-6
the annual growth rate at 2% in the latter period was more 
than double the trend prevailing in the years form 1958 to 1969.
Implications of Shifts in Terms of Trade on Output
In the absence of time series data on marketable surplus, a 
rigorous test of the response of marketed surplus to changes in the
terms of trade has not been possible for the Pakistan economy. However
1 2 cross-sectional studies by Khan and Chaudhury and Raqibuzzaman
based on National Sample Survey data for 1959 and 1960 respectively
have statistically tested the response of marketed output to various
economic variables. Hie results of both studies indicate that the
principal determinant of marketed surplus is total output. In each
case the elasticity of marketed output with respect to output was
greater than unity reflecting the strong positive association between
the two variables.
Evidence on the responsiveness of output to prices is mainly
3
limited to single crops. The findings show a positive supply response 
to changes in relative prices, the degree of output elasticity to 
price being greater for cash crops. However, these results cannot 
be. generalized to indicate the response of aggregate output to the 
level of intersectoral terms of trade. Given the scarcity of land 
resources, improvements in productivity per acre is an essential 
prerequisite to an increase in overall farm output. Thus although 
price incentives may induce a shift of acreage from one crop to 
another, they may be ineffective in raising aggregate output where
 ^ Khan and Chaudhury (1963).
^ Raqibuzzaman (1966 )*
^ Cummings (1975), Falcon (1964).
1 ^ 7
productivity per acre is constrained at low levels due to 
technological and organizational bottlenecks.
Despite these considerations, a number of studies on
agricultural development in Pakistan assume a strong positive
X
association between faim prices and sectoral output. The
tendency to singling out price incentives as the major catalyst
for the expansion of agricultural output gained popularity in the
sixties when favourable movements in agriculture's terns of trade
coincided with substantial improvements in faim productivity, 
o
Lewis interpreted the positive association between prices and 
output during the period as evidence of a casual link with higher 
prices leading to increased output. No mechamism was specified 
as to how price incentives led to a major breakthrough in aggregate 
output. By shifting the emphasis to prices as the major determinant 
of production he undermined the importance of technological and 
structural factors underlying low productivity.
The dramatic growth in farm output in the sixties was 
preceded by a considerable easing of the irrigation constraint 
as a result of the widespread installation of tubwells. Regular 
availability and seasonal flexibility of water supply made possible 
by tubewell irrigation, set the stage for the adoption of the 
seed-fertilizer technology. In the absence of an improvement in
^ Lewis and Hussain (1966), p. 415-416; Lieftinck, Sadove
and Creyke (1968), pp. 10-11; Bose and Clark (1969), pp. 273-30;' 
Ealcon and Gotsch (1966),pp. 25-26.
^ Lewis and Hussain (1966), p. 415-416.
3
Mohammed (1965).
1^ 8
water availability, the increase in output was not forthcoming. 
Terms of trade moved in favour of agriculture in the late fifties 
yet their effect on output was limited before the spread of 
tubewell irrigation. Moreover positive price policies did 
not produce a "green revolution" in East Pakistan due to a 
variety of infra-structural obstacles. As Bose in his study on 
the contrast in agricultural development in East and West 
Pakistan has pointed out: "the main factors limiting the 
programme of increased uses of improved inputs have been the 
size and quality of the extension sources, financial inability 
of most faimers to purchase these inputs, and the risks of 
crop failures due to natural calamities. These obstacles 
cannot be eliminated by price incentives."*
The ability to respond to prices was a function of the
increased and timely availability of water. At the same time
the productive potential of tubewell technology was so great
that the incentive effect of prices was marginal by comparison, 
o
Nulty has estimated that a 20% fall in prices of rice, maize, 
sugarcane and wheat would reduce the advantage of a tubewell 
farm as compared to a non-tubewell farm from a 60%-80% increase 
to a 50-70% increase in net income.
The results of the only attempt to estimate the relationship 
between teims of trade changes and aggregate output for the
1 Bose (1972), p.92.
2 Nulty (1972), p.92.
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Pakistan economy during the sixties, show that the effect 
of prices on output was statistically insignificant. However 
the regression of output on the time variable, a proxy for 
technological change, was highly significant. On the basis 
of these results the authors concluded that "the general 
profitability of agriculture and the obvious fact that in 
the Pakistan case the productivity of improved technology 
was sufficient to provide the incentive necessary for a 
respectable rate of growth".^
After the initial impact of the new technology had
run through, continued favourable movements in the terms
of trade in the seventies were associated with relative
stagnation in aggregate output. Hie government policy of
enhancing procurement prices of major crops did lead to
significant gains in the output of wheat, rice and sugarcane.
However this was achieved largely through shifts in acreage.
away frcm inferior cereals and pulses, product outside the
purview of the procurement program. The yields of major
crops, with the exception of wheat, were either stagnant or
declining. Rice yields showed no improvement while output
per acre for sugarcane and cotton revealed a falling trend. Increased
production of these crops was almost entirely attributable to
shifts in acreage. A more detailed empirical analysis of the
pattern and sources of agricultural growth in the seventies is
presented in a later chapter, the brief mention in the present
context was merely to illustrate the ineffectiveness of the policy 
of relying on price incentives in raising the level of aggregate output.
 ^ Gotsch and Brown (1977), p. 39.
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APPENDIX A
Determinants of Eoodgrain Prioes 1961/62 - 1976/77
An attempt is made in this section to statistically 
test the influence of economic variable such as net availability 
of foodgrains and money supply on foodgrain prices by fitting 
a multiple regression equation of the following form:'*'
Pt=a+b( D-S) t _ x + c ( D-S) t_2 +Mt
D-S is the gap between aggregate demand and supply 
measured frcm a base period in this case, 1959/60, when the 
two are assumed to be balanced.
The Demand variable (D) incorporates the effect of changes 
over time in per capita income and population and is measured 
by the following equation:
Dt=Lt(Q(A/Y)b)t
where L^_ is population in period t
Q is per capita consumption of foodgrains in base period 
Y is per capita income over base period level 
A- Y is change in per capita in cone over base period level 
b is the income elasticity of demand for foodgrains
Alternate values for aggregate demand (D) were calculated
^This model was used by Mellor and Dar (1968) In their study on 
foodgrain prices in the Indian economy from 1949 to 1964„
on the basis of three sets of figures for b. Estimates
1
of income elasticity of foodgrains vary from .33' to an
2 3alternate value of .22 vVhile EAO studies use a much
higher estimate of .5.
Aggregate supply (S) is the sum of production lagged 
by one year plus imports plus government stocks of foodgrains.
(P^) represents the foodgrain price index.
In keeping with a priori expectation; that changes
in the level of money would be a major determinant of the
absolute level of prices, the results reveal that the
coefficient of the money supply variable was positive and
highly significant. However the variable of net aggregate
demand was statistically insignificant implying that the
changes in price level did not reflect the relative scarcity
of sectoral output. These findings are in keeping with
enpirical work on determinants of farm prices in the Indian 
4
economy. The research also indicates that the upward trend 
in foodgrain prices is explained primarily by expansion of
1 Bahman (1963).
 ^Hufbauer (1968).
3 Gibbs et al. (1966). ,
H Mellor and Dar (1968); Parthasarathy and Mudahar (1976); 
Sidhu and Singh (1979).
1 ^ 2
money supplied while the -impact of sectoral output is 
insignificant.
Ihe low explanatory power of relative supply may be
attributable to the fact that changes in private stocks of
foodgrains are not incorporated in the variable. If, as would
be expected, years of good crop lead to greater storage
and years of bad harvest lead to a depletion of stocks,
changes in private holdings of foodgrains would to sane
extent counteract the influence of production change. However
1
information available for India suggests that farmers 
storage behaviour does not necessarily follow the expected 
pattern and is not highly predictable.
Ihe negligible effect on the net aggregate demand
variable could also be interpreted as highlighting the
importance of government policies, rather than supply demand
factors, as the determining influence for the rising trend
in faim prices. In the Indian context, the role of government
policies, specially policies with respect to administered
2
prices, has been stressed by a number of observers as the 
principal explanation of the relatively faster rising trend 
of agricultural prices. The case has been put forward most 
forcefully in Mitra's study which outlines in detail the 
repercussions of changes in procurement prices on the level 
of market prices in the Indian economy.
 ^ Mellor and Dar (1968), pp. 968-970.
2 Mitra (1977), pp. 110-112; Rao (1974), p. 12; Shetty (1978), 
p. 207.
Whereas this section was primarily concerned with 
assessing the effect of supply and demand of sectoral output 
and changes in money supply on the movement of farm prices, 
the influence of government policy and the factors which 
determine price setting decisions in the Pakistan economy 
will be analysed in the next chapter.
xTable A.l 
Regression Results
(D-S) (D-S) M
t-1 t-2 t
b=.22 .015 -.005 .007*
♦Significant at the 1% lavel
Source: Kemal and Bilquees(i98i); Government of Pakistan, 
Ministy of Finance, Economic Survey, various 
issues.
Table A.2
Weights - Non-Agricultural Commodities
Lewis Alternative Method
Sugarle .018
Edible oil .14
Vegetable Ghee
Tea .05
Salts and Spices .012
Beverages .006
Tobacco .038
Cotton textiles .25
Silk and Artsilk .034
Footwear .017
Wood and Furniture .003
Printing and Publishing .017
Soap and Perfume .024
Matches .009
Jute Textile .023
Paper Manufacturing .08
Leather .001
Rubber products .010
Fertilizers .146
Medicine .038
Petrol and Coal .045
Non Metalic Minerals .012
Basic Metal .02
Metal Products .01
Machinery except electrical .08
Electical Machinery .014
Transport equipment .02
Charcoal
Gas —
Electricity (final use)
Electricity (intermediate use)
Diesel oil (intermediate use)
.13
.005
.07
.052
.083
.04
.36
.115
.01
.04
.034
.0004
.0003
.008
.023
.03
Table A.3 
Weights - Agricultural Ccmnodities 
Lewis Alternative Method
Wheat .228 .22
Rice .083 .04
Other Cereals .021 .01
Gram .04 .01
Other Pluses .04 .02
Milk .137 .12
Ghee .07 .056
Meat .02 .056
Fish - .005
Chicken - .005
Eggs - .005
Vegetables .011 .055
Oilseeds .03 .27
Cotton .16 .153
Sugarcane .13 .13
Tobacco .04 .04
Wool .014
Hide and Skin .014
Firewood - .048
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Table A. 4
Annual Percentage Change In the Price Indices of Various Agricultural
Ccmnodities 1971/72 - 1978/79
Wheat Rice Cotton Sugarcane Tobacco
1971/72 14% 5% 9.2% 1% 9.3%
1972/73 3% 50% 21% 32% 1%
1973/74 24% 25% 45% 15% 16.4%
1974/75 54% 15% -12% 12% 89%
1975/76 -2.6% 10% 20% 21% 2%
1976/77 -1.7% 13% 28% -2% 8.8%
1977/78 14.7% 14% 14.8% .1% 9.4%
1978/79 10% 9% 21% — 11.7%
Milk Meat Vegetable Jowar Bajra
1971/72 4% 2% -24% 24% 23%
1972/73 20% 11% 2% 22% 44%
1973/74 41% 40% 221% 9% 12%
1974/75 29% 37% -51% 81% 118%
1975/76 13% 13% 13% 12% .4%
1976/77 17% 10% 52% -1% -19%
1977/78 1% 7.4% -7% -5.4% 20%
1978/79 4% 2.8% 5% 7% 53%
Table A.5
Annual Percentage change in the Price Indices of Various Non-Agricultural
Carmodities 1971/72 - 1978/79
Vegetable
Ghee
Salt and 
Spices
Sugar Cigarettes Tea
1971/72 1% 8% -3% 13.5% 2%
1972/73 -.4% -1% 32% 3% 25%
1973/74 25% 30% 40% 11% 3%
1974/75 31% 113% 24% 58% 8%
1975/76 14% -21% 11% 17% -.8%
1976/77 1% 32% —  - 9% 2%
1977/78 -.7% 7% _ 14% 75%
1978/79 3% 2% — 12% *
Cotton Textiles Footwear Kerosene Oli Fertilizers
1971/72 4% 4.5% 19% -12%
1972/73 7.7% 8% -1% -22%
1973/74 64% 16% 27% 34%
1974/75 16% 40% 35% 41%
1975/76 5% 8% 12% 5%
1976/77 17% 8% 5% -10%
1977/78 9% 17% 1% -1%
1978/79 -1% 4% 17% -5%
\
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CHAPTER IV
INTERPRETATION OF CHANGES IN TERMS OF TRADE FOR THE PAKISTAN 
ECONOMY 1952-1977
Terms of Trade for the Pakistan economy have remained 
consistently favourable to agriculture since the late fifties. 
Irrespective of the methodology used, estimates of agriculture's 
net barter terms of trade have shown a substantial improvement 
in the past twenty two years. In recent years, estimates of terms 
of trade derived in this thesis show that the series has been 
characterized by sharp fluctuations but there is no mistaking 
the clearly increasing trend during the seventies.
What have been the factors responsible for movements in the
terms of trade over time? Empirical analysis on the subject
emphasizes the importance of government intervention in price
setting. The earlier work by Lewis'1" views the state as
neutral and above class and sectional interests. Government
policy is determined mainly by economic considerations. The
2 3more recent interpretation by Gotsch and Brown and Burki 
pertaining to terms of trade changes in the seventies, 
explicitly recognizes the political motives behind state 
decisions on economic policy. Public policy is seen as a means 
of furthering the interests of the groups in power. The state 
is no longer neutral but dominated by urban groups who are the
Lewis and Hussain (1966).
^ Gotsch and Brown (1977).
^ Burki (1980).
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principal beneficiaries of it's various policies and programs.
The difference in approach corresponds to changes over the 
period of the two studies of what was widely accepted in development 
research as the objective of state intervention in the economic 
sphere. Lewis's interpretation of economic policies as being 
guided primarily by the requirements of economic growth reflects the 
view current in the development literature of the early sixties. 
Government manipulation of terms of trade was recognised as an 
instrument for transferring resources between sectors.’*' However 
the direction of these transfers was determined by the exigencies 
of development strategy with the objective of maximising the 
economic welfare of the society.
It soon became clear that the benefits of the development
programs undertaken by developing countries were confined to the
priviledged strata of society whereas the relative position of
the low income groups continued to deteriorate. In the face of
the persistence of extreme poverty and increasing income
disparities the "growth oriented" policies came under severe
criticism. The focus of development research previously limited
to the problem of allocation of resources shifted to questions
2
of income distribution, basic needs and poverty. The emphasis
■*■ For a detailed account of the neo-classical approach to terms 
of trade see Mitra (1977), pp. 82-92.
2 The large number of studies on this subject which came out 
in the seventies include Chenery et al. (1974); Streeten and 
Burki (1978); Adleman and Morris (1973).
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on the distributional impact of state intervention brought the 
issue of benefits of economic policies to the forefront of the 
discussion. The links between the beneficiaries of public 
policy and the groups who weilded power in the state were 
unambiguous. It became increasingly untenable to justify 
the concentration of gains in the hands of the priviledged 
few as a result of mistaken priorities or errors in the choice 
of development strategy.
The concept of the neutral state lost credibility. While 
the view that public policy on economic issues should be analysed 
within a socio-political framework gained increased acceptance 
even amongst mainstream economists. It was widely admitted that 
decisions on economic policy were the result of pressure from 
power blocs in the society who were also their chief beneficiaries.
On the basis of evidence from less developed countries
Lipton claimed that the state represented urban interests and
government policies were aimed at strengthening the economic
position of the urban sector. This urban bias in public policy
was responsible for the diversion of a disproportionate share
of development funds to the urban sector than could be justified
either on the grounds of efficiency or equity. He argued that
these policies transferring resources were "based not on wisdom but
2
the pressure and concentration of urban power."
^ Schultz (.1978); Adleman and Morris (1973). 
2 Lipton ;(:1977), p. 19.
16 2
Resources are channelized into the urban sector through
a variety of mechanisms such as taxation, credit policy,
manipulation of terms of trade etc. The latter is the most
effective means of resource transfer. "It is above all by
cheapening farm output with private and public powers that
transfer savings capacity frcm agriculture to the rest of the
economy compulsory procurement, subsidized input disposal,
marketing boards, these are three of the many methods used by
the governments. The impact of these price twists is felt
throughout the economy, "They make temptations for off farm
investments more plentiful and for farm investments less so.
Price twists also directly encourage workers, managers,
educators and suppliers of allocable inputs to switch out 
2
of agriculture."
Recent research on agricultural development in Third World
countries has been considerably influenced by Lipton’s work.
The bias in government policies against the farm sector is singled
out by various economists as the principal reason for the
stagnation in productivity which characterized the agricultural
3
sector in a number of these countries during the seventies.
 ^ Ibid., p. 293.
^ Ibid., p . 307.
^ Schultz (1978), pp. 10-13; Brown (1978), p. 84; Lutz and 
Scandizzo (1980), pp. 15-16.
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In the context of Pakistan the influence of the thesis is 
most noticeable in analysis of changes in relative prices 
of farm and non-farm output. Mainly on the basis of a 
comparison of domestic and international prices, these 
studies'*' claim that price policy has favoured the non- 
agricultural sector. Following Lipton's reasoning, with 
no reference to facts on the power structure of the country, 
the bias in price policy is attributed to the control of the 
state apparatus by urban groups.
In this chapter an attempt is made to critically examine 
these various explanations of factors determining relative price 
movements. The discussion that follows is divided into three 
sections. The first part provides a more detailed assessment 
of Lewis’s interpretation of changes in intersectoral terms 
of trade covering the period from 1951/52 to 1969/70. This is 
followed by a critical analysis of more recent explanations of 
shifts in terms of trade during the Bhutto period put forward 
by Gotsch and Brown and by Burki. The final section, on the basis 
of available evidence on terms of trade, world prices, fertilizer- 
crop ratios etc., presents an alternative view on the determinants 
of government price policy decisions.
■*■ Gotsch and Brown (1977), p. 101; Burki (1980, pp. 135-141).
Changes in Terms of Trade 1951/52-1969/70
Terms of trade for the period 1950/51 to 1964 have been 
estimated by Lewis and Hussain and later updated by Lewis 
up to 1970.
Table 4.1.
Terms of Trade for Agriculture 1951/52-1969/70 (three year 
moving averages)
1951-54 97.39 1959-62 106.37
1952-55 91.14 1960-63 108.25
1953-56 87.36 1961-64 107.17
1954-57 91.41 1962-65 109.15
1955-58 96.03 1963-66 1 1 0 .0 1
1956-59 98.76 1964-67 1 1 2 .1 0
1957-60 99.43 1965-68 108.46
1958-61 103.13 1966-69 106.55
Source: terms of trade index for the years from 1951-54
is taken from S. Lewis and S.M. Hussain, Relative 
Price Changes and Industrialization in Pakistan, 
1951-64, Karachi, 1967; the estimates for the 
later period fran 1961/64-1966/69 are taken from 
S.R. Lewis, "Agriculture's Teims of Trade," 
Pakistan Development Review, 1970,
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Their estimates reveal a...fall in agriculture's teims of 
trade till the mid-fifties followed by an increasing trend 
tapering off in the late sixties.
Lewis attributes the sharp turn in terms of trade against 
agriculture in the early fifties to two factors.^ The sharp 
fall in export prices and the government trade policy of import 
control and over-valuation of the domestic currency. The 
trade policy was an attempt to cope with the balance of payment 
crises the country faced in 1953. As a result of the collapse 
of export earnings following the end of the Korean War Boon the 
import requirements of the economy could not be sustained by 
it's supply of foreign exchange. To meet the problem of 
exchange shortage the government decided to impose stringent 
controls rather than devalue the domestic currency. The 
result was an increase in the price of imports mostly manufactured 
goods. At the same time the fall in world prices not accompanied 
by a devaluation led to a fall in the domestic prices of exports, 
mostly agricultural commodities.
The subsequent improvement in agriculture's terms of trade
from the mid-fifties onward attributed by Lewis to the changes in
o
the relative supply of output in the two sectors. Large scale 
industry grew at an annual rate of 16.3% for the period from
1
Lewis and Hussain (1966), p. 413.
2
Lewis and Hussain (1966), p.413.
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Table 4.2.
Annual Compound Growth Rates by Sectors at 1959/60 Factor Cost
1949/50- 1960/61- 1963/64-
1959/60 1969/70 1970/71
Agriculture 1.2 3.7
Large-scale Manufact­
uring 16.3 9.0
Source: Growth rates for the period from 1949/50 to -
1959/60 are taken from T.M. Khan and A. Bergan, 
""Measurement of Structural Change in the Pakistan 
Economy: A Review of the National Income Estimates, 
1949/50 to 1963/64", Pakistan Development Review, 
Sumner 1967; growth rate for 1960/61-1969/70 
taken from Pakistan Economic Survey 1970/71; 
growth rate for 1963/64-1970/71 taken fran 
S. Guisinger, "Patterns of Industrial Growth", 
Pakistan Development Review. 1977.
1949/50 to 1959/60. The rapid growth was a response to high 
returns of investment, in the range of 50% to 100%, attributable 
to favourable terms of trade along with various fiscal rebates 
and cheap credit facilities. On the other hand agricultural 
output failed to keep pace even with population growth resulting 
in a decline in per capita agricultural product.
The persistance of relatively higher prices for farm 
products vis a vis non-farm products in the face of a dramatic 
increase in agricultural output during the sixties does not run 
counter to lewis's argument. Despite the acceleration in the
growth of agricultural production industrial output 
was still growing as a faster rate. Hence the 
continued favourable trend in agriculture's terms 
of trade.
However this does not explain why agriculture's 
terms of trade should increase sharply with a narrowing 
of the differential in sectoral growth rates. By 
attributing the positive shift in relative prices largely 
to supply factors, Lewis undermines the influence of 
government policy on prices during the period. The 
jump in agriculture's terms of trade index coincided 
with a shift in government price policy in the beginning 
of 1960. Control on the movement and price of wheat 
was replaced by a system of voluntary sale to 
government at a support price of 13.50 per maund.
Other measures that followed included a reduction of 
export duty on cotton, subsidy on fertilizer and 
other inputs, export bonus on fine quality rice etc.
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In analysing factor's responsible for a continued shift
in terms of trade in favour of agriculture during the sixties,
it would be crucial to consider the influence of the increase
in the support price of wheat (with a weight of 42% in the teims
of trade index). The support price of wheat was raised from Rs.
13.50 to Rs. 18.50 in May 1968^ with the official objective of
providing incentives to farmers to increase wheat production
as a part of the food self-sufficiency program. The price rise
was substantially more than what was considered necessary for
incentive purposes. On the basis of an enpirical study on a 12.5
acre farm in the Northern zone on Punjab, Rs. 11 was estimated
as the minimum price up to which it was worthwhile for farmers 
2
to grow wheat. Most economists and planners reccnmend a
3
price increase up to Rs. 14 or Rs. 15 per maund. Obviously 
non-economic considerations dominated in the decision to fix 
the price substantially above this level.
The government was persuaded to reduce the price seme
4months later in December 1968 not on the advice of economists, 
but due to the politically volatile situation in the urban areas
5
of the country at the time. However the following year the 
1
Government of Pakistan, Finance Division, Ecomonic Survey 1968-69,
p. 1 0 0 .
2
Falcon and Gotsch. Cited in government document; no source given.
3 Hasan (1976), p. 236; Nulty (1972), p;96.
4
Government of Pakistan, Finance Division, Economic Survey 1968/69, 
P. 100.
5
For a detailed account of unrest in urban areas in 1968 see 
Ziring (1971), pp. 92-95.
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price was rai?ad again in response to the demands of landed
interest. The move is described by Gotsch in the following
terms: "An exairple of their waxing power was the recent
re-establishment of the wheat support price in the face of
•>
the most unanimous opposition of economists in the provincial
1
and central planning agencies."
To the extent that price policies are determined by the
class basis of the state the question arises as to why in
the early fifties when the landlords were at the peak of their
power that terms of trade were turned against agriculture.
Why was the crises in the balance of payments met by a policy
of import controls rather than by the devaluation of the
rupee, a more favourable option frcm agriculture's point of
view? The major losers of the decision not to devalue were
the Bengali peasants. Jute comprised nearly 50% of the foreign
exchange earnings and was grown mostly on small farms in the
2
eastern province of the country. The overvaluation of the 
rupee was a means of transferring the surplus from the Bengali 
peasants in the form of foreign exchange to the industrialists 
based in West Pakistan. Thus in the first decade East Pakistan 
earned on average more than half the total foreign exchange
Gotsch (1976), p. 259.
2
Government of Pakistan, Planning Board (1958), p. 172.
of the country while its share of imports was less than 
1
one third. According to an official report the transfer 
of resources from East to West Pakistan was at the rate of 
Rs. 730 million a year over the twenty year period from 
1948/49 to 1968/9.2
The neglect of the interests of East Pakistan was made
possible by the dominance of the West Pakistani elites in the
policy making structure. The army was almost entirely drawn
from the provinces of Punjab and NWEP in the western wing.
East Pakistanis constituted not more than five per cent 
3
of the officers. A similar pattern was visible in the
4
regional composition of the civil service hierarchy.
The West Pakistani landlords were primarily concerned 
with maintaining their vast land resources. Information on
5
the concentration of landholdings for the pre-military period 
has been provided earlier in the study. To get a further idea 
of the enormous tracts of land involved, the average holdings 
of the landlords affected by '59 Land Reforms was over 5000
4 Government of Pakistan, Planning Commission (1970), p. 143.
2 Ibid., p. 73.
3 Sayeed (1968), p. 276.
4 Ayoob (1971), p. 201.
5 See Table 1.1.
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acres before surrender of land. 4 Hence avoidance of ceiling 
legislation was of far greater importance to their economic 
position than changes in farm prices.
Secondly the large landowners of West Pakistan were the
principal beneficiaries of the government program of large
scale investments. These irrigation schemes made possible
sharp increases in the area under cultivation and thereby the
income of this class. For the period from 1951/52 to 1959/60
o
irrigated land increased at an annual growth rate of 2 .11%.
The feudal aristocracy made use of their power to divert a 
disproportionate share of irrigation water to their lands.
3
According to Burkifs calculations, out of the 108 members 
of the landed elite who had held ministerial posts in the 
premilitary period at least 42 were charged by the military 
regime for "diverting to their land a higher proportion than 
allowed by law and custom of the available irrigation water. " 4
Interpretation of Terms of Trade Movements during the Bhutto 
Period
The net barter terms of trade series, derived in the preceding 
chapter, reveals a continued increasing trend in favour of 
agriculture during the seventies. The annual rate of price
4 Compiled from unpublished Land Commission statistics by 
Hirashima (1978), p. 69.
3 Hirashima (1978), p. 69.
3 Burki (1976), p. 303.
4 Burki (1976), p. 303.
increase was higher for agricultural commodities vis a vis 
non-agricultural goods irrespective of the level of 
aggregation. The differential in favour of agriculture 
was largest in the case of intermediate products. Whereas 
terms of trade Improved for agriculture as a whole at
an annual rate of 0.9% the increase was specially marked
in the case of intermediate products (4.5%) as compared 
to final goods (1 .0 %).
Gotsch and Brown in their study on price incentives in 
the Pakistan economy have claimed that the relative prices 
of agricultural commodities deteriorated in the seventies. 4 
The empirical basis of this conclusion was an extension of 
terms of trade using Lewis' weights. Their findings reveal 
a dramatic improvement in agriculture’s terms of trade till 
1973/74 followed by a steep fall in the index in 1974/75.3 
The sharp downward fluctuation in the series, however, does 
not warrant the conclusion that the relative price ratio had 
turned against the farm sector. This fact is brought 
out clearly by a further extension of the series up to 1978/79 
and a dis-aggregated analysis of the factors behind the slump 
in agriculture's terms of trade provided in Chapter 3. The 
analysis shows that the decline in farm prices was of a
4 Gotsch and Brown (1977), p . 39.
2
The estimates derived by Gotsch and Brown are presented in
graph form only.
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transitory nature while the overall trend in relative prices 
during the seventies was unambiguously to the advantage of 
the agricultural sector.
Gotsch. and Brown's interpretation of the supposedly 
unfavourable trend in agriculture's terms of trade differ from 
the approach used by Lewis in that they explicitly recognise 
political objectives of government manipulation of relative 
Xxrices. The state is viewed as mediating between the demands 
of the relative bargaining position of three powerful 
constituencies —  agriculturists, industrialists and consumers.
Thus "Government decisions concerning argicultural prices have 
been taken after the considerations of the interests of three
1
major groups: agricultural producers, consumers and manufacturers," 
The latter two share a common interest in low prices and are 
representative of the urban sector while the agriculturists 
represent the rural population. Intra-sectoral conflict of 
interest between net buyers and sellers of farm output in the 
rural sector is not mentioned. Whereas the classification of 
urban groups as industrialists and consumers is also designed 
to underplay any hint of conflict within the sector.
Hie influence of the urban bias thesis is clearly evident 
in the analysis although at one point the authors state that "it 
is not possible to know the weight policy makers gave to each of
 ^ Gotsch and Brown (1977), p. 8 8 .
these interests” the conclusions of the study indicate clearly 
that it is the urban interests who are pulling the strings of 
state policy. Thus "...the government has been primarily concerned 
with stabilizing the prices paid by the consumers and manufacturers 
for food and raw materials and has systematically held prices 
received by farmers to far less than world market prices.”^
The claim that urban interests dominated the state apparatus, 
even if urban interests are equated with those of the industrialists, 
is refuted by the discussion in a preceding chapter which clearly 
pointed to an appreciable reduction in the influence of this 
group relative to the rural elite during the Bhutto period. In 
any case lumping together labour and industrialists as 
representatives of the urban sector is specially misleading 
during the seventies when the conflict between the two classes 
was at it’s peak. Urban labour was a major constitiency of 
the Peoples Party and the price policy was used to cater to 
it's needs. However this objective was achieved not through 
paying lower prices to the agriculturists but by not allowing 
the issue price at which wheat was sold to low incane consumers 
to increase with the enhancement of procurement price. The 
burden of this subsidy was borne by the state exchequer.
The cost was substantial but Bhutto from his experience in Ayub' s 
cabinet was very aware of the political implications of a sharp
Gotsch and Brown (1977), p. 101.
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increase in food prices. In April '75 when the budgetary 
constraints made it impossible to maintain the lower issue 
price the government was careful to similtaneously announce 
an adjustment in wages as well.’*'
2
Another recent study by Burki also interprets state 
decision making on economic issues, including decisions on 
price setting, within the context of the political, framework 
of the period. The analysis of Bhutto’s policies is divided 
into two distinct periods - from 1972-1974 and from 1974-1977.
Each phase is viewed as marking a distinct shift in the groups
o
who dchinated the state machinery. In the earlier period 
representatives of the urban left occupied key policy making 
positions while the latter period was characterized by the 
re-emergence and control of the conservative elements of the party. 
The strength of the more radical faction of the PPP in the 
initial years was reflected in their control of important 
portfolios such as finance, economic affairs, planning and 
industrial production. A reshuffling of cabinet posts in 1974 
resulting in the exit of Mubashar Hasan, finance minister, 
and the appointment of Bucha, an avid spokesman of the large 
landowners lobby, marked the ascendancy of the more conservative 
group of the ppp into power.
^ Government of Pakistan, finance Division, Economic Survey, 1974/75, 
p. 1 0 2 .
Burki (1980).
_
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The policies adopted by the state in the early left 
dominated phase are viewed by Burki as serving the interests 
of their constituency —  the urban sector. Diverse policies 
#iich if anything were aimed at maintaining the progressive 
posture on which. Bhutto had fought the elections are lumped 
together as exhibiting urban bias. "Nationalization of companies 
in the more important basic industries, government take-over 
of the insurance and banking industries, labour reforms, 
establishment of public sector over private schools and colleges 
and the introduction of a scheme of generic medicine are 
examples of measures adopted with a distinct urban bias."'1'
IhrtheiTOore the PPP Left's main constituency was urban 
labour, students and the low income groups not the urban sector 
as a whole. As mentioned earlier in the discussion conflict 
within urban groups, specially between the industrialists and 
labour, was so intense at the time that it's ridiculous to 
refer to the urban sector as a homogeneous entity with a 
common platform on important economic issues.
In giving more detailed examples of "urban bias", Burki 
further confuses the issue and provides evidence which, instead 
of supporting, seems to refute his hypothesis. One such
1 Ibid., p. 135.
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instance concerns the pricing policy with, respect to refined 
1
sugar. In the Autumn of '72 due to sharp decline in the output
of sugarcane the price of refined sugar doubled. A twoitier
system was quickly established under which the urban consumers
were permitted to purchase their requirements from ration
shops at heavily subsidized prices. The burden of the subsidy
was borne by the state since the government could not pass on
the burden in teims of lower prices to sugarcane growers.
Another illustration of urban bias provided by Burki refers
to the "grey cloth scheme" aimed at ensuring adequate production
2
of a type of coarse cloth demanded by poor people. This was 
implemented firstly by enhancing minimum prices payable to 
growers with the supposed objective of increasing production 
of raw cotton and secondly by setting grey cloth quotas for 
textile mills. Burki himself points out .that low income 
consumers were the intended beneficiaries while the interests 
of the cotton growers were protected through a higher level 
of prices. It was the textile owners and cotton traders who 
were squeezed. Both 3he examples, far from reflecting "urban 
bias", serve to illustrate the governments concern to promote 
the interests of their two major constituencies, urban 
labour on the one hand and the rural elite on the other.
1 Burki (1980), p. 136.
2 Ibid., p. 137.
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One of the most crucial economic measures undertaken
by the regime in the first phase, the devaluation of the rupee,
with important bearing on inter-sectoral relations is emitted
from the discussion on urban biased policies because it goes
contrary to the hypothesis. While the sharp increase in
procurement prices is made to fit in with the neat link
established between the government of the urban left and pro-
urban thrust of policies. Hence according to Burki the
enhancement of procurement prices was motivated by a desire
to provide maximum amount of food to low income consumers,
any benefits to farmers were incidental.^ In any case he claims
that the farmers gained little or nothing since the cost of
inputs increased more than proportionately to the price hike.
Empirical support is provided for the argument by a comparison
of the real cost of purchasing inputs in 1973/74 to the level
that prevailed in the sixties. "However in 1973/74 at the height
of the PPP Left’s power the real cost of purchasing inputs by
farmers growing wheat was more than double that during the 
2
1960's." No further reference is made as to what is meant 
by "real cost" or as to how it is derived. An obvious measure 
for assessing the impact of changes in the output and input 
prices on the relative position of farmers is the intersectoral 
terms of trade series. Although Burki duscusses estimates of 
terms of trade derived by Gotsch and Brown at various points
1 Burki (1980), p. 157.
2 Ibid., p. 156.
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in the analysis,'*' he makes no attempt to use the results to 
substantiate his claim that the farmers did not benefit 
frcm the enhancement in procurement prices in 1973/74.
The most probable reason for this neglect is that the estimates 
provided evidence of a sharp shift in favour of agriculture 
in 1973/74 totally contradicting Burki's line of argument.
Movements in terms of trade during the Bhutto period 
present a problem from the point of view of Burki's analysis 
as the direction of changes does not tie in neatly with the 
interests of the groups in power. The index registers sharp 
increases up to 1973/74, the heyday of the urban left, 
followed by a decline at exactly when according to Burki the 
pro-agricultural lobby came into power.
To get around this contradiction Burki draws a distinction
2between the interest of middle and large landowners. The
3
middle farmers, defined in an early study as those with 
holdings between 50 and 100 acres, specialize in the production 
of wheat and rice whereas larger fanners mainly grew cash 
crops such as cotton, sugarcane and oilseeds. Not only is the 
crop composition different between these two size category 
of farmers but there is also considerable variation in the 
level of input use. The large farmers use "seed variety
1 Ibid.
3 Burki (1980), p. 157. 
3 Burki (1976), p. 307.
1 8 0
that do not need much, application of chemical fertilizers" 
while middle farmers use a larger amount of modem inputs 
and high yielding seed varieties. On the basis of these
V\
differences the incentive structure, and hence the terms 
of trade, facing the two classes of farmers is entirely 
different.
Prom here Burki goes on to argue that the decline
in aggregate terms of trade for agriculture masked considerable
variations in relative prices facing the different class of
farmers. The middle farmers suffered. "Ihe changes in the
prices of inputs and outputs during this period took away
the incentive that the price and subsidy policy had provided
2to the middle class farmers in the Ayub period." Whereas
the government dominated by the representatives of the landed
elite ensured that the terms of trade continued to favour
large landowners. In this context Burki specially mentions
• 3
the cotton growers of the Punjab.
However once again Burki’s argument is refuted by the 
available empirical evidence. Examination of price data at 
a more disaggregated level revealed that it was the decline 
in prices in the intermediate goods sector, specially raw 
cotton, which caused the slump in agriculture's terms of trade 
in 1974/75 in the first place. Furthermore there is no
1 Burki (1980), p. 158. 
^ Ibid., p. 158.
3 Burki (1980), p. 15.
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justification for classifying middle and large fanners
separately on the basis of the fact that they face different
sets of output and input prices and hence different sets
of terms of trade. Available data does not support either
the proposition that there is such a wide variation in the
crop composition for the two groups of farmers* or the
generalization of differences in the type and level of
o
inputs used by the middle and large sized farmers.
Alavi had aptly criticised Burki's thesis of a 
conflict of interest between the two categories of farmers.
”We cannot accept the implication that they constitute 
separate classes, since their interests do not conflict.
Their grounds on all essential issues of public policy are 
identical whether they be questions of prices of agricultural 
commodities, taxation of agricultural incomes or provision 
of facilities and services and subsidized inputs to landowners. 
Similarly they share an identical position on issues of class
i
The breakdown of crop composition by farm size provided in the 
1972 Census of Agriculture does not reveal any marked difference 
between the two largest size categories (50-150 acres and 150 
acres or more) with respect to area allocated to foodgrains 
(Government of Pakistan, Agricultural Census Organisation, 1976, p. 13).
o
Available evidence indicates a positive relationship between 
size of farm and use of modem inputs i.e. fertilizers, mechanical 
inputs etc. (Khan 1975, pp. 112-115; Ercelawn, 1979, p. 223;
Hussain 1980, p. 147-148). However in most of these studies 
landholdings of 50 acres or more are classified as large farms 
whereas Burki defines middle farmers as operating farms of between 
50 and 100 acres. The only empirical work which provides a further 
breakdown of farms into categories of 50-150 acres and 150 acres 
plus (Hussain 1980, p. 147.) shows that the use of modem inputs 
is higher in the larger size group.
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relationships in the rural society vis a vis sharecroppers
and landless labourers and on questions of public policy
and legislation."^ The middle and rich fanners are on
the same continuum of interest with respect to issues of
prices, inputs, land reform etc. Fran the point of view
of the differential impact of terms of trade a more useful
distinction would be between subsistence and non-subsistence 
2
farmers. As Mitra has emphasized the'Conflict of interest 
over prices is between farmers who are net sellers of output 
and those who are net buyers.
Finally fixing on 1974 as the point marking the switch 
from "urban biased" policies to pro-agricultural policies is ■ 
misleading and of no analytical significance. Although the 
changes in 1974 led to the exit of a prominent representative 
of the leftist faction, the deradicalization of the party 
apparatus was almost complete soon after Bhutto came into
3
power in 1972. A few leftists were kept on to maintain 
political identity as a progressive government. Even after 
the reshuffling of top positions in 1974, the Ministry of 
Agriculture was placed under the control of Sheikh Rashid, 
the only remaining socialist in the cabinet, to placate the 
more progressive component of PPP support. Furthermore the
1 Alavi (.1976), pp. 340-341.
2 Mitra (1977), p.97.
3 Lodhi (1980), p. 409.
1 8 3
tilt in economic policies in favour of the landed elite 
was visible long before this point. The land reforms of 
' 72 reflected a political conpromise in favour of the 
feudals. Devaluation, credit policies, frequent increases 
in procurement prices, policies undertaken before the 1974 
demarcation point, conferred further economic gains to this 
class.
Determinants of Price Policy: The Bhutto Period
Gotsch and Brown have claimed that the government price 
policy during the seventies was motivated by the objective 
of maintaining low agricultural prices for the benefit of the 
manufacturing sectors.^ In this section it will be shown on 
the basis of available evidence that on the contrary state 
decision making on prices was biased in favour of agriculture 
and the frequent enhancement of procurement prices were more 
than would have been warranted on economic considerations alone.
A look at the production and price data for the two 
sectors, presented in table 4.3 confirms the fact that the 
changes in terms of trade did not merely reflect the relative 
scarcity of sectoral outputs. Even though agricultural output 
increased at the same rate as industrial production from 1970/71
 ^ Gotsch and Brown (.1977), p. 101.
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Table 4.3
* Trend Rates of Growth of Output and Price Indices for Agriculture 
and Industry 1970/71-1978/79
1. Index of agricultural output 2.5%
2. Index of industrial output 2.5%
3. Index of prices received by agriculture 15.2%
4. Index of prices received by Industry 12.9%
Source: (1) and (2) based on data from Government of Pakistan 
Economic Survey ,1977/78; (3) and (4) are taken from 
table 3.8, chapter III of this thesis.
* Trend rate of growth of output is estimated by : log Y=a+bt.
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to 1976/77, the prices received for faim products showed 
a relatively greater increase at 15.7% as compared to the 
corresponding figure of 14.5% for the manufacturing sector.
Hence prices moved in the opposite direction to what would 
be expected on the basis of the relative supply of output 
of each sector.
Government policies with respect to devaluation of the 
rupee and procurement prices were among the major factors 
contributing to the considerable improvement in agriculture's 
terms of trade during the period. The decision to increase 
procurement prices was rationalized each time in terms of 
the necessity of providing greater incentives to stimulate 
agricultural production and to compensate for the increase in 
input costs. Irrespective of the specific factors limiting 
production in a particular year the appropriate remedy to the 
problem invariably lay in greater incentives through higher 
prices or subsidies or both. The descrepancy in officially 
cited causes and solutions of shortfalls in agricultural 
output is clearly illustrated in the government assessment 
of farm sector performance and policy prescriptions for 
1974/75.
The year was marked by a decline of over 2% in value-added 
in agriculture.^ According to the Economic Survey, the annual
Government of Pakistan, Economic Survey 1974/75, p. 14.
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official assessment of economic performance, the fall in 
production was "explained mainly by shortage of irrigation 
water, rains and pest attack on sugarcane and cotton crops. 
Canal water flow at the farm gate fell to as low as 60% 
during critical months for important crops. Similarly 
there was not sufficient rain when critically required..."'1'
Unremunerative farm prices were) mot mentioned as a possible 
reason for the crop failure.
However the measures taken to increase production was to 
substantially raise the procurement prices of major crops - 
wheat, sugarcane,and rice - which had just been increased 
in the previous year (Table 4.4.). Thus with respect to 
wheat "it is necessary to accelerate the pace of improvement 
in yield per acre as a steady growth in wheat production 
substantially higher than the rate of increase in population 
is needed to reduce and eventually eliminate food defecit 
of the country. Government has taken special measures. The 
sale price of fertilizers was reduced for 6 weeks with effect 
from Dec. 1, 1974 to encourage more use of fertilizer for 
wheat. The support price has also been enhanced from Rs. 25.50 
to Rs. 37 . " 2
The increase in the price of sugarcane by nearly 25%
 ^ Ibid.
2 Ibid., p. 15.
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Table 4.4
Procurement and Minimum Prices for Agricultural Commodities
(rupees/mds.)
69/70 70/71 71/72 72/73 73/74 74/75 75/76 76/77 77/78
Wheat
17.00 17.00 17.00 22.50 27.50 37.00 37.00 37.00 37.0
Rice
Basmati 35.00 32.00 38.00 46.00 62.00 90.00 90.00 90.00 95.00
IRRI-6 21.00 21.00 21.00 21.00 27.00 40.00 40.00 40.00 46.00
IRRI-8 18.50 18.50 19.50 19.50 25.00 38.00 40.00 40.00 38.00
Kangani 19.00 19.00 19.00 20.50 26.00 39.00 39.00 39.00 39.00
Cotton
(seed cotton) 
American 125.00 138.00
Variety
Desi
Variety 120.00
to
160.00
132.00
Sugarcane
(factory
gate)
NWFP 2.75 2.75 2.25 4.00 4.00 5.00 5.50 5.50 5.50
Punjab 2.75 2.75 2.50 4.25 4.25 5.25 5.75 5.75 5.75
Sind 2.90 2.90 2.65 4.40 4.40 5.40 5.90 5.90 5.90
Maize _ mm 32.00 32.0
Potato
*«* 25.00 25.0
Onion
— mm 18.00 18.0
Source: Government of Pakistan, Ministry of Food, Agriculture and 
Co-operative, Agricultural Statistics of Pakistan, 1978.
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frcm Rs. 4.25 per md. in 1973/74 to Rs. 5.25 in 1974/75
was specially unjustifiable in terms of incentive consideration.
Ihe shortfall in sugarcane output reflected declining yields
which were attributed in the Survey to "poor germination,
poor rains during monsoons, shortage of irrigation water
and attack of sugarcane borers."^ Area under the crop
had increased by nearly 6% from 15.74 lakh acres in 1973/74
2
to 16.55 acres in 1974/75. Ihe shift in acreage reflected 
more than adequate incentive for the cultivation of sugarcane.
A fact which was officially recognized in the same document.
"Ihe improvement in acreage was in response to higher prices
3
of sugarcane, gur and shakkar."
A more detailed assessment of factors that influence 
government decisions on the setting of procurement prices 
will be provided in the discussion that follows. An attempt 
will be made to see to what extent the evidence on costs of 
acquiring inputs, level of world prices of faim crops, the 
rate of return etc. , support the claim made in government 
publications that the appreciable increase in prices during 
the period were necessary to maintain incentives in the face 
of rising costs.
1 Ibid., p. 18.
2 Ibid.
3 Ibid.
189
Before proceeding with the discussion it would be
useful to briefly list the main elements of the government
1procurement program m  Pakistan.
(i) Announcement of procurement prices. Procurement 
prices in Pakistan- have a dual function. Apart 
from the price at which the government buys surplus 
wheat, it also serves as a support price which sets 
a lower limit to price movements.
(ii) Building up of buffer stocks to meet emergency 
situations and/or mitigating seasonal fluctuations.
(iii) Running a public distribution system for safeguarding 
the interest of low income consumers.
Procurement has been a regular phenomenon in Pakistan. 
However till April 1960 it was on a compulsory basis and 
entailed direct control over market price and movement of 
wheat. The government fixes from time to time procurement 
prices of major crops (wheat, rice, sugarcane) at which it 
purchases frcm farmers and issue prices at which it sells to 
low income consuners.
Decisions to enhance procurement prices are determined by
2various factors. Government background papers provide 
Turvey and Cook (1976), p. 112.
o
Government of Pakistan, Pricing Policy Packages (files
frcm 1972/73 to 1977/78).
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infomation considered necessary to guide price setting, 
mostly data on rates of return, world prices, cost of 
acquiring inputs, crop-fertilizer price ratios etc.
These papers assume a very strong relationship between 
prices on the one hand and agricultural production and input 
use on the other. Hence any set back in output targets 
or any short fall in fertilizer offtake is to be remedied 
by an increase in incentives in terms of higher prices of 
output or lower prioes of inputs.
One most frequently cited reason for the increase in
procurement prices in the early seventies was the increase
1in fertilizer prices during that period. Price of a bag 
of urea went up by 111.4% between October '72 to April '74.
On the assumption used in most government studies that fertilizer 
consumption constitutes 10% of total cost, the average increase 
in overall cost as a result of the change in fertilizer prices 
would be roughly 12%. To compensate for the higher price 
of fertilizers procurement price of wheat was enhanced by 
114%, of sugarcane by 110%, of Basmati rice by 181% and 
of Irri- 6  variety by 90% over the same period.
The price of a 110 lb. bag of urea was increased from Rs. 25.50 
to Rs. 35 in October 1972 and then to Rs. 42 in March 1973.
In the financial year 1973/74 fertilizer prices were adjusted 
three times reaching a peak of Rs. 75 per bag in April 1974.
The initial increase in prices in 1972/73 was motivated by 
a need to reduce the subsidy element. Subsequent increases 
were necessitated by a sharp jump in international prices.
The sale price of Rs. 75 implied a considerable subsidy since 
the estimated imported fertilizer cost was Rs. 160 per bag.
Table 4.5
Sale Price of Fertilizers 1961-1976 (rupees per bag)
Domestic Inported
Airmonium Super Airmonium Triple Super
Sulphate Urea Phosphate Sulphate Urea Phospahate
1961/62 7.75
1962/63 to
9-1-64
10-1-64 to
23-9-65
24-9-65 to
7-6-66
8-9-66 to 
28-8-68
29-8-68 to
26-3-69
27-3-69 to
28-6-70
29-6-70 to
2-7-70
3-7-70 to 
31-7-70
I-8-70 to
24-9-72
25-9-72 to
29-1-73
30-1-73 to
30-3-73
31-3-73 to 
10-8-73
II-8-73 to 
19-4-74
11.00 
8.00
8.50
11.00
11.50 26.00
13.00 26.00
17.00 28.50
17.00 31.00
17.00 28.50
17.00 35.00
17.00 35.00
20.00 42.00
25.00 55.00
20-4-74 to
April 1976 34.00 75.00
6.00 -
11.00 - 24.25
7.00 - 25.00
7.50 - 25.00
10.00 11.00 25.00 19.00
9.50 11.50 26.00 20.00
9.50 17.00 28.50 28.00
9.50 17.00 28.50 20.00
9.50 17.50 31.00 20.00
9.50 17.00 28.50 20.00
9.50 17.00 35.00 20.00
9.50 17.00 35.00 20.00
11.00 20.00 42.00 26.00
25.00 25.00 55.00 34.00
34.00 34.00 75.00 35.00
weight of 
Bag
Nutrient
Content
42 lb>6. 112 lbs 112 lbs. 110 lbs. 110 lbs. -
21%N 46%N 18 %P 21%N 46%N 46%P
Source: Government of Pakistan, Economic Survey, 1978-79.
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Eertilizer crop price ratios readied a peal?; in 
April 1974. Subsequent changes in input/output prices 
have lead to a declining trend for all crops. With respect 
to Basmati rice the real cost of fertilizer has fallen cLose 
to the levels prev alent in the mid sixties (Table 4.6 ).
On the other hand comparable estimates for India 
presented in Table 4.7 , show a continued increasing trend.
The price of fertilizers for wheat growers in India was 
cheaper than their counterparts in Pakistan at the beginning 
of the decade but by 1976 the situation was reversed with the 
Pakistani farmer being in a more advantageous position.
Although in terns of rice, fertilizers were cheaper in Pakistan 
in 1971/72, the differential increased considerably and by April 
1976 the price of fertilizer to rice growers in Pakistan 
was half that in India.
The above comparison with data for the Indian economy 
points to the much higher importance assigned by government 
policy in Pakistan to maintaining a favourable output-input 
price ratio as a means of encouraging fertilizer consumption. 
However fertilizer is a function of technological change as 
well as price. While government policy stressed the effective­
ness of price as a determinant of input use it underplayed 
the powerful incentive of higher productivity associated with
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Table 4.6
Fertilizer-Crqp Price Ratios (lb, of crop necessary to buy a lb. of
Wheat Basmati
Rice
Nitrogen
Irri-6
Rice
American 
Seed Cotton
Sugarcane Maize
1961-62 1.44 .77 - .56 7.67 1.53
1962-63 2.94 1.47 - 1.31 15.67 2.76
July-Dee "63 2.94 1.38 - 1.21 23.50 2.76
Jan-June "64 1.75 .82 - .69 14.00 1.47
1964-65 1.75 .82 - .60 9.33 1.55
Oct "65-Jan "66 1.81 .82 - .60 9.67 1.55
Feb-June "66 1.61 .85 - .64 1.61
1966-67 2.72 1.44 - 1.04 24.50 2.53
1967-68 2.43 1.29 1.17 17.00 2.45
1968-69 2.43 1. n - 1.16 17.00 2.83
1969-70 2.83 1.19 1.96 1.16 17.00 2.68
1970-71 2.67 1.44 2.15 .93 18.67 2.95
1971-72 2.67 1.22 2.15 .98 18.67 2.56
July-Sept "72 2.67 1.00 2.15 .84 18.67 1.93
Sept "72 to 
March "73 2.56 1.23 2.65 1.03 13.80 2.38
July-Aug "73 3.07 1.11 2.52 .75 16.60 2.68
Aug "73 to 
April "74 4.04 1.45 3.30 .98 21.80 3.52
April-June "74 4.77 1.97 4.48 29.60 4.77
1974/75 3.29 1.36 3.02 1.53 24.67 2.74
1974/75(for 5 
weeks from Dec 
19 1974 2.89 1.19 2.65 1.34 21.67 2.41
July "75 to 
April "76 3.29 1.36 2.55 1.22 21.14
April-June "76 1.16 2.37 1.10 19.14
1976/77 2.97 1.16 2.39
00CO. 19.14
1977/78 2.97 1.16 2.23
0000• 19.14
Source: Government of Pakistan, Fertilizer-crop Ratios, Unpublished.
1 9 ^
Table 4.7
Fertilizer-crop price Ratios-India (lb. of crop needed to buy 1 lb. of
Nitrogen)
Wheat Rice
1971/72 2.54 3.77
1972/73 2.64 3.60
1973/74 1.90 3.08
1974/75 3.45 4.73
Dec '15 3.53 5.28
May ^76 3.90 5.43
Source: Nandal and Gcwer, "Input Prices, Profitability 
and production", Indian Journal of Agricultural 
Economics, July-Sept, 1976.
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technological inprovement. Statistics on fertilizer 
subsidies and expenditure on agricultural research for 
Pakistan and sane other Asian countries (Table 4.8) leave 
no doubt as to the high priority assigned to price incentives 
rather than technological progress as a means of increasing 
production.
Table 4. 8
Fertilizer Subsidy, Agricultural Research Expenditure in 
Selected Countries 1969-1975
Subsidy Expenditure Agricultural Subsidy as %, 
(million $) Research Exp. of Agr. Research
Expenditure
Afghanistan 15.10 .63 2397
Bangladesh 14.63 1.40 1045
Indonesia 71.90 3.42 2102
Iran 36.08 16.66 217
South Korea 27.26 2.44 1117
Pakistan 20.97 1.26 1664
Phillipines 36.77 7.96 462
Sri Lanka 5.25 2.44 215
Source: M.S. Mudahar, "Needed Information and Economic
Analysis for Fertilizer Policy Formulation", 
Indian Journal of Agricultural Economics, July- 
Sept., 1978.
Due to the varied conditions prevalent in Pakistan 
agriculture it would be impossible to work out average cost
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of production and net profit of various crops which could be
representative for all regions, different soil conditions
and different sized holdings. However the Planning Commission
1has carried out exercises to determine cost of production and 
net profit of different crops for leading farmers (defined 
as belonging to the upper lC ffo of farms) and operating a 12.5 
acre farm in the Punjab. The objective of these exercises 
is to provide information to guide price setting decisions and 
as such they are an integral part of background papers on 
price policy. Given their limitations they are at best rougjh. 
indicators of relative profitability over time rather than 
measures of absolute levels of returns.
To the extent that increase in procurement prices were 
meant to ensure adequate incentives in the face of rising 
input costs, they more than, fulfilled the objective. Table 
4.9. shows' clearly that net profit had increased substantially 
at a faster rate than the general price level, even taking 
into account the increase in the prices of fertilizers and 
other inputs. It is interesting to note that despite the 
high levels of returns on all crops in 1973/74 further
1 Government of Pakistan, Planning Commission, Cost of Production 
of Various Crops under Irrigated and Unirrigated Conditions, 
Central Punjab, issues from 1973/74 to 1977/78.
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Table 4.9.
Per Acre Net Profit^ (excluding land rent) for Average 
Leading Farmers in Punjab (irrigated districts)
Crops 1970-71 1973-74 1974-75 1975-76 1976-77
Wheat (Mexi-Pak) 1 0 1 .2 1 259.78 390.03 371.50 388
Rice (Basmati) 167.58 217.14 728.22 660.34 460
Rice (Irri-6 ) 341.28 340.67 712.17 600.54 539
Sugarcane 166.23 639.30 817.60 587.60 842
Cotton 185.03 645.99 419.36 795.17 632
Maize 159.34 279.50 592.22 587.92 584
Source: Government of Pakistan, Planning Commssion, Cost of
Production of Various Crops under Irrigated and 
Unirrigated Conditions, Central Punjab.
increases in procurement prices were announced for the
financial year 1974/75. The official reason was that the
enhancement of procurement prices was. necessary to "encourage
increased production" and "to enable farmers to absorb higher
2prices of key inputs." It is obvious that there wexe more 
than adequate incentives available and government policy was 
guided by the political objective of ensuring benefits to 
a very crucial power bloc, the landed elite.
Estimates of net return, as well as fertilizer-crop price 
ratio presented earlier, are based on procurement prices 
where applicable. Rice is procured by the government on a 
monopoly basis (only 1C% of stocks of Basmati and 25% of 
inferior variety are allowed for sale to the private agencies) 
since 1972/73. However a fair proportion of the marketable 
surplus of wheat is sold in the open market. Open market 
prices are usually higher than procurement prices by a fair 
margin.
o
Government of Pakistan, Finance Division, Pakistan Economic
Survey 1974/75, p. 20.
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Most research studies on price incentives in the 
Pakistani context rely on a comparison of domestic and world 
prices as sufficient empirical basis for establishing the 
downward bias in government price policy. World prices are 
frequently used as a benchmark for measuring distortions 
in agricultural prices. Most such comparisons begin with 
the qualification that international prices may be neither 
free nor equitable nor reflecting relative scarcity.
However any movement away frcm these prices is considered 
sufficient proof of implicit taxation of agriculture and a 
transfer of income to urban groups.
In view of the instability of international prices of 
agricultural commodities and evidence of a secular decline 
in their terms of trade vis a vis manufactured goods it is 
certainly not necessary that parity with world prices would 
have benefited domestic farmers. Furthermore if the principal 
aim of prices is to elicit necessary supplies of agricultural 
conrmodities the rate of return would be a more complete 
measure of incentives to invest.
Setting aside theoretical objection, even if world 
prices are accepted as a norm for comparison, the changes in
Government of Pakistan, Finance Division, Pakistan Economic
Survey 1974/75, p. 20.
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Table 4.10
Ratio of Domestic to Border Prices for Selected Crops (percent)
Wheat
Rice
Fine
Raw
Cotton Maize
Rice
Medium
1972/73 81 79 74 134 64
1973/74 63 60 57 43 40
1974/75 68 42 71 59 33
1975/76 81 64 81 105 57
1976/77 99 109 59 83 69
1977/78 114 94 87 124 63
1978/79 97 53 100 128 67
Border Price: With the exception of maize, unit values of export 
are imports are used. In the case of maize Inter­
national price (U.S. NO.2 Yellcw F.O.B. Gulf port) 
plus freight (US to india) is converted at the official 
exchange rate. Also for maize the time period is the 
calender year - so 1972/73 refers to 1972 and so on. 
Data on unit values of taken fromthe Wbrld Bank. 
Conmodity Trade and Price Trends, August 1979.
Domestic prices: Annual average wholesale prices at Karachi taken 
from Government of Pakistan, Market and Prices, 
various issues.
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the two sets of prices over the seventies do not point 
to a policy of maintaining low agricultural prices.
The ratio of domestic to international prices was
lowest in 1973/74 and 1974/75 (Table 4.10 ) due to the
conibined inpact of the devaluation of the rupee and the
dramatic increases in world prices. The situation changed
considerably frcm 1975/76 onwards when international
prices showed a declining trend while procurement prices
continued at the higher level. By the end of the decade
domestic prices were comparable or greater than world prices
for wheat, maize, sugarcane and cotton seed.
Table 4.11
International and Domestic Price Indices
Index D Index I
1971 108.95 109.65
1972 118.35 132.50
1973 137.00 219.00
1974 176.70 389.30
1975 215.80 303.50
1976 232.80 246.20
1977 253.20 205.31
1978 281.50 217.80
Source: weights are based on share in value-added of various 
crops in 1969/70; domestic wholesale price indices are 
taken from The Statistical Bulletin 1978/79; international 
price indices are taken from World Bank (1979).
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Index D and Index I represents trends in international 
and domestic prices of seven major crops —  wheat, rice, 
maize, sugarcane, cotton, tobacco and oilseeds. Both 
indices are based on identical weights. The international 
index shows, initially, a much steeper price increase it 
reaches a peak in 1974/75 and then declines significantly.
In contrast the index based on domestic prices shows far 
less fluctuation and a continued increasing trend. Contrary 
to the general view it seems that inflation in world prices 
of primary commodities and fertilizers was a favourable 
climate for pegging up prices. Once established procurement 
prices remained at the higher level despite subsequent fall 
in international prices and a downward adjustment in 
fertilizer prices.
The main beneficiaries of favourable terms of trade 
were the large farmers, a sub-sector of the rural population. 
Estimates based on the 1972 Argicultural Census data reveal that 
over 41% of the cultivating population in Pakistan operate 
holdings of 7.5 acres or less which barely produce enough 
for their production and consumption needs.^ This stratum of 
the rural economy are likely to be net buyers of output. They 
usually sell some output to meet their immediate cash 
requirements but later in the year they buy back grain for 
their consumption needs often at higher prices. Within
 ^ Hussain (1982) , p . 336 .
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the subgroup of net sellers benefits are proportionate
to sales. It has been shown that large farmers market a
much larger proportion of their output'*" and due to their
greater holding capacity can take best advantage of
2
seasonal fluctuations in price.
Price policy was motivated by the political objective 
of rewarding this class of large landowners, a very 
important source of support for the ruling party. As the 
evidence on world prices, costs etc., analysed in this 
section makes clear, the rate of increase in procurement 
prices was more than warranged by considerations of 
economic incentives alone. The price setting process in 
the seventies represented a continuation of the experience 
of the sixties whereby large farmers always succeeded in 
getting higher procurement prices than those re carmen ded by 
the planning agencies. A detailed discussion of the 
political power of this class is provided in a preceding 
chapter, the present analysis serves to illustrate the use 
of this bargaining strength to influence price policy to 
their economic advantage.
Ercelawn (1980), pp. 236-237; Government of Pakistan, Ministry 
of Food and Agriculture (1976), p. 6 ; Raquibuzzaman (1966), 
p. 381.
2 Government of Pakistan (1976), p. 17.
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CHAPTER V'
AGRICULTURAL TAX POLICY IN PAKISTAN
Taxation of the agricultural sector is a major instrument 
for mobilisation of the surplus and redistribution of income 
in the economy, the two most crucial problems facing developing 
countries today. Yet despite its importance the subject has 
been largely neglected in empirical research on the Pakistan 
economy. This chapter attempts to redress this imbalance.
It will do so first, by bringing together and critically 
evaluating the existing work on the subject. Secondly, 
independent estimates of the incidence of taxation by sectors 
will be derived which in conjunction with the assessment of 
available evidence will provide a sounder empirical basis to 
the question of the adequacy of agriculture's contribution 
to tax revenue, finally the direction of tax policy with 
respect to the farm and non-farm sector will be examined 
within the context of the political objectives of the state.
The discussion will proceed along the following lines.
It will begin with a brief examination of the case for 
agricultural taxation in terms of development and distribution 
objectives. This will be followed by a critical review of 
empirical work on sectoral tax burdens for the Pakistan 
economy. The third section will provide estimates of 
the incidence of taxation for the agricultural and non-
agricultural sector for the period from 1972/73 to 
1976/77. These estimates along with available empirical 
research will be used to see "whether the farm sector is 
adequantely taxed on the criteria of equity. This will 
be followed by a discussion of the contribution of tax 
revenue, specially agricultural taxation, to the developmental 
objective of resource mobilization in the context of the 
Pakistan economy. Finally, the analysis will focus on the 
approach of various regimes to the question of taxation 
of agricultural incomes and the reform of the land tax 
structure. An attempt will be made to see whether the 
failure to institute any significant reforms of the agrarian 
tax structure was attributable to administrative in­
feasibility or the low revenue potential of these reform^, 
the frequently cited official reasons, or was it a further 
illustration of the power of the rural elite to withold 
any measures detrimental to their interests.
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Theoretical Case for Agricultural Taxation and Seme Evidence on 
its Implementation in Less Developed Countries
A principal objective of tax policy in less developed 
countries is to raise the overall level of savings in the 
economy and to direct than into productive investment.
Aggregate voluntary savings in these countries fall far 
short of the resource requirements of a development program.
Not only is the level of private savings low but a considerable 
proportion of these savings is diverted into unproductive 
channels like real estate, inventory speculation and precious 
metals. Fiscal policy serves to step up the level of capital 
formation in the economy indirectly by encouraging private 
capital through a system of subsidies and tax concessions and 
directly by generating development resources to be invested 
in social overheads or to be used as a source of government 
finance for private entrepreneurs.
In this context agriculture, by virtue of the fact that 
it is the largest sector in most developing countries, is 
expected to make a significant contribution to the resource 
mobilization effort in the public sector. The importance of 
agricultural taxation in the development literature also derives 
frcm its role as a major mechanism for transferring resources 
frcm agriculture to finance the expansion of industrial investment.
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Mobilization of agricultural surpluses through tax policy 
or changes in intersectoral terms of trade have played a 
strategic role in the development policy of several centrally 
planned economies as well as a number of capitalist countries.
The use of heavy land taxation in the Meiji period in 
Japan is the most often cited example of effective use of 
tax policy for financing development. Growth in farm 
productivity made possible by capital saving technological 
innovations provided a surplus which was tapped through land 
taxes for capital formation. In the latter part of the 
nineteenth century land taxes contributed between 85%-90% 
of central tax revenue.'*' The disproportionately high burden 
of taxation on agriculture can also be judged from the fact 
that between 1883-87 more than one-fifth of farm income 
was paid out in the foim of direct taxes as compared to the 
figure of 3% for the non-farm sector. Ihe extraction of 
such a substantial portion of agricultural surplus was 
achieved without any negative effect on farm productivity.
However recent research has led to same major 
qualifications of this general view of the Japanese development 
model which considerably limits it's applicability to present 
day Third World countries, firstly, it has been .shown that
Gkhawa and Rosovoky (1960), p. 63. 
2 Ibid.
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prior to the Meiji period substantial capital expenditure 
had already been undertaken in irrigation and other key 
land development projects which were an essential pre­
requisite of the later successful adoption of the labour
1intensive fertilizer-seed technology'; Secondly it is
claimed that when the Meiji land tax was enacted Japanese
agriculture was in a more prosperous state than the situation
2in most developing countries today. finally the land 
tax structure of Meiji Japan was too highly regressive to
3
be politically acceptable in these countries.
Furthermore the emphasis in recent thinking on the question 
of intersectoral resource transfer has shifted to the problem 
of the investment requirements of the agricultural sector itself. 
It is increasingly argued that the principal task of agricultural 
development is not only to finance key capital projects within 
the sector but also to raise the income and consumption level
4
of the large rural population. However this approach does not 
imply a reduced priority on agricultural taxation. As Bird 
has pointed out "even if the capital is used for development 
of the agricultural sector itself, the role of tax policy in
5
mobilizing savings in that sector may of course be vital."
Smith (1968); Hayami and Yanada (1958).
2
Ishikawa (1967).
3 Ranis (1959).
^ Hunter (1969).
5 Bird (1974). p. 19.
i
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Apart from considerations of economic objectives, 
a strong case can be made for comparable tax treatment of 
agriculture on the basis of the traditional fiscal canon 
of equity which "demands that the burden involved in rapid 
economic development be distributed equally among the 
different sections of the population".^ There are two 
aspects of equity; tax paying units in similar economic 
conditions should be treated equally (horizontal equity), 
whereas those with greater ability to pay should bear a 
greater tax burden (vertical equity) whatever the sectoral 
origins of the income.
Thus in theory irrespective of the relative roles of 
agriculture and manufacturing in the development strategy, 
taxation of agriculture is expected to make a substantial 
contribution to government savings on the basis of both 
economic and equity criteria. However in practice the evidence 
from most third world countries indicates that they are not 
mobilizing any significant amount of resources from agriculture 
through taxation. Their fiscal performance is specially 
inadequate with respect to direct taxes on the farm sector, 
there being hardly any attempt to utilize an effective 
system of land or income taxation. Hence Bird concluded 
a survey of agricultural tax systems in a number of developing 
countries on the following note: "It is thus no exaggeration
1 Chelliah (1960), p. 67.
to say that not one developing country has to date 
utilized the undoubted potential of properly constructed 
agricultural taxes as a point of conscious development 
policy as well as to raise revenue’1.^
While another study ccranenting on the relevance
of the Japanese experience to present day India stated that
"the government of India may not resort to the severe
measures of land taxation adopted by Japan in the Meiji period
but the difference between 15% and 2C% of in cane paid in
the Meiji period to the meagre 1.5% paid by India is 
2too glaring".
Most explanation of this discrepancy between the strong 
case for effective taxation of agriculture in theory and 
its less than half-hearted implementation in practice 
inevitably make seme reference to political and administrative 
obstacles. The following comnents by Bhagwati on the subject 
are fairly representative: "In many instances the hesitation 
to tax the agricultural sector is traceable to political 
factors although administrative difficulties are generally 
cited as the explanation. Either rural votes have to be 
safeguarded - a question of great significance in most 
democratic less developed countries in view of the massive 
rural sector or the landed interest constitute an oligarchy 
powerful enough to block further taxation of the agricultural
1 Bird (1974), p. 41.
2 Cutt (1969), p. 146.
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1
sector".
lipton in his study on urban bias in Third World
countries not only emphasises the importance of the
political determinants of government decision making on
tax issues but goes further to state that tax policy,
mere than any other policy instrument, provides the
clearest indication of the relative bargaining strength of
rural and urban interest groups. Thus "tax burdens represent
conscious and integrated public policy more clearly than
do the mass of largely ad hoc governmental decisions on
prices and investments" and "provide convenient foci to
examine administrative, legislative and executive decision
2
procedure on the farm and non-farm balance".
However the picture provided in Lipton's thesis of 
the political scenario of third world states and of the 
relative sectoral tax burdens in these countries goes 
contrary to the more widely held view on the subject presented 
earlier in this chapter. It is claimed that the rural sector 
in most developing countries bears a larger share of taxes 
than can be justified either on ground of equity of efficiency. 
The explanation for the adoption of such an inequitable tax 
structure lies in the domination of the state by powerful urban
 ^ Bhagwati (1966), p. 78. 
2 Lipton (1977), p. 272.
groups who use their tremendous influence to resist 
government policies, including tax policy, which go against 
their economic interests. Cn the other hand there are 
fewer political obstacles to imposing a disproportionately 
heavy tax burden on the weak and vulnerable rural sector.
Hence "in almost all poor countries, immediate political 
stress can be reduced by taxing the many, the dispersed, the 
weak —  the rural people —  more heavily, compared to the 
townspeople, than would be the case if political stress 
were determined by an egalitarian or democratic balance 
of influence'!.'*'
The over-taxation of the rural sector is not confined 
to the lower strata but is equally true of the rich farmers. 
Several reasons are put forward by Lipton as to why, in most 
cases, even the large landowners bear a heavier burden of taxes
in relation to taxable capacity than comparable urban inccme
ik
2groups. The most important among these is the greater negative 
impact on their income of the policy of maintaining unfavourable 
teims of trade for farm output. Although Lipton concedes a 
few instances whereby the rural elite may be lightly taxed, 
these are attributable more to the high administrative cost 
of taxing agricultural income than to the political influence 
of this group.
1 Lipton (1977), p. 273.
2 Ibid., p. 279.
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While the relatively heavier taxation of the agricultural 
sector is cannon to "almost all poor countries", very little 
concrete evidence is produced in support of the hypothesis.
Ihe statement that "on the evidence of those few poor 
countries with available data, agriculture and the rural 
sector are overtaxed by all the criteria that can be sensibly 
be applied to tax policy"^ is not substantiated with reference 
to empirical estimates of tax burdens for these specific 
countries.
Ihe many empirical studies on tax incidence for India, 
one of the few countries with substantial literature on the 
subject, are either not mentioned or brushed aside on the 
grounds that they do not incorporate the inpact of non-tax 
policies or that they ignore the differences in ability to 
pay in the two sectors. Ihe re may be sane controversy, both 
at the conceptual and empirical level, over the question
o
of aggregate sectoral tax burdens in the Indian economy.
However the evidence on tax incidence by income classes for
the two sectors points conclusively to the presence of
3
horizontal inequity, in favour of the rural rich. It has 
been clearly demonstrated that the high incane groups in the
1 Ibid., p.271. .
3 Gandhi (1966); Krishna (1972); Mathew (1968); Mitra (1963); 
Shetty (198 ).
3 Gandhi (1966); Krishna (1972); Mathew (1968).
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rural sector have borne a significantly lighter tax burden 
than their urban counterparts.
While ignoring these carefully researched studies,
Lipton criticises in great detail the following statement 
taken from a report of the Pakistan Taxation Commission.
"Ihe third aspect of the structure of taxation in Pakistan 
is the inadequate taxation of the agricultural sector.
Agriculture constitutes the largest sector of the economy 
and claims about one half of the G.N.P. Ihe contribution 
of agriculture to total tax revenue is estimated to be 27% 
excluding water rates and assuming that indirect taxes on 
agricultural products are shifted forward".'*' These statements 
are seen to epitomize the weak empirical basis of claims of 
under taxation of agriculture for a number of less developed 
countries.
Using the commission1 s figures for agriculture’s share
of total taxes and income levels in the two sectors and an
2arbitrary figure for subsistence requirements, it is shown 
on the basis of seme rough calculations that in fact the 
agricultural sector was overtaxed vis a vis the non farm 
sector when account is taken of the difference in taxable 
capacity of the two sectors. However since lipton’s own
■*" Government of Pakistan (1971), p.6 .
2 Agriculture's share of total taxes is 27%; its share of income 
is 46.3%; agricultural population is 67% of total population; 
while subsistence requirements for the two sectors are assumed 
to be 30% of per capita income in 1968/69 (GovemriBnt of 
Pakistan, 1971, p. 6 .).
2 1 ^
results are based on very rough approximations and arbitrary 
assumptions, they cannot serve as the basis of any valid 
conclusions regarding the adequacy of the level of agricultural 
taxation.
Here it should be mentioned that at another point of 
Upton's study, his conclusions with respect to sectoral tax 
burdens for Pakistan are based on incorrect data. His 
deduction that the share of tax burdens in the Pakistan 
rural sector would be greater than its share of benefits 
derived from public expenditure is based on the fact that 
"seme 27% of all taxation comprised direct taxes on agriculture". 
Ihe figure is inaccurate. Agriculture's share in tax revenues, 
including both direct and indirect taxes was estimated at 27% 
in the late sixties. Ihe ratio of direct taxes on agriculture 
to total tax revenue was far lower at 3%. Even the figure for 
all direct taxes as a proportion of total taxes was lower 
at 2 2 % .2
Other relatively more detailed attempts at measuring 
intersectoral tax burden for the Pakistan economy are reviewed 
in the next section.
Lipton (1977), p. 284.
2 Government of Pakistan (1971), p. 6 .
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Critical Review of Enpirical Literature on Agricultural Taxation 
Policy in Pakistan
The empirical work on intersectoral tax burdens for
Pakistan is limited to three studies, two of which pertain
to the late sixties while the third estimate is for the '
year 1972/73. The case for or against higher agricultural 
taxation in these studies is based on the criteria of equity.
Before proceeding to a critical evaluation of this research it
is useful to outline the methodological framework generally
used to compare tax burdens in accordance with the equity
objective. Here it should be mentioned again that an equitable
tax structure has to satisfy two conditions; the canon of
horizontal equity which entails that units with equal taxable
capacity be treated identically and the principle of vertical
equity which necessitates that the tax burden should increase
with the level of income according to sane socially acceptable
rate.
Tax burden is measured as the ratio of taxes, incorporating 
all taxes direct..as well as indirect, to taxable capacity. TWo 
different concepts are used to measure taxable capacity —  income 
per capita and income less subsistence requirements per capita.
Due to problems, enpirical and conceptual, in estimating basic 
subsistence levels the ratio of taxes to income per capita, 
although a less accurate concept, is the more widely used 
measure. However since the measure does not allow for any
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progression in tax rates, it does not fulfill the requirements 
of vertical equity when comparisons between unequal' economic 
units are involved. To remedy this limitation ah alternate s 
index was put forward by Frank.'*' Tax burden was now defined 
as the ratio of taxes as a proportion of income to income per 
capita. Hence in cases where income levels differed and the 
standard measure indicated equal sacrifice as reflected in 
the tax income ratio, Frank's index would slow a lower 
sacrifice for the higher income.
o
However this measure has been criticised by Gandhi 
for giving an unduly high weight to income thereby incorporating 
"too much progression" justifiable only when there is an 
extremely large degree of dispersion in income levels. He 
suggested an improvement of the measure whereby the degree of 
progression was not fixed and could be specified in accordance 
with the variation in incomes being compared. The index was 
of the following form:
B=t/yeo
where t is tax per capita
y is income per capita 
eo represents the level of progression 
Thus Frank's measure where eo=2 becomes a specific case of 
this general form. Gandhi used the value of eo=l.5 to
Frank (1959).
2 Gandhi (1966).
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represent the rate of progression appropriate for the level 
of disparity in rural and urban incones in India. This 
value of eo has since been used in a number of more recent 
estimates of the sectoral distribution of tax burdens in 
the Indian economy.^
The few studies available for Pakistan display sane
variation in the methodological framework used for estimating
o
sectoral tax burdens. Hamid's assessment of rural-urban 
tax burdens relies mainly on a comparison of the ratio of 
direct taxes to income in the two sectors. The lower direct 
tax-income ratio in the farm sector is the basis of the 
study's conclusion that agriculture is under-taxed.
The distribution of indirect taxes between the rural and 
urban sector is estimated through an incomplete method. Data 
from the Household Income and Expenditure Survey is used to 
show the relatively higher per capita expenditure by urban 
households on excisable commodities such as sugar, tobacco, 
fats and oils' as compared to their rural counterparts. This 
observation on the sectoral consumption patterns is considered 
sufficient to deduce a higher per capita contribution of the 
uiban sector to indirect taxes. No attempt is made to systemat­
ically allocate indirect taxes between sectors incorporating
* Lipton (1978), p. 208.
2 Hamid (1970), p. 425.,
not only differentials in per capita expenditure on taxed 
commodities by rural and urban households but the differences 
in sectoral populations as well, finally Hamid's conclusion 
that agriculture bears a disproportionately small share of 
taxes is based on a comparison of average tax rates. Given 
the disparity in rural and urban incomes, the use of the 
measure neglects the norm of vertical equity which would 
require a higher tax rate on the relatively higher income 
sector.
An alternate estimate of sectoral tax burdens for the
late sixties provided by Chaudhury'1' shows, contrary to Hamid's
results for the same period, that agriculture was overtaxed
in relation to it's capacity to pay. Chaudhury's estimates
of the rural-urban breakdown of tax revenue rest on firmer
enpirical ground to the extent that the money burden of both
direct and indirect taxes is incoiporated. Indirect taxes
are apportioned between sectors on the basis of a percentage
o
derived in an IBRD report. According to this estimate 27% 
of all indirect taxes are borne by the agricultural sector.
On the assumption that there is no shifting of direct taxes, 
land revenue and water rates are assigned to agriculture 
while income and corporation tax are allocated to the non- 
agricultural sector.
Chaudhury (1973).
2 World Bank (1969), p. 6 .
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Comparing the tax income ratios to the ratio of income 
per worker in the two sectors, the author concludes that 
agriculture is relatively over-taxed. The estimates 
reproduced in Table 5.1. show that Pereas the income per 
worker ratio for non-agriculture to agriculture was as high 
as 163.5% and 179.2% in 1967/68 and 1969/70 respectively, 
the correspondingly tax income ratios were much lower at 
138.06% and 137.3%. The measure of intersectoral equity 
used is based on Frank's method whereby tax burden is 
estimated as a ratio of tax as a proportion of income to 
incane per worker. As mentioned earlier this method has 
been criticised for assigning too large a weight to income.
Hence comparisons of tax burdens using this method would tend 
to over-estimate the relative sacrifice of the low incare 
sector, in this case agriculture. In contrast to Hamid's 
study where comparison of sectoral tax burdens was based on the 
principle of proportional taxation, Chaudhury's assessment 
of relative burdens incorporates a greater degree of progression 
in tax rates than warranted by the differential in sectoral 
incomes.
Furthermore the classification of water rates as a 
direct tax on agriculture has been rightly criticised. As 
Qureishi^ has pointed out water rates could only be considered
 ^ Qureishi (1973), p.434.
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Table 5.1
Chaudhury"*s Estimates of Relative Incane and Taxable Capacity
Sector 1967/68 1968/69 1969/70
A. Agriculture
1. Total Taxes (million
rupees) 1518 1785 2002
2. Income per Worker
(rupees) 1631 1618 1765
3. Taxes as % of Income 10.85 12.67 12.80
B. Non-agriculture
1. Total Taxes 2847 3418 4068
2. Income per Worker 2667 2862 2983
3. Taxes as % of Income 15.04 16.07 17.57
C. Disparity
1. Income
(BT2) as % of (At2) 163.5 176.9 179.2
2. Taxes
(&f3) as % of (At3) 138.6 126.8 137.3
Source: Chaudhury (1973), p.105.
Table 5.2
Adjusted Estimates of Relative Income and Taxable Capacity
1967/68 1968/69 1969/70
A. Agriculture
1. Total Taxes (million Rs.)
Chaudhury s Estimates
(Alternative I) 1518 1785 2002
2. Total Taxes (million Rs.)
Less Water Rates
(Alternative II) 1278 1490 1655
3. Tax per Worker (Rs.)
(Alternative I) 176.9 205 255.8
4. Tax per Worker (Rs.)
(Alternative II) 148.9 171.1 186.6
5. Income per Worker (Rs.) 1631 1618 1765
B. Non-Agriculture
1. Total Taxes 
Chaudhury s Estimate
2. Tax per Worker
3. Income per Worker
2847
400.8
3418
460.1
4068
523.6
C. Disparity
1. Relative Tax Payments Alternative I 
(A-3) 4 (B-2) .44
2. Relative Tax Payments Alternative II 
(A—4) 4 (B-2) .37
3. Relative Income per Worker 
(A-5) 4 (B-5)
4. Relative Income 
Allowance for Progression 
eo=1.5
.61
.48
.44
.37
.57
.43
.43
.36
.59
.453
Source: Data for Water rates is taken from Qureishi (1973), p.436; 
the remaining data is taken from Chaudury (1973), p. 105.
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a tax if the government charged a higher price than the 
marginal cost of supplying water. Comparing data on marginal 
cost, marginal value of water and level of water rates,^ he 
shows that the rates, on the contrary, involve a considerable 
degree of subsidy. Thus it is totally unjustifiable to 
classify them as a tax.
Excluding water rates from Chaudhury' s estimates of 
total tax payments of the rural sector, the sectoral tax 
burdens are compared on the basis of Gandhi's measure.
The results presented in Table 5.2. indicate that agriculture 
was paying less in taxes than was justified by the difference 
in the level of sectoral incomes. Thus in 1967/68 whereas 
the tax payments by the f a m  sector were 34% of the taxes 
paid out by the non-farm sector, the ratio of average farm 
incomes to average income in the non-agricultural sector, 
incorporating a certain level of progression, was substantially 
higher at 48%. Similarly for the other two years, the results 
reveal that the ratio of relative tax payment for agriculture 
to non-agriculture was consistently lower than the corresponding 
ratio of incomes adjusted for progression.
^ This information is taken from a study by Falcon and Gotsch(/('1966j 
where irrigation charges are estimated at Rs. 0.4 per acre inch, 
value to fanners often exceeds Rs. 5 per acre inch, while the 
long run cost of supplying water is calculated as Rs. 2 per acre 
inch. The value of total subsidy on water use, assessed as the 
difference between long run marginal cost and government receipts, 
comes to Rs. 900 million for 1968/69.
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The usefulness of studies, such as those discussed 
above, where the case for increased taxation of agriculture 
is based on grounds of intersectoral equity has been questioned 
by recent writings on the subject. It is argued that the 
approach does not present a comprehensive picture of intersectoral 
burdens since it ignores the great many government policies 
which affect transfer of resources between sectors through 
non-tax measures such as foreign exchange policy, price policy, 
etc.
In the context of Pakistan the system of multiple 
exchange rates was considered the major instrument used to 
maintain unfavourable prices for farm products. Under this 
system the earnings of agricultural exports were assessed at 
the artificially low official exchange rate while industrial 
exports received a more favourable rate. Industrialists 
could also import their machinery requirements at the cheaper 
official rate.
The few empirical estimates of resources transfers 
attributable to non-tax policies, for the late sixties provide 
contradictory results. Hamid'*' has quantified the resource 
flow attributable to price policy as the difference between 
disguised taxes on agricultural output and subsidies on inputs.
Hamid (1970), p. 430.
22b
Disguised taxes are estimated as the difference between 
world prices of farm output at the scarcity and actual 
exchange rate, while subsidies to the sector include direct 
subsidies as well as indirect subsidies through underpricing 
of public utilities such as irrigation water. His results 
show that implicit and direct subsidies to agriculture 
outweighed the net effect of disguised taxes, leading to 
a net transfer of Rs. 1150 million in favour of agriculture 
in 1968/69.
An alternate estimate is provided in a World Bank 
Study ^  of a net outflow frcm agriculture to the amount of 
Rs. 500-900 million in 1969/70. However the emphasis on world 
prices as a benchmark for measuring the level of resource 
outflow/inflow attributable to price policy has underplayed 
the inpact of changes in domestic terms of trade during the 
period on the intersectoral transfer of resources. Ihe terms 
of trade moved in favour of agriculture throughout the sixties 
yet their impact on the transfer of resources has not been 
incorporated in either estimate. Hence on the basis of 
available evidence no conclusive statement can be made on the 
direction and magnitude of resource flows in the mid and 
late sixties through non-tax policies.
1 World Bank (1969), pp. 9-10.
225
The devaluation of the Rupee in May ’72 ended the 
discriminatory treatment of agricultural exports. Pro­
curement prices of major crops were raised four times in 
the five years frcm 1972 to 1977. Agriculture's terms of 
trade registered a sharp increase during the period. In view 
of these developments the argument that non-tax policies 
work to the detriment of the farm sector can no longer be 
considered relevant.
The other more basic objection to the measurement of
equity in taxation at the sectoral level has been put forward
by Krishna.^ The concept of "intersectoral" equity is
considered meaningless and of no functional singificance as
only "the magnitude of the income of real tax paying units
is relevant for equity; the nature of the particular activity
2
or sector frcm which the income is derived is unimportant".
It is superfluous to go into the question of sectoral burdens. 
Inequity in the tax system can be demonstrated if "fiscal 
authorities have failed to tax various income brackets in 
the sector at the same rate as those brackets are taxed in 
other sectors. The deficiency if it exists, as it does in India 
at present, can be pointed out without any reference to the 
redundant concept of intersectoral equity. Tor it is a simple
3
instance of horizontal inequity".
 ^ Krishna (1972).
2 Ibid., p. 1589.
3 Ibid., p. 1589.
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In this context a valuable contribution to the analysis 
of tax incidence is made by Jeetun's study which provides the 
only estimates of inter-class tax burdens by the rural and 
urban sector for the Pakistan economy in the seventies. 
Comparison of tax burdens between classes is made on the basis 
of average tax rates, a perfectly appropriate method when 
comparisons between equal incomes are involved. The results 
presented in Table 5.3 indicate that the higher income groups
Table 5.3.
Effective Tax Rates by Income Classes in the Urban and Rural
Sector —  1972/73
Income 1% of
URBAN
Share Share Effect­ % of
RURAL
Share Share Effect­
Classes House­ of of ive Tax House­ of of ive Tax
(Rs.) holds Income Taxes Rate holds Income Taxes Rate
Less
than 2 0 0 27.68 9.32 4.43 8.19 51.91 28.73 26.33 7.81
200-499 54.30 38.26 20.80 9.38 42.29 48.29 47.26 8.34
500-1499 13.73 23.44 18.63 13.71 4.36 12.52 13.32 9.07
1500 and
above 4.29 28.98 56.14 33.42 1.25 10.46 13.09 1 0 .6 6
All
Classes 1 0 0 1 0 0 1 0 0 17.25 1 0 0 1 0 0 1 0 0 8.52
Source: Jeetun (1978), p . 52. 
in the farm sector are not only greatly under-taxed vis a vis 
their urban counterparts but also vis a vis the low income rural 
households. The predominance of indirect taxes had led to a 
very low level of progressivity of the rural tax structure 
reflected in the smaller degree of variation of effective tax 
rates over income classes in the sector. While the effective
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tax rate in the urban sector varies iron a low of 8.19% to 
a peak of 33.42%, the corresponding tax rates for the rural 
sector vary from 7.8% to 10.66%. Hence the presence of 
horizontal inequity to the advantage of the rural sector is 
specially marked for the highest income groups. The average 
tax rate for this class in the urban sector is more than three 
times the rate on the comparable income group in the rural 
sector. Here it needs to be emphasised that Jeetun's estimates 
refer to the rural and urban sector as opposed to the 
agricultural and non-agricultural sector. If the distribution 
of income in the farm sector is more skewed than that of rural 
income, which is very likely given the extreme concentration 
of resources in the com try side,'*' the disparity in the tax 
burden by size classes will be higher in a comparison between 
the agricultural and non-agricultural sector.
A drawback of these estimates is the exclusion of 
provincial taxes and thereby land revenue, the major direct tax 
on agriculture, from the calculations. Since land revenue, a 
proportional tax, has far greater impact on low income groups 
it's omission would mainly effect comparisons of effective 
tax rates for the lower strata of the urban and rural sector: 
especially since the low income groups in the urban sector 
are not liable to any direct tax payments. In the case of
Evidence on the high concentration of land resources based on
landownership data for 1976 is provided by Khan (1981, pp. 70-71).
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high in cane groups the incorporation of land revenue would
only lead to a marginal reduction in the differential in tax
burdens. As Jeetun points out ’’even if we allocate total
receipts frcm land revenue to the top two rural incane classes
which is undoubtedly an extreme assunption as other classes
also pay this tax the differential in effective rates between
the two sectors will be narrowed by five points but the
effective rate in the rural sector will still only be half
1of the urban sector for those two classes”.
It is necessary to point out that these results, if
anything, understate the differential in tax burdens between
the two sectors due to the fact that Jeetun has allocated a far
larger proportion of taxes to the rural sector than would have 
/ I
beer^  justified under more realistic assumptions on the shifting 
of various taxes.
Jeetun's estimate of the incidence of indirect taxes by
sectors is based on the assumption that taxes on all commodities
are shifted forward to the final consumers. Hence the yield
of each commodity tax is allocated between the two sectors
o
in direct proportion to their respective expenditure on the 
taxed item. In case of taxes on intermediate and capital goods, 
distribution of revenue is based on the ratio of sectoral
Jeetun (1978) , p . 55.
2
Data on consumption expenditure is taken from the Household 
In cane and Expenditure Survey 1971/72.
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expenditures on all manufactured goods. With respect to 
direct taxes, the income tax is assumed not to be shifted 
while fifty percent of the corporation tax is shifted forward 
to consumers. Finally the incidence analysis is limited to 
federal taxes only.
Estimates, derived in the study, on the share of the 
rural and urban sector in total tax revenue are presented 
in Table 5.4. show that the contribution of the urban sector 
in total tax revenue is 53.8% as compared to the figure of 46.12% 
for the rural sector. With respect to indirect taxes, the urban 
component at 44.27% is even lower than the corresponding 
rural share of 55.73%. fhese results differ dramatically 
from those of an earlier study'1' according to which the rural 
contribution to indirect taxes was substantially smaller at 
27% of the total.
The reliability of Jeetun's estimates depends on the
validity of his assumptions on the shifting of various taxes
in the context of the Pakistan economy. On the basis of
2available enpirical evidence on the shifting of indirect 
taxes for Pakistan and certain characteristic of the country's 
corporate sector, it is felt that the assumption of the shifting 
of indirect and corporation taxes are of questionable relevance
^ World Bank (1969). p. 6 .
^ Mohammed (1978); .Naqvi (1975) ,
Table 5.4
*
Share of Rural and Urban Sectors in Federal Tax Revenue Jeetuns
Estimates
RURAL URBAN
Type of 
Tax
Amount
(Rs.
Share
Lakhs)
Amount
(Rs.
Share
Lakhs)
Personal Income 
Tax 8707.0 100.00
Corporation Tax 806.2 32.52 1693.8 67.75
Excise Duties 12766.5 51.82 11868.2 48.18
Import Duties 9723.8 60.49 6352.2 39.51
Sales Tax 2813.3 59.97 1877.7 40.03
Direct Taxes 806.2 7.19 10400.8 92.81
Indirect Taxes 25303.6 55.19 20098.1 44.27
Total Taxes 26109.8 46.12 30498.9 53.88
Source: Jeetun (1978), p.23.
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and have led to an over-estimate of agriculture's 
contribution to total taxes. Furthermore the Jeetun study is 
limited to the incidence of federal taxes. Although federal 
taxes constitute the major portion of tax revenues, pro­
vincial taxes incorporate the only direct tax on agriculture. 
Hence to get a complete picture it would be useful to look 
at the distribution of both federal and provincial tax 
revenue.
Finally Jeetun's findings pertain to the rural and 
urban sector while the objective of this thesis is to assess 
tax policy within the wider problem of the transfer of 
resources between the faim and non-farm sector. In this 
context a more relevant classification of tax incidence 
would be by the agricultural and non-agricultural sector. 
Available data does not permit an estimate of inter-class 
incidence by the farm and non-farm sector, however it is 
possible to derive the incidence of taxes by the functional 
classification of sectors. To this we now turn.
Alternate Estimate of the Contribution to Tax Revenue by the 
gricultural and Nonagricultural Sectors y
An attempt is made in this section to estimate the share 
of the agricultural and non-agricultural sector in both
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federal and provincial taxes on the basis of more appropriate 
assumptions on tax shifting covering the period from 1972/73 
to 1976/77.
In keeping with the general view in fiscal theoiy 
that direct taxes are difficult to shift, it is assumed that 
direct taxes are borne by persons on whom they are imposed. 
Accordingly land revenue and it’s various surcharges are 
assigned to the agricultural sector and the personal income, 
tax to non-agriculture.
The incidence of the corporation tax has been a
subject of considerable controversy. Despite numerous studies
for developed countries the question of shifting is still not
decided at either the theoretical or enpirical level. In
the context of India, Gandhi'*' has put forward a strong case
for the view that the burden of this tax rests with the 
2
business sector. Ihe major point in the argument is the 
condition that under monopoly situations, characteristic of 
Indian industry, a tax on profits is seldom shifted as the 
monopolist always charges the maximum price. A high 
degree of monopoly, attributable to a number of factors such 
as limited competition, licensing of new capacity etc., is 
characteristic of the Pakistani business sector as well.
1 Gandhi (1966).
2
The assumption that the coiporation tax is not shifted is 
accepted in nearly all other more recent empirical work on tax 
incidence in India (Gandhi, 1966, pp. 44-49; Shetty-,1971, p. 230) 
and the studies by Hamid (1970) and Chaudhury (1973) for Pakistan.
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A recent study'*' shows that the nationalization of basic 
industries by the Bhutto government and the loss of assets 
in East Pakistan have made very little impact on the degree 
of concentration in the Pakistan industry. Hence for the 
purpose of this study the revenue from the corporation tax 
is allocated entirely to the non-agricultural sector.
Although there is no direct empirical evidence on the
2incidence of the coipo ration tax, there are sane studies 
on the shifting of indirect taxes in Pakistan for the early 
seventies. The findings of both the studies are very 
similar and show that -whereas taxes on consumer goods are 
likely to be shifted almost fully to consumers, taxes on 
intermediate products display a very low degree of shiftability. 
On the basis of these results, revenue from indirect taxes 
on intermediate products is assigned to the non-agricultural 
sector while the yield of taxes on final products is divided 
between the faim and non-fam sector in proportion to their 
total expenditure on various taxed items. Details on the 
procedure applied to calculate total sectoral expenditure on 
various cannodities are provided in the appendix.
finally, export duties assumed importance as a source 
of revenue following the '72 devaluation when they were imposed
1 Amjad (i'976), p. 275.
^ Jeetun (1978); Mohammed (1978); Naqvi (1975).
to siphon off windfall profits accruing to exporters, as a 
result of the shaip increase in their exchange earnings.
It seems likely that the tax would have been passed on to 
the foreign buyers due to two reasons, firstly, because of 
the devaluation the increase in domestic prices would not 
be fully reflected in world price and secondly the period 
under consideration was marked by a boon in the demand for 
primary products in the international market. Furthermore 
from 1974/75 onwards as a result of the subsequent slump 
in the world market the export duties were removed frcm 
most commodities. Hence it can safely be assumed that the 
domestic producers did not bear the burden of these duties.
Data on taxes are taken from various issues of the 
Explanatory Memorandum on the Budget, Public finance Statistics 
and Federal Tax Administration Report. Information on the 
methodology used for allocating various other central and 
provincial taxes (wealth taxes, estate duty, stamp and 
registration etc) between agriculture and non-agriculture is 
given in the Appendix.
Estimates of incidence of direct, indirect and total 
taxes by the farm and non-farm sector are presented in Table 
5.6. The results indicate that despite the larger agricultural 
population the share of the farm sector in tax revenues was
2 3 5
Table 5.5
Share of Direct and Indirect Taxes in Agricultural and Non-Agricultural Tax
Revenues
(rupees lakhs)
AGRICULTURE
Direct Tax % Indirect Tax % Total
1972/73 1859.42 14.8 10742.09 85.2 12601.51
1973/74 2263.3 9.8 20705.65 90.1 22969.48
1974/75 2501.7 8.9 25451.97 91.1 27953.67
1975/76 2864.6 8.3 31538.57 91.7 34403.17
1977/78 1794.2 4.9 34538.45 95.1 36332.65
NON-AGRICULTURE
Direct Tax % Indirect Tax % Total
1972/73 13375.58 26.1 37895.91 73.9 51271.49
1973/74 15297.36 24.4 47515.35 75.6 62812.71
1974/75 16103.3 18.0 73506.03 82.0 89609.33
1975/76 24381.4 21.6 88739.43 78.4 113120.83
1977/78 28065.8 21.0 105788.55 79.0 133854.35
Source: Data on taxes is taken from various issues of Explanatory 
Memorandum on the budget,Public Finance Statistics, and 
Federal Tax Administation Report; information on weights 
used to allocate taxes is provided in the Appendix.
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Table 5.6
Incidence of Direct, Indirect and Total Taxes by the Agricultural and 
Non-Agricultural Sectors. 1972-1977
(rupees lakhs)
DIRECT TAXES* INDIRECT TAXES
Agr Non-Agr Agr Non-Agr
Amount Share Amount share Amount share Amount Share
1972/73 1859.42 12% 13375.58 88% 10742.09 22% 37895.91 78%
1973/74 2263.83 13% 15297.36 87% 20705.65 30% 47515.35 70%
1974/75 2501.7 13% 16103.3 87% 25451.97 26% 73506.03 74%
1975/76 2864.7 11% 24381.4 89% 31538.57 26% 88739.43 74%
1976/77 1794.2 6% 28065.8 94% 34538.45 25% 105788.55 75%
TOTAL TAXES 
Agr Non-Agr
Amount Share Amount share
1972/73 12601.51 20% 51271.49 80%
1973/74 22969.48 27% 62812.71 73%
1974/75 27953.67 24% 89609.33 76%
1975/76 34403.17 23% 113120.83 77%
1976/77 36332.65 21% 133854.35 79%
*Direct taxes on agriculture include land revenue, surcharge on land 
revenue, motor vehicle tax, wealth tax, and estate duty.
Source: Data on taxes is taken from various issues of Explanatory 
Memorandum on the budget,Public Finance Statistics, and 
Federal Tax Administation Report; information on weights 
used to allocate taxes is provided in the Appendix.
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lower than that of the non-farm sector for the entire 
period varying between a low of less than 20% of total tax 
revenue in 1972/73 to a high of nearly 27% of total taxes 
in 1973/74. The smaller share of agriculture is attributable 
to the lower per capita income and the relatively lower 
consumption expenditure on high tax items such as petroleum 
products etc., while a much larger percentage of expenditure 
is devoted to food items which are exempt frcm taxation.
Also intermediate inputs, such as fertilizers and agricultural 
machinery are imported duty free.
Further disaggregation of the farm and non-faim share 
of taxes into their direct and indirect tax components is 
presented in Table 5.5. The estimates not only reveal a 
greater degree of dependence on indirect taxes in the 
agricultural tax structure but also show that the reliance 
on indirect taxation has increased substantially in both 
sectors during the period under study. There was a relatively 
moderate increase in the case of non-agriculture where the 
indirect tax component of total taxes increased from 74% 
to 77% between 1972/73 to 1976/77. In the farm sector the 
share of indirect taxes in total taxes paid by agriculture 
increased from 85% in 1972/73 to 95% in 1976/77 with the 
share of direct taxes falling to a mere 5% of the total 
revenue collected from the sector. The disproportionately
2^8
small share of direct taxes in agriculture and the sharp 
reduction over time underlies the rigidity of the land revenue 
system and 1 'agricultural income tax" (which is no more than 
a surcharge on land revenue), the two major direct taxes 
on agriculture.
Unfortunately due to the lack of data on household
1income and expenditure patterns for the years under study,
it is not possible to estimate the inter-class tax burdens
for the agricultural and non-agricultural sectors. Available
information permits a rough measure of sectoral tax burdens,
however it is felt that this statistical exercise will not
2
yield any useful information. As Krishna has convincingly 
argued, the desirability of higher taxation of agriculture 
frcm the viewpoint of distributional criteria has to be 
assessed in texms of it’s impact by incane classes rather 
than by sectors.
In any case the results of Jeetun's study and the 
estimates derived above indicate clearly that it is the higher 
income group of rich farmers rather than the rural 
sector as a whole which is grossly undertaxed due to the virtual 
absence of any effective system of direct taxation on the sector.
1
The latest year for which this data was available was 1971/72 
in the Household Income and Expenditure Survey which was the 
basis of Jeetun's study.
2 Krishna (1972).
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While the question of an agricultural incane tax has 
become a point of great contention, the various governments 
have not hesitated to tax the rural sector through indirect 
taxation despite the negligible progressivity of the 
rural tax structure. The tendency of an increased reliance 
on indirect taxes over time, characteristic of both sectors, 
was specially noticeable in the case of agriculture. A s  
shown in Table 5.6. the dependence on indirect taxes in the 
rural tax structure has increased substantially over time.
By the end of the Bhutto period 95% of the tax revenue 
collected from the farm sector was in the form of indirect taxes.
The inequities inherent in the tax structure are all the 
more glaring in view of the fact that it is this class of 
farmers who have been the major beneficiaries of the 
agricultural policies of successive governments that have 
ruled the country since the past two decades. Given the 
unequal access to resources in the countryside, policies 
such as subsidies on inputs (fertilizers, tractors etc.) 
have worked to the advantage of the wealthy farmers who have 
the capital and influence to avail bf them.
High procurement prices and the favourable movements in the 
terms of trade have further accentuated the income disparities 
in the rural sector by conferring disproportionate benefits 
to large farmers who market a greater share of their output.
2^0
Yet no attempt has been made to redress the negative 
distributional effects of these policies and to tap the 
windfall gains accruing to the rural elite through an 
effective direct tax on farm incomes.
Agricultural Taxation and the Objective of Domestic Resource 
Mobilization
Apart from equity considerations the revenue needs of 
the state required a more efficient system of taxing the income 
of the largest sector of the economy. Ihe failure to realise 
this substantial potential is specially glaring in the 
context of the shortage of domestic resources which has 
consistently plagued the country's development programs.
A problem which has been specially acute since the mid-sixties.
The growth policy pursued by the Ayub regime was 
predicted on the saving effort of the entrepreneurial class 
and large inflows of foreign aid. fiscal policy was to 
provide incentives to attract private capital into industry 
through a variety of fiscal concessions and high tariff 
policies. In this context public savings were not expected 
to make any significant contribution to the savings rate and 
hence, the role of taxation as a mechanism for mobilizing 
resources in the public sector was of minor importance.
2*H
The strategy, however, failed to generate a hi$i and 
rising saving rate. Hie only exception were the early years of 
the Second Plan which were marked by a tremendous increase in
Table 5.7.
Savings and Investment in the Pakistan Economy 1949-1970 
Percent
of GNP 1949/50 1959/60 1964/65 1969/70
Investment
(gross) 3.5 8.9 18.3 13.5
Savings 2 . 2 6 . 1 11.7 9.7
F. Aid 2 . 8 7.2 3.6
Tax Revenue 6 . 1 8 . 2 8 . 2
Source: Government of Pakistan, Planning Oanfimssion, Fourth 
Five Year Plan, p. 8 ,
foreign aid. However, with the restriction in the foreign aid
flow, subsequent to the '65 war, the domestic saving rate also
fell sharply. In the event the government had no adequate
response but to cut back on public sector outlay. Thus the actual
expenditure in the public sector was only Rs 2i750 as. compared to the 
plan target of Rs. 30000.1 Even this was achieved by borrowing 
abroad on harder teims and defecit financing at home. No 
attempt was made to come to terms with the inadequacy of the 
public resource mobilization effort. The ratio of taxes to GNP 
over the twenty year period from 1950 to 1970 rose by a mere 
two percentage points (Table 5.7).
Government of Pakistan, Planning Commission, Fourth Five
Year Plan, 1970, p. 45.
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The Bhutto period was characterized by a dramatic 
widening of the resource gap frcm a level of 3.5% of GDP in 
1971 to 1 0 .2% in 1976 (Table 6.24).' " The shift in'government strategy 
to greater emphasis on distributional objectives was reflected 
in a sharp increase in public spending on social sectors, 
subsidies on food, on nationalized industries etc. Public 
sector development expenditure went up frcm 5.5% to 10.2% 
of GNP while non-development expenditure more than trebled 
during the period (Table 6.24).
However despite the professed difference in social and 
economic goals, the Bhutto '.government's approach to the 
problem of resource mobilization showed no significant departure 
frcm that of the earlier regime. The Pakistan economy continued 
to rely heavily on foreign aid to finance investment at more 
and more unfavourable terms. The level of deficit financing 
also accelerated sharply during the period, while no serious 
effort was made to restructure the tax system.
Tax revenue continued to stagnate at 11%-12% of GNP 
while the proportion of direct taxes to total tax revenue 
declined frcm 23% in 1971/72 to 14.2% in 1977/^8 (Table 5.10). Due to low 
income levels and the large non-monetized sector, most 
developing countries find it difficult to raise revenue
Table 5.8
Share of Government Revenue in GNP of selected Countries, 1971-76
(percent)
COUNTRIES
1971
TAX REVENUES 
1973 1976
Bangladesh - 5.1 8.5
Burma 12.3 9.6 11.2
India 15.2 17.1 16.7
Korea 13.7 12.4 15.2
Malaysia 17.0 18.3 19.6
Pakistan 11.2 11.4 12.0
Phillipines 7.7 8.9 n.a
Singapore 13.4 14.1 14.4
Sri Lanka 16.4 18.0 19.1
Thailand 12.0 13.1 n.a
Average for 
above countries 13.2 12.8
Source: "A Caiparative Study of Fiscal Development in the
Developing Member Countries of Asian Deveopment Bank," 
APB Staff Paper No.9; Government Finance Statistic 
Yearbook, IMF.
Table 5.9
Comparison of Pakistan's Tax Structure with Other Developing Countries
July, 1971
Tax
Income Taxes
Pakistan
Shares of Tax/GDP 
Tax Revenue Ratio
14.25
Taxes on
International Trade 41.2%
Taxes on Production
and sales 40.8%
1.7%
5.2%
2.8%
Taxes on Property 
Pay-Roll Taxes
0.4%
LDC s with per capita 
income between 100-200 
dollors
Share of Tax/GDP 
Tax Revenue Ratio
19.6%
33.4%
33.8%
2.0%
3.7%
2.6%
4.4%
4.5%
0.3%
0.5%
Source: Raja.J.Chelliah, "Recent Trends in Developing Countries," 
IMF Staff Paper, July 1971.
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The
Nature of
Tax
A.Direct
Tax
1. Income 
Taxes
2. Others
B.Indirect
Taxes
1. Custcme 
Duties
a.Import 
Duties
b.Exoprt 
Duties
2. Excise 
Duties
3. Sales 
Tax
4. Surcharge -
C.Total
Taxes 1411.7
Share Tax Share 
(Rs. mil)
22.8 1267.2 23.0
22.6 1236.4 22.5
0.2 30.8 0.5
77.2 4426.4 77.0
31.1 1312.2 23.9
29.3 1170.7 89.2
1.8 142.5 10.8
20.4 2119.1 38.6
25.7 481.5 8.8
313.6 5.7
100 5493.6 100
Tax Revenue in Pakistan
1977/78 Annual
Compound 
Growth 
Tax Share Rate
(Rs mil)
2733.2 14.2 13.3
2654.7 13.8 13.3
78.5 0.4 21.7
16558.5 85.8 17.4
7944.6 41.2 17.0
7859.6 40.7 18.9
5.0 0.5 7.3
6184.0 32.0 20.1
1614.4 8.4 9.2
815.5 4.2
19291.7 100 16.6
Table 5.10
Changing Composition of Federal 
1960/61 1971/72
Tax
(Rs. mil)
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319.6
2.8
1089.3
438.8
413.3 
25.5
288.1
362.4
Source: Jeetun, The Federal Tax System in Pakistan: An Overview,
Discussion paper No.33, Applied Economics Research Centre, 
Sepetember 1978, p.3
through direct taxes. However, a comparison with tax 
effort for other countries at a similar level of incane 
(Table 5.9 ) indicates clearly that Pakistan's poor 
performance cannot be attributed to a lower level of 
development. Thus while incane tax comprised 14.2% of 
tax revenue for Pakistan, the average figure for a select 
sample of less developed countries was much higher at 
nearly 20%.
Furthermore empirical research on the tax system reveals 
a highly inelastic structure with very low responsiveness of 
tax yields to changes in output and prices. The elasticity of 
total taxes was considerably below unity at .776 whereas 
the elasticity of direct taxes was even lower at only .496.^
Due to the inelasticity of the revenue structure, a substantial 
tax effort in the way of new taxes, comprising nearly half 
the icnrease in tax revenues each year from 1972-77, was 
required to prevent the tax GNP ratio frcm falling.
Failure to tax agricultural income has been singled out 
in various government reports as one of the principal causes 
underlying the meagre contribution of direct taxes to revenue 
as well as the inelasticity of the tax system. Thus in the 
words of the planning agency: "If we have a tax system in 
which the sector constituing roughly half the GNP and 
expected to grow rapidly is bearing a tax burden which is
 ^ Jeetun (19 78$),p. 16.
fixed in money terms and cannot change automatically with 
increasing incanes, it is difficult to conceive of an 
elastic tax system".^
The urgent need to tap the surplus in the largest 
sector of the economy through a reform of the agrarian tax 
structure has also been reiterated in nearly every official
J
document related to the subject. The report of the Taxation
Commission of 1959, the first thorough inquiry into the
country's tax structure, stated clearly that the agricultural
sector was inadequantely taxed both on the basis of equity
and in terms of revenue requirements of the development plan.
"The separate tax treatment of incomes originating from
agricultural and non-agricultural sources militates against
the fundamental concept of incane taxation which requires
that an individual's capacity to pay tax should be deteimined
with reference to his total income from all sources. The
present distinction results in undue sacrifice of revenue
and is ill suited for a country whose economy is mainly 
2
agricultural". Brushing aside objections of administrative 
inconvenience, the committee strongly recommended that the 
present system of levy surcharges on land revenue be abolished 
and replaced by a proper tax on agricultural subject to a 
a progressively rising rate.
 ^ Government of Pakistan, Planning Commission, (1970), p. 55. 
2
Government of Pakistan, (1960), p. 31.
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The case put forward by the commission was further 
strengthened by the tremendous productivity gains in 
agriculture from the early sixties onward. Thus the following 
statement frcm the Third Plan: "some ways and means must be 
devised to capture same of the increase in agricultural income 
in the foim of taxes particularly because agricultural incomes 
are expected to increase during the Third Plan. There was 
some justification for not raising the burden of agricultural 
taxation in the fifties due to it's virtual stagnation but 
with the high rates of growth achieved in the sector during 
the Second Plan period the picture has changed dramatically".^
While nothing tangible was done, the tendency to stress
the importance of fiscal reform in agriculture in official
pronouncements continued into the Fourth Plan. 'Present
rate of tax revenue to GNP in Pakistan is the lowest in the
world. Reform of the old agricultural system is urgently
needed either through a graduated land tax or by extending
2
the principles of income tax to agricultureV.
Reforms of the Land Tax Structure
Not only was there no attempt to bring agriculture under 
the sphere of income tax legislation but also there was no
1
Government of Pakistan, Planning Commission (1965), p.71.
2
Government of Pakistan, Planning Commission (1970), p.55.
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serious effort made to institute any effective reforms of 
the outmoded land tax structure.
The land revenue system, the only direct tax on 
agriculture, is regressive and highly inelastic with respect 
to changes in output and prices. The inflexibility of land 
revenue receipts is attributable to the prevalence of a 
fixed assessment system. With the exception of the sliding 
scale system which was applicable in sane parts of Sind, 
the land revenue liability of ‘each landholder is fixed in money 
terms at the time of settlement and remains so fixed for the 
duration of the settlement. Turtheimore the increase in tax 
incidence under a new settlement is limited to 25% of the 
previously assessed demand. This restriction along with the 
long intervals between settlements has led to the decreasing 
share of the state in agricultural income to much less than the 
legal limit of twenty five percent of net assets. A government 
commission'*' noted that in twenty nine out of the total of 
forty one districts the operative settlement in the late sixties 
had been concluded prior to independence and of these sixteen 
pre-dated World War II. Even in more recent settlements 
because of the 25% ceiling on increase in assessed demand, 
the land revenue burden has fallen far behind the sharp increases 
in productivity and prices.
Government of Pakistan., Interim Report of the Taxation Commission,
(1971), p.40.
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Until 1975 the revenue collected varied little with 
size of landholding. The "agricultural inccsne tax" whose 
contribution to provincial revenue has been negligible is the 
nature of a surcharge on land revenue. Since it is proport­
ional to land revenue the yield of this tax has also remained 
fixed.
The 1959 Tax Cannission had re carmen ded sane reforms 
of the land tax system with a view to making it a more 
flexible source of revenue. The most important of these 
was that a sliding scale system, which would allow the 
revenue liability to vary with price changes, be adopted 
instead of the present fixed assessment system. The commission 
also suggested a reduction in the period of settlement from 
thirty to fifteen years. None of these reforms were 
implemented.
However, seven years after the report some minor cosmetic
reforms of the land revenue system were enacted. The period
of settlement was reduced from thirty to twenty-five years.
An ad hoc increase of 25% over the basic rate of assessment
1
applicable at the time was announced and adopted in 1969.
This brought about only a token change in revenue demand since 
the assessed value of assets was unchanged. As mentioned 
earlier this value was based on settlements which had been
 ^ Government of Pakistan, Land Revenue Rates in West Pakistan (1969).
enacted before partition or earlier and in no way reflected 
tiie sharp increase in actual value of net assets since then.
Bhutto's government introduced sane further reforms
of the land revenue system. In 1972 the sliding scale system
in effect in seme areas of Sind was replaced by a flat rate
system fixed on the basis of produce index unitsf The Sind
government also instituted a graduated surcharge on land
revenue similar to the "agricultural income tax" of Punjab
aimed at incorporating a degree of progression into the 
2
system. These surcharges based on a flat revenue rate were 
not likely to impart progressiveness to the system. If 
anything these changes made the system more rigid and inequitable 
than before. Firstly, they ended the flexibility of revenue 
demand with respect to prices. Secondly the flat rate was 
based on produce index units which grossly under-stated the 
actual productivity of land.
In 1975, Bhutto announced the exemption of small landowners 
(with holdings under 12 acres of irrigated and 25 acres of 
unirrigated land) frcm land revenue. At the same time all 
landowners with holdings greater than 25 acres of irrigated and 
50 acres of unirrigated land were liable to pay land revenue
3
at an increased rate. The fiscal impact of the reform amounted
 ^ Government of Sind, Board of Revenue, Flat Rate Assessment in 
Sind (1975), Appendix I.
^ Ibid., Appendix VI, p. 58.
3
Amendment in the West Pakistan Land Revenue Act of 1967.
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to a net loss of Rs. 26 million for the two provinces of
Punjab and Sind which was 13% of the land revenue collected
in these provinces prior to the reform.'1' Out of 8 . 6 8
million landholders, 7.65 million were expected to benefit
2
frcm these reforms. The small landowners were a major 
constituency of the PPP and these reforms were primarily 
meant to ensure their support while the large landlords were 
effected much less than would have been the case if a 
progressive direct tax had been adopted.
Meanwhile the proportion of direct taxes to income in 
the agricultural sector fell consistently over the period to 
the ridiculously low figure of .32% in 1976/77. At the same 
time the contribution of direct taxes on agriculture to provincial 
tax revenue which was 41% in 1964/65 declined dramatically 
to less than 11% in 1976/77 (Table 5,11).
It was clear that the very low elasticity and inequity 
of the tax structure could not be corrected by a mere revision 
of revenue rates and yet till 1977 the principle of income tax 
on agriculture stood rejected. Administrative infeasibility was 
the most often cited "official" explanation for the failure 
to impose an effective direct tax on agricultural income. Since 
the majority of the rural population was illiterate and could
1 Khan (1981), p. 262.
2 Ibid., p. 262.
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Table 5.11
Direct Agriculture Taxes as a Proportion of Income and Provincial 
Revenue - Selected Years, between 1960 and 1979
million rupees
*
Year Direct Agricult- Total Ratio of Direct Agricultural
Agricu- ural Income Provin- Taxes to
ltural cial Agricultural Provincial
Taxes Taxes Income Revenue
1960/61 135 8184 - 1.65 -
1964/65 154 10438 374 1.48 41.2
1965/66 165 10572 416 1.56 39.2
1966/67 154 12460 423 1.25 36.4
1967/68 169 13994 451 1.21 37.4
1968/69 172 14038 520 1.23 33.1
1969/70 172 15964 538 1.08 32.0
1970/71 138 16236 536 0.85 25.7
1971/72 155 17934 629 0.86 24.6
1972/73 164 21907 638 0.75 25.7
1973/74 147 28084 723 0.52 20.3
1974/75 194 33533 1163 0.58 16.7
1975/76 200 38338 1365 0.52 14.7
1976/77 140 43686 1308 0.32 10.7
1977/78 184 49370 1446 0.37 14.1
1978/79 210 56370 1491 0.37 14.1
Source: M.H.Khan, Underdevelopment and Agrarian Structure in Pakistan, 
1981, p. 272-273.
*Direct Agricultural taxes include land revenue and surcharge on land 
revenue.
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not keep accounts, it was argued that a tax on agricultural 
income would stretch the administrative capabilities 
of the ill-equiped Income Tax Department to the breaking 
point.^
As far back as 1959 the Taxation Commission had
considered and rejected this argument in the following terms.
,rWe would point out that the exemption limit in terms of
land holdings would exempt the small agriculturists from the
necessity of maintaining separate accounts. Even in other
cases the difficulty would not be more than what is felt
by small retail shop-keepers in the urban areas. In their
case as most of them do not keep acceptable accounts the
incane tax officer calculates their turnover and profit on
the basis of general information available to him. Such
a calculation would be much easier in agriculture because the
yield and prices can be independently determined. In East
Pakistan revenue authorities do use these indirect methods
for calculating the in cane of the agriculturists where accounts
are not produced for determining the liability under
2
provincial Agricultural In cane Tax".
The other much publicised argument against imposing a
 ^ Government of Pakistan (1960), p . 115.
^ Ibid., p. 115.
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direct tax on agricultural income'is the supposedly 
low yield potential of the measure. However this view 
is effectively countered by empirical estimates of an 
income tax on agriculture provided in a study by Khan.^
The results show clearly that the tax would not only fulfil 
equity objectives but would also be capable of generating 
substantial revenue.
On the basis of alternative assumptions' about net 
2
farm income, Khan derives three sets of estimates of 
potential revenue from the agricultural incare tax. The tax 
rates used in the study are much lower than those applicable 
to non-farm incomes. The author, demonstrates that even the 
most conservative estimates, based on income data frcm low 
productivity districts like Rahimyar Khan for Punjab and 
Hyderabad for Sind, yield considerably higher revenues than 
those collected from agriculture in recent years in the fontn 
of direct taxes. The minimum estimates of the agricultural 
income tax for 1972/73 is nearly six times the value of land 
revenue and it's surcharge and one and a half time the value of 
all provincial taxes for the year.
1 Khan (1978).
2
Data on net farm incomes by farm size is taken fran a sample 
survey of 752 farmers from nine districts of Sind and Punjab 
in 1972/73. Information on cultivated area is taken frcm the 
1972 Census of Agriculture.
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No credible case can be built for maintaining the 
existing agrarian tax structure. The only beneficiaries of the 
system are the class of wealthy landowners. It was a widely 
accepted fact that the real obstacle to agricultural taxation 
lay not in administrative difficulties or other economic 
rationale but in the stronghold of the landed elite on the 
power structire of the country. Their interests were well 
represented at every level of government in all the regimes 
that have ruled Pakistan. The failure to inpose an effective 
direct tax on agriculture was just one aspect of the sub­
servience of public policy to the demands of this powerful 
landlord lobby.
In March '77 Bhutto announced the refoim of the 
agricultural tax structure. Hie land revenue system was 
abolished. All landowners with holdings of up to 25 acres 
were entirely exempt from direct taxation. Tor the rest of 
the landowning population agricultural inccme was to be taxed 
at the same rates applicable to the non-farm sector. Generous 
deductions were allowed on gross inccme for working capital 
in the form of seeds, fertilizers, wages, interest etc. Tull 
deductions were also allowed for the cost of agricultural 
machinery such as tractors, tubewells, other farm implements 
as well as land development and levelling. Gross in cane was
1
Finance Supplementary A c t,  1977, V o l,2 9 ^p p . l l8 -= 2 5 .
estimated by a simple accounting procedure as sane 
multiple of produce index units. The various deductions 
carbined with the accounting method held considerable 
incentive potential for the modernization of agriculture.
The reform on the one hand provided further 
encouragement to capitalist fanning while on the other hand 
it augumented the revenue needs of the government. The 
state urgently needed to expand it's resource base. Exemption 
frcm land revenue for small farmers announced in 1975 had led 
to a net loss to the public exchequer despite the upward 
revision in the rates for the middle and large landholders.
This was at a time when the government was having a severe 
crises in mobilizing resources for it's public sector program.
However the timing of the announcement just two months 
before the March elections indicated that the refoim was 
primarily motivated by political considerations. Bhutto 
wanted to ensure the support of his rural constituency of 
the poorer strata of the sector. The exemption of landowners 
with holdings under 25 acres would according to One est-
i
imate* confer benefits to 91% of the country's peasantry owning 
over half of the cultivable area in Pakistan] Not to mention 
the fact that the decision removed the peasants from under the 
influence of the corrupt local revenue officers.
1 *
Ahmed (.1978), p,489.
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furthermore the question of an income tax on 
agriculture had tremendous implications in the context of 
Pakistan. Hie failure to tax farm income was widely 
attributed to the political influence of the landed gentry. 
Bhutto's tax reform was an effective means of countering 
the growing impression that the Peoples Party had become a 
vehicle for large landlords and no longer represented the 
interests of the less priviledged groups.
However the reform did not reflect any diminution in the 
importance of the support of the landed elite to the ruling 
party. It was very much in keeping with Bhutto's policy towards 
the landlords as well as the other power blocs. While their 
independent influence was undermined, there were various 
compensations to assure continued support. Hence while the 
agricultural inccme tax was an encroachment on their priviledged 
position, at the same time there were enough loopholes in the 
foim of deduction and exemptions to ensure favours to loyal 
supporters. Besides loyalty would be well rewarded in the form 
of other benefits, in the form of the input subsidy and price 
program to ensure the support of the landlord lobby.
The reform of the tax structure was never implemented. 
Bhutto was ousted frcm power by a military coup in July '77.
Another official committee was constituted in 1978 to 
examine the pros and cons of the new legislation. The 
committee concluded that there was no tax advantage to 
shifting to the agricultural inccme tax an^ the system 
of land revenue should be continued.
Government of Pakistan, Report of Hie Committee on the 
Revitalization of Revenue Administration, 1978, pp. 12-13.
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Appendix B
Distribution of the Burden of Indirect Taxes between the Agri­
cultural and Non-Agricultural Sectors
The revenue from indirect taxes on consumption goods is 
distributed between the two sectors on the basis of total 
expenditure on the taxed commodity in each sector.
The Household Income and: Expenditure Survey provides 
data on monthly consumption expenditure for rural and urban 
households on a number of commodities such as clothing, footwear, 
food, fuel and lighting and other miscellaneous items, Inform- 
mation frcm HIES 1971/72 (the latest available issue) is used 
in the calculations of intersectoral distribution of indirect 
taxes for the years 1972-1977 on the assumption that there was 
no significant change in the pattern of consumption expenditure 
during the period.
To derive total expenditure on taxed commodities by 
agriculture and non-agriculture a breakdown of rural and urban 
population by economic categories is required. The Labour 
force Survey published by the Central Statistical Office 
provides data on self-supporting persons in various economic 
categories as a proportion of rural and urban totals. This 
information is used to estimate the agricultural and non- 
agricultural population in the rural and urban areas on the
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assumption that the distribution of population between 
different economic categories is in the same ratio as that 
of self-supporting persons,
Hie total value of expenditure on individual) products 
by the agricultural sector is derived by multiplying the 
per capita expenditure on the product in the rural and urban 
sector by the rural agricultural population and the urban 
agricultural population respectively and summing the totals.
A similar procedure is used to derive the value of expenditure 
of the non-agricultural sector on various items.
The ratios of sectoral expenditures on various products 
are used to allocate taxes on items such as sugar, vegetable 
products, tobacco, tea, salt, clothing, footwear etc. Taxes 
on electrical goods were divided in proportion to the 
expenditure on electrciity in the two sectors. The sectoral 
expenditure on renti,was the base for allocation of taxes on 
cement and paints and varnishes. The durable component of 
the expenditure on travelling was used to distribute taxes 
on vehicles while taxes on wood pulp, paper and stationery 
were divided on the basis of expenditure on education in the 
two sectors. In cases where it was not possible to identify 
expenditure categories of taxed items such as rubber products, 
plastic products, etc., the ratio of sectoral expenditure 
on miscellaneous items was used.
In case of petroleum products additional information
provided in a^'official publication was used (Table B.2)’. Tax 
yields for this category were allocated on the basis of these 
estimates of petroleum consumption by sectors. The proportion 
of petroleum products for domestic use was further divided 
between the two sectors in the ratio of their expenditure 
on fuel and conveyance. Within the chemical products 
category taxes on industrial chemicals were assigned to 
non-agriculture (fertilizers are exempt from indirect 
taxation) whereas revenue from taxes on cosmetics and 
pharmaceutical products were distributed in the ratio of 
expenditure of the two sectors'on nodical andpersonal care.
Finally, taxes on iron and steel imports and machinery 
(agricultural machinery is imported duty free) were allocated 
to the non-agricultural sector.
Provincial Taxes: Revenue frcm Provincial Excise 
derived largely frcm :intoxicants and alcoholic beverages was 
divided in the ratio of sectoral expenditure on miscellaneous 
food items.
Property and capital transactions involving nominal 
amounts have to bear registration and stamp fee. Assuming a 
direct relationship between transactions and inccme the 
burden of these taxes is distributed in the same proportion 
as inccme in the two sectors.
Other provincial taxes consist largely of taxes that 
fall on non-agriculture e.g. taxes on cinemas, hotels, urban 
immovable property tax, and profession tax etc. Hence only 
10% of the yield of this category is assigned to agriculture.
Wealth Tax, Estate Duty, and Gift Tax: These taxes are 
characterized by high exemption limits and mostly fall on the 
very high income groups. Jeetun has derived the share in the 
rural and urban incomes of the highest income bracket, 
defined as the households earning Rs. 2 0 0 0 or mere per month, 
by adjusting H.I.E.S. data for the under-reporting of income 
of this class. Assuming an identical distribution of income 
in agriculture and non-agriculture, income accruing to this 
bracket in the two sectors is estimated. The revenue from 
the gift, wealth, and estate taxes is then divided in 
proportion to the ratio of the income of the richest strata 
in the farm and non-farm sector.
Table B.l
Share of The Agricultural and Non-Agricultural Sector in Total 
Expenditure on Various Ccrmodities
Commodity Share of Share of
Agriculture Non-Agriculture
Animal and Vegetable
Products .375 .625
Tea and Coffee .49 .51
Sugar .45 .55
Salt .51 .49
Cigarettes .32 .68
Misc. Food Items .34 .66
Clothing .52 .48
Footwear .52 .47
Kerosene Oil .42 .58
Electricity .19 .81
Matches ,53 .47
Fuel and Light .5 .5
Rent .10 .90
Personal Care .43 .57
Medical Care .49 .51
Education .33 .67
Travelling .37 .63
Durable .12 .88
Non-durable .40 .60
Fuel, Light and Conveyance .45 .55
Misc. Items .47 .53
Table B.2
Sectoral Distribution of Petroleum Consumption (percent)
1964/65 1973/74
Domestic 7.6 12.5
Industry 10.4 5.8
Agriculture 5.2 6.5
Transport 28.1 34.7
Power 1.0 5.4
Other Govt. 24.1 15.6
Export 21.6 19.5
Source: Government of Pakistan, Energy Yearbook, 1979
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CHAPTER VI
ECONOMIC POLICIES AND PERFORMANCE: THE BHUTTO PERIOD
This chapter presents a detailed analysis of the impact 
of major policies undertaken by the Bhutto government on sectoral 
growth, savings, investment and distribution.
Agriculture: Government Policies and Growth Performance 
A. Strategy of Agricultural Development
Despite its commitment to a new distribution oriented strategy 
the policies adopted by the Bhutto regime in agriculture displayed 
a remarkable similarity to those of his predecessors. Thus the 
land reform while more effective than Ayub's, was not aimed at a 
drastic redistribution of land resources and nor was his approach 
to the development of agriculture significantly different from the 
strategy that prevailed in the sixties.
As has been discussed in more detail elsewhere in this study, 
Bhutto's government did not reflect a dimunition in the political 
power of the large landowners. On the contrary, the rural elite 
were heavily represented in the Peoples Party from its ascension 
to power. The leading feudal families flocked to join the party 
after the PPP Victory in the '70 election. However unlike the 
preceding governments, the Peoples Party alsd had the support 
of the less priviledged strata in the countryside who had rallied
26?
to Bhutto's promise of sweeping socio-economic reforms.
To satisfy the conflicting interests of the two major 
components of his support in the rural sector Bhutto enacted 
land reforms which on the one hand had tremendous symbolic 
impact while on the other hand their effectiveness was 
considerably reduced through various exemptions and further 
diluted through less than half hearted implementation.^
Analysis of the main features of the refoiU. and its limited 
impact on the distribution of- land resources, in the rural areas 
is provided in chapter 2. Here it need only be repeated that 
although a land reform was essential to establish the social 
legitimacy of the regime, a number of loopholes in the 
legislation as well as illegal ways of avoiding land transfers 
enabled the politically powerful class of large farmers to 
maintain land resources considerably above the official ceiling.
It is clear that the strategy for the development of the
agricultural sector was not predicated on a redistribution of
land and other resources, In keeping with the approach of
previous regimes primary reliance was placed on a strategy of
providing incentives to private investment in the sector.
Ihe major stimulus to growth was to come through the continued
modernization and mechanization of the sector of large farms.
iVv
Generous exemptions for mechanized farming provided in the land 
reforms, fifty acres per tractor or tubewell, set the stage
^ See Herring (19 80), jp. 506-7.
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towards this objective. The process was to be further facilitated 
by a dramatic increase in the supply of credit to the rural 
sector. Institutional credit to the sector increased dramatically 
from Rs. 80 million in 1971 / 1 2  to Rs. 415.2 million in 1973/74 
and Rs. 637.9 million in 1976/77 (Table 2.2. Chapter 2).
Credit from the government sponsored Agricultural Development 
Bank at very favourable interest rates was the main source used 
to finance tractor imports (Table 2.3. Chapter 2). Furthermore, 
the nationalisation of comnercial banks in 1974 gave the government 
greater control over their funds enabling the diversion of an 
increasing amount of credit to the farm sector. As a result, 
loans by cotnnercial banks to agriculturists increased threefold 
from Rs. 85.7 million in 1972/73 to Rs. 286.4 million in 1973/74 
(Table 2.2. Chapter 2).
The other major element of the development strategy in 
agriculture was the policy of subsidizing inputs and maintaining 
high procurement prices. In addition to fertilizers, subsidies 
were provided on canal irrigation, plant protection, power for 
tubewells etc. Despite sharp increase in public funds for 
subsidies, high world prices of fertilizers in the years from 
1972/73 to 1975 necessitated sane upward adjustment in danestic 
prices of fertilizers. Procurement prices of major crops were 
increased four times in the five year period from 1972/73 
to 1976/77. The frequent enhancement of procurement prices was
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justified officially as necessary to maintain incentives to 
invest in agriculture and to adsorb the impact of higher 
prices of inputs mainly fertilizers.
Ihese policies were reflected in an appreciable 
improvement in agriculture's terms of trade during the 
seventies. The index of terms of trade presented in table 3.9. 
reveals not only a continuation of the positive trend of the 
sixties but also a sharp acceleration in the rate of change 
in relative prices in favour of agriculture. Hence while 
agriculture's terms of trade increase at a rate of less than 
1% in the sixties, the trend for the later period was more 
than double at 2% (Table 3.10).
A. Growth Performance
The incentive strategy which was associated with high rates 
of agricultural grcwth in the sixties failed to produce the 
desired results in the subsequent period.
Agricultural production in the seventies was marked by a 
sharp deceleration in growth after the consistently high output 
trend of the previous decade. Total output of major crops 
increased at an annual rate of 2% for the period from 1969/70 
to 1976/77 compared to an annual grcwth of 6.7% for the earlier 
years from 1959/60 to 1968/69 (Table 6.1.).
270
Table 6.1
Trend Rates of Growth of Output of Major Crops and Foodgrains
In Pakistan
1959/60-68/69 1969/70-76/77 1959/60-76/77
Annual Rate Annual Rate Annual Rate
_ 2 _2 _2 
% R % R % R
Total output
of Foodgrains 6.7* .90 2.0** .26 4.3* .84
Output per Acre
of Major Crope 4.3* .77 1.5** .18 3.0* .79
Total Output of
Foodgains 5.0* .72 3.3* .77 5.2* .95
Output per Acre
of Foodgrains 2.8** .38 2.9* .76 4.2* .85
Output per Person
of Foodgrains 2.3** .35 .32 .04 2.2* .70
* Significant at 5% level 
** Significant at 10% level
Source: Khan, M.H. Undervelopment and Agrarian Structure, 1981.
Table 6.2
Gross Value of Major Crops In Agriculture (Constant Factor Cost)
1971/72 1972/73 1973/74 1974/75 1975/76 1976/77
Major crops 8285 8516 8862 8407 8998 9097
Rice 1180 1249 1315 1254 1404 1412
Wheat 2778 3001 3078 2868 3524 3687
Cotton 1893 1878 1762 1682 1363 1132
Sugarcane 1004 1003 1203 1117 1276 1400
Minor Crops 1702 1681 1789 1903 2113 2276
Source: Government of Pakistan, Statistics Division, National
Accountsl971-72 to 1974-75.
Aggregate gross value of major crops in constant costs 
was only 11% higher in 1976/77 than in 1971/72 (Table 6.2).
The negligible change in aggregate value added partly reflected 
the major setback in cotton production which declined 
throughout the period. Performance of other major crops 
was far more satisfactory and excluding cotton^ gross value 
for this sector increased by 27% over the same period. As 
can be seen in table 6.3., although coarse cereals grew 
at an annual rate of 1.9%, considerably below the overall 
average, the growth of other major crops was substantially 
higher. Thus sugarcane registered an annual growth of 3.3% 
while output of wheat and rice showed a trend of 3.9%. The 
growth rate in the food sector while relatively higher than 
the overall trend was nevertheless significantly lower than 
the trend of 5% in food output achieved in the preceding ten 
years (Table 6.1 ). Continued population growth of 3% or 
more yielded the meagre annual increase in food production per 
capita of .32%.
The most disappointing aspect of agricultural growth in 
the seventies was the prevalence of stagnant and declining 
yields in the case of all crops with the sole exception of 
wheat. The above average growth recorded for crops like 
rice and sugarcane were made possible not through an
Table 6.3
Trend Rates of Growth for Production Indices of Major Crops
1959/60--1969/70 1969/70-1978/79
Rate 2 Rate 2
% R % R
Wheat 6.3* .67 3.9* .76
Rice 8.0* .84 3.9* .77
Maize 4.5* .71 1.9*
n.s
.78
Jowar 2.3 .57 1.9
n.s
.10
Bajra N.S. .11 .7 .05
Gram -2.3* .36 2.6* .66
Sugarcane 8.0* .81 3.3*
n.s
.33
Cotton 6.7* .94 -2.6 .12
Source: Estimating trend equation is logY-a+bt.
Data is taken from Pakistan Economic Survey 1977-78,
Table 6.4
Trend Rates of Output per Acre of Selected Crop
Wheat Rice Cotton Sugarcane
Rate __2 Rate _2 Rate _2 Rate _2
% R % R % R % R
1959/60
-1968/69 2.5** .41 3.5* .71 3.4* .80 3.5* .78
1969/70 n.s n.s
-1976/77 3.6* .86 4.3 .07 -3.5*** .32 -1.5 .22
1959/60
-1976/77 3.9* .87 4.4: .87 1.7** .34 1.1* .28
** Significan at the 5% level 
*** Significant at the 10% level
Source: Khan,M.H. Underdevelopment and Agrarian Structure in 
Pakistan, 1981.
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improvement in yields but through a shift in acreage away
from inferior cereals. Only in the case of wheat was improvement
in yields a major contributory factor to increase output.
Output per acre for wheat grew at an annual rate of 3.57o 
which was higher than the corresponding figure of 2.5% for 
the previous decade (Table6 .4). The strong positive trend 
in wheat yields reflected the spread of acreage under 
hyv seeds. The area covered by the new seed variety which 
comprised 43% of total wheat agreage in 1969/70 increased 
to 72% of total wheat acreage and nearly 85% of irrigated 
wheat acreage by 1976/77 (Table 6.9’)*
The expansion in area under new seed varieties of rice 
lagged behind due to the dominant position of the Basmati a 
superior variety of rice traditionally grown in the Punjab.
Hence while rice acreage under inproved seed varieties 
increased from 57% to 68.7% in Sind the proportion of area
covered in the Punjab was only 14.5% in 1976/77 as compared
to 11.8% in 1971/72. The substantial growth rate in rice 
output was the result of greater acreage allocated to the
crop. The area under rice increased by 20% between 1971/72
and 1976/77, the largest improvement in area recorded 
amongst all crops during the period, raising the share of 
this crop in kharif acreage from 26% to 31% (Table 6 , 6 . ) ,
Since overall area under kharif crops did not increase
Table 6.5
Index of Output per Acre of Major Crops 
Foodgrain Cotton Sugarcane Sugarcane Sugarcane
(Pakistan) (Punjab) (Sind)
1959/60 100 100 100 100 100
1960/61 101.3 108.7 111.7 115.7 95.5
1961/62 103.3 108.7 120.3 124.8 96.2
1962/63 105.3 126.1 129.2 132.1 101.8
1963/64 106.3 134.8 125.8 129.6 96.2
1964/65 109.3 121.7 138.1 140.9 100.0
1965/66 98.7 126.1 139.2 142.7 99.3
1966/67 104.6 134.8 126.1 129.9 89.5
1967/68 129.8 134.8 138.1 142.2 96.6
1968/69 135.4 143.5 151.5 161.3 99.3
1969/70 149.0 143.5 158.4 171.5 99.1
1970/71 140.1 147.8 135.7 139.8 99.3
1971/72 150.7 169.6 134.7 139.4 89.7
1972/73 157.6 165.2 139.2 147.8 89.7
1973/74 157.9 169.6 138.1 144.9 90.8
1974/75 163.2 147.8 117.5 123.4 64.1
1975/76 174.2 130.4 136.0 144.6 82.6
1976/77 175.6 108.7 139.5 151.7 82.5
Source: Government of Pakistan, Agriculture Statistics of 
Pakistan, 1978.
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Table 6.6
Trends in Cropped Area 1971/72-1976/77 
1971/72 1972/73 1973/74
(million acres) 
1974/75 1975/76 1976/77
Kharif
Rice 3.60 3.66 3.74 3.96 4.23 4.32
a
Other Cereals 4.69 4.34 4.83 3.96 4.25 4.25
Cotton 4.84 4.97 4.56 5.02 4.58 4.61
b
Other Kharif .65 .53 .59 .60 .69 .67
Total 13.78 13.50 13.72 13.55 13.75 13.75
Rabi
Wheat 14.33 14.75 15.11 15.11 14.36 15.10
Gram 2.38 2.51 2.74 2.46 2.64 2.71
Rape & Mustard 1.39 1.32 1.32 1.12 1.16 1.28
c
Othe Rabi .67 .71 .86 .80 .76 .75
Total 18.77 19.30 20.03 18.74 19.66 20.36
Sugarcane 1.37 1.32 1.60 1.66 1.73 1.95
Farroqate Water Availability (million acre feet) 
Kharif 50.16 56.24 53.94 54.53
Rabi 28.04 32.91 34.24 29.40
55.26 53.42
38.03 40.88
maize, millet, sorghum.
mash, mung, sesamum, groundnuts, onions, garlic, chillies.
barley, masoor, tobacco.
Source: Government of Pakistan, Agriculture Statistics of Pakistan,
1978.
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during these years, the greater share oi rice was accompanied 
by a corresponding decline in the share of inferior cereals, 
mainly jowar and bajra, frcm 34% to 30% of total area under 
kharif crops.
Similarly in the case of sugarcane, expansion in area 
was the main factor contributing to above average rates of 
production growth. The national average figure for output 
per acre hides substantial regional variation for the crop.
As can be seen frcm table 6.5, the trend in yield was positive 
in the Punjab whereas in Sind it was negative. The exceptionally 
poor performance in the latter province was attributed to rapid 
expansion in area despite unfavourable soil and water conditions 
in response to substantial enhancement of procurement price. ^
Ibis expansion in acreage occurred in some areas at the expense 
of wheat and cotton.
Thus there was a significant change in the sources of 
increase in output for the period from 1971/72 to 1976/77 as 
compared to the decade frcm 1959/60 to 1969/70. In the sixties, 
especially in the latter half, the combination of hyv seed, 
fertilizers and increased water availability led to production 
growth through intensive cultivation rather than through an 
increase in crop acreage. The output per acre for wheat, rice,
1 Khan (1981), p. 41.
2
Gotsch (1976., p. 360) as much as 74% of the increase in output 
in the Third Plan period to the yield effect as compared to 
only 7% to the area affect.
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sugarcane and cotton showed a positive trend varying frcm 2 .5% 
for wheat to 3.5% for rice and sugarcane (Table 6,4 ). The 
most disquieting feature of agricultural growth in the 
subsequent years was the fact that output increases were 
largely attributable to shifts in acreage rather than 
improvements in yields, with the single exception of wheat, 
despite continued increase in the use of inputs like water 
and fertilizers.
Data on the supply of irrigation water presented in 
table 6.7,’ reveal that the availability of water increased 
by 24% over the period fran 1971/72 to 1976/77. This upward 
trend was almost entirely due to an increase of 42% in 
tubewell irrigation raising the share of ground water supplies 
in total water availability from 21% to 33% during the period. 
Although the flow of canal water did not display any positive 
trend, it was marked by considerable fluctuations which had 
inevitable reprecussions on output. The setback in agriculture 
in 1974/75 was the result of drought which led to an all time 
low discharge from canal outlets. Fertilizer offtake which 
was still much lower than technological potential, doubled 
during the six year period (Table6 .8 ). Thus although there was 
a shift fran inferior cereals to the major crops, the 
dramatic improvement in terms of trade and the continued 
increase in inputs did not induce an increase in overall
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Table 6.7
Supply of Irrigation Water in Pakistan (million acre feet)
1965/66-1976/77 
Source of Irrigation
Surface Ground (Tubewells) Total
(Canals) Public Private
1965/66 55 3 7 64
1966/67 58 2 8 68
1967/68 57 2 10 69
1968/69 59 3 11 73
1969/70 60 4 12 76
1970/71 52 4 13 70
1971/72 52 5 15 71
1972/73 61 5 16 81
1973/74 58 5 17 80
1974/75 52 7 18 77
1975/76 59 7 19 85
1976/77 58 8 21 87
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Table 6.8 
Annual Fertilizer Offtake
Nitrogen Phosphate NPK (Nutrient in Kilogram 
(thousand nutrient per cultivated acre)
metric tons)
1969/70 274 37 6.6
1970/71 252 30 6.1
1971/72 344 37 8.2
1972/73 386 49 9.4
1973/74 342 58 8.5
1974/75 363 60 9.1
1975/76 445 103 11.7
1976/77 511 118 13.1
Source; for table 6.7 and 6.8 : Government of Pakistan, Agricultural 
Statistics of Pakistan, 1978.
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Table 6.9
Use of High Yielding Variety of Wheat and Rice in Pakistan and Provinces
Percentage share of HYV in Percentage share of HYV in 
Total Acreage of Wheat Total Acreage of Rice
Pakistan Punjab Sind Pakistan Punjab Sind
1968/69 38.4 42.4 35.2 19.8 9.0 36.3
1969/70 43.0 47.0 45.7 30.9 11.8 57.0
1970/71 52.3 53.4 65.2 36.6 13.4 63.1
1971/72 56.7 58.0 67.6 50.0 28.2 75.6
1972/73 56.5 57.8 68.3 43.7 18.4 70.4
1973/74 56.9 58.7 66.9 44.2 17.8 71.6
1974/75 63.3 65.1 80.9 39.3 13.5 69.1
1975/76 65.6 66.7 71.0 38.9 13.2 71.4
1976/77 72.0 74.7 77.3 38.7 14.5 69.7
Source: Government of Pakistan, Agricultural Statistics of Pakistan.
1978. —
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output through either an increase in area under cultivation 
or an increase in productivity. Ihe inability to raise the 
level of productivity in the farm sector despite renumerative 
prices further underlines the importance of structural 
impediments to expansion of agricultural production. Under 
the initial impetus of the tubewell-hyv-fertilizer technology 
quids easy gains in productivity were possible without any 
modification of the institutional environment. However while 
making possible rapid gains in the short run the "green 
revolution" of the sixties did not set the foundations of 
sustained growth in the farm sector due to it's limited 
impact, firstly the use of new high yielding seed variety 
was confined to the two major crops of wheat and rice. A 
similar technological breakthrough had not materialized 
for other major crops or inferior cereals. Furthermore in 
the case of rice there was little progress in the spread 
of area under new varieties in the seventies due to the 
demand for traditional varieties of the crop. Secondly since 
supplementary irrigation was an essential prerequisite to 
the adoption of new seeds technology, its benefits were limited 
to farms with access to tubewells. In Pakistan where tubewells 
are concentrated in large farms of 25 acres or more this meant 
that the benefits of the technological development of the 
sixties were limited to a small proportion of the farming 
population. ^
 ^ For a detailed discussion of this point see Chapter 1 
of this thesis.
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The sustenance of the momentum of the technological 
breakthrough required not only qualitative improvement 
in input use (specially water supply) in conjunction with an 
effective research and extension program but even more 
importantly a thoroughgoing reform of the agrarian structure7^
A more equitable distribution of land resources was an essential 
condition to a more broad based partici potion in the productive 
potential of the new technology. These elements were largely 
neglected in the Bhutto government strategy which, despite 
its progressive posture, continued to rely on increasing 
quantities of inputs and price incentives to achieve the 
objective of development in the agricultural sector.
Impact of Policies of Mechanization and the Agrarian Structure
Whereas these policies did not raise the level of 
productivity in the sector they had significant implications 
on distribution. The improvement in agriculture's terms of 
trade along with output growth rates of over 3% for major crops 
transferred incane to the net sellers of farm output comprising 
mainly of large and middle sized farmers.
The surplus was allowed to accumulate in the hands of 
this group in the continued absence of an effective direct tax
1 Sane studies on the causes of agricultural stagnation in the 
seventies have stressed the need for qualitative improvements 
in water supply through improvement in water channel and drainage 
works (Gotsch and Brown, 1977; Government of Pakistan, 1978). 
However the detrimental effect of the highly differentiated 
agrarian structure on farm productivity has been largely neglected.
on agricultural income. The rate of direct taxes to 
agricultural income declined markedly over the period 
falling frcm an exceptionally low level of 1.0% in 1970/71 
to .32% in 1976/77 (See Table 5.11).An income tax on 
agriculture was announced two months before the March '77 
election but the measure was later rejected by the military 
regime that followed in 1978. The timing of the 
announcement was an indication of the political importance 
of the gesture. A tax on agriculture was considered a direct 
encroachment on the priviledged position of the landed elite. 
On the one hand with the tremendous symbolic significance of 
the reform, Bhutto was re-establishing his credentials as the 
champion of the underpriviledged and above the influence of 
vested interests. And on the other hand he was providing 
further incentives for investment in the sector. Generous 
deductions were allowed on gross income for working capital 
in the form of seeds, fertilizers, wages, interest etc.
Full deductions were also allowed for cost of agricultural 
machinery such as tractors, tubewells, other farm implements 
as well as land development and levelling expenses. The 
various deductions held considerable potential incentives 
for the modernization of agriculture.
28**
In response to the economic opportunities created by 
the government policies and the high profitability of capitalist 
agriculture, the surplus accruing to the landed elite was 
increasingly channelized into investment in mechanical 
technology. The share of agriculture in private capital 
formation which was 13.6% in 1969/70 rose to 19% in 1976/77. 
(Table 6.31). The rapidly growing component of private 
capital formation in the sector was investment in machinery 
and equipment, other than tubewells, comprising mainly 
of tractors. Thus sub-section accounted for 67% of monetized 
investment in 1976/77 as compared to the corresponding figure 
of 44% in 1973/74 (Table 6.10).
Although direct subsidy on tractor purchase was 
eliminated with the devaluation of the rupee in May 72, private 
profitability remained high in areas with access to tubewell 
irrigation. In a study on the economics of mechanization Ahmed'*' 
has estimated rates of return on tractor use by farms size, 
based on social accounting prices for factors, prevailing 
in 1970. His results confirm the expectation of a positive 
relationship with farm size and show a rate of return as high 
as 46% for a 50 acre tractor farm with tubewell. Tor a 
farm without tubewell the rate falls dramatically to only 3%.
1 Ahmed (1975)P -59.
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Table 6.10
Gross Fixed Capital Formation in Private Agriculture by Type of Assets
million Rs.
Assets 1969/70 1970/71 1971/72 1972/73 1973/74 1974/75 1975/76 1976/77
Total 476.1 463.4 535.2 612.1 737.9 845.7 1348.5 1600.0
Monetized
Investment
336.6 321.2 385.9 445.4 558.3 634.7 1100.6 1322.8
Farms, Build­
ings, Barns
and Sheds 8.1 8.2 8.9 9.5 11.8 19.3 28.9 29.8
Transport
Equipment 19.1 18.1 21.8 25.2 22.7 25.2 37.2 39.2
Machinery 
and Other 
Equipment 
(Excluding 
Tubewells)
309.5 294.9 355.2 410.7 248.8 301.3 709.3 883.5
Tubewells 275.0 288.9 324.2 370.3
Non-monetized
Investment
139.5 142.2 149.3 166.7 179.6 211.0 247.9 277.2
Source: Government of Pakistan, National Accounts, various issues.
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The contribution of tubewells and tractors to net revenue
operates through different mechanisms as explained in the
study. "Whereas the addition of a tractor increases
net revenue through changes in the cropping pattern frcm
low to high value crops, the tubewell achieves it by
enabling the bullock farmer to attain a higher cropping
intensity.'1"*' These findings are consistent with the results
2of other empirical evidence on the subject for Pakistan 
which reveals no significant positive effect of tractor 
use on either yields or cropping intensity.
On the other hand available evidence provides considerable
support for the negative distributional implications of
tractorization through increases in the size of operational
holdings, displacement of tenants and unfavourable enployment
effects. The expectation of an increase in the size of
operational holdings with acquisition of a tractor is
3
confirmed by the results of an IBRD survey report. According 
to the survey 90% of the farms using tractors added to their 
existing acreage leading to an increase in average farm size 
from 45 acres to 109 acres, i.e. a change of 142%. The 
increase was made possible mainly through resumption of land
 ^ Ibid., p. 52.
2
Census of Agriculture (1972); Mclnerney and Donaldson (1975).
3
Mclnerney and Donaldson (1975).
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formerly rented out to tenants and through renting in of 
land. The former source accounted for 42% of newly acquired 
land while the contribution of the latter method was 24% 
of the additional area.
With regard to the employment effects, Ahmed^ on the 
basis of a programing model approach predicts an increase 
in labour demand when tractors are used on tubewell farms.
In fact a large proportion of tractors, nearly 72% of the
total, are installed in areas with access to tubewell
2 3irrigation. However using data frcm the IBRD survey, Naseem
has estimated that the introduction of a tractor lead to the
net loss of five permanent jobs. Furthermore nearly 20% of
tractors are operating in canal irrigated areas where their
employment effect is unambiguously negative.
In the context of the Pakistani rural sector, character­
ized by highly unequal access to land and the prevalence of 
surplus labour, the above discussion points to a considerable 
divergence between the social and private returns to tractor 
use. However the government saw fit to provide additional 
incentives for purchase of tractors. Following the devaluation
1 Ahmed (1975), p. 58.
2
Farm Mechanization Survey 1968.
^ Naseem (1982), p. 103.
of the rupee in '71 tractor imports had slowed down 
markedly (Table 2.4.). However from 1973 the government 
encouraged tractor imports mainly through generous 
provisions of institutional credit at very low interest 
rates for financing tractor purchases. Agricultural 
Development Bank loans for tractors increased by four 
times in the one year period frcm 1972/73 to 1973/74 
(Table 2.3.). As a result tractor inports accelerated 
sharply and by 1976/77 annual inports had risen to over 
15000 compared to inports of less than half that number 
only two years earlier (Table 2.4.).
Tractor ownership continued to be heavily concentrated
in farms of fifty acres or more. Data for 1975^ shows that
nearly 60% of total tractors belonged to this group as
2compared to 74% in 1968. Ownership of tractors and tubewells 
was highly corelated: nearly 72% of tractors were purchased 
by farms with access to supplementary ground water supplies. 
The combined benefits of hydrological and mechanical techn­
ology generated high tax free profits for the large farm 
sector. Thus while Bhutto's strategy for modernization of 
agriculture failed to raise the level of productivity in
Government of Pakistan, Farm Mechanization Survey (1975). 
Government of Pakistan, Farm Mechanization Survey (1968).
the farm sector, it did serve to further strengthen the 
economic position of the landed elite.
Hence the dualistic development of agriculture set 
into motion under the impetus of technological change, land 
reform and the incentive program of the Ayub regime was 
further perpetuated by the continuation of these policies 
by Bhutto's government. Since the momentum of the "green 
revolution" fizzled out considerably in the seventies, the 
impact of these developments on output was short lived but 
they triggered off significant changes in the agrarian 
structure.
The structural changes in operational holdings during 
the sixties have been analysed in some recent studies^ based 
on a comparison of the Agricultural Censuses of 1960. and 1972. 
The findings of this research show an increase in concentration 
of land use, reduction of tenancy and a dramatic increase in 
landlessness over the intercensal period. Resumption of 
lands from tenants and renting in of land from small owners 
have been the main factors responsible for the increased 
skewedness of the distribution of operational holdings.
The land reforms of 1958 which did little to change the
 ^ Hussain (1980); Naseem (1982); Khan (1981).
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distribution of land ownership did lead to pre-emptive 
land transfers and tenant eviction providing the initial 
stimulus to the process of agrarian change. The tendency 
towards concentration of land use reflects the ineffective­
ness of ceiling legislation in curbing the growing control 
of the rural elite on land resources. As Naseem has noted:
"Tie fact that the largest size group (i.e. 150 acres or 
more) of owner cum tenants have gained both in owned and 
tenanted area very substantially, shows that the power of 
the "landed aristocracy" has not declined and that by 
adopting the clever mechanism of transferring land in the 
names of heirs or fictitious purchasers, which they then 
rent-in they may be attempting to dodge the land reforms."
Technological change and mechanization have further 
strengthened the tendency towards larger operational holdings.
A large operated area is required to realize maximum profits
q
from the combined effect of tractors, tubewells and new seeds. 
The importance of this factor in accelerating the process 
initiated by land reforms is reflected in the fact that the 
tendencies have been specially marked in the Punjab where 
the impact of the "green revolution" has been most dramatic. 
Ibis trend is visible in Khan’s provincewise estimates of 
changes in the number and area of farms by size classes
 ^ Naseem (1982), p. 146.
2 Ahmed (1975), p. 59.
between 1960 and 1972 as well as changes in the land tenure 
patterns for period presented in tables 6 .1 1  and 6 .1 2  
respectively. The results indicate that the increase in 
number and area of large farms, of 50 acres or more, was 
most impressive in the Punjab. Further analysis by tenurial 
groups reveals that the declining importance of tenancy was 
also most pronounced in the Punjab. The number of tenant 
farms for all size groups declined by 46.6% and their area 
declined by 26.1% in the Punjab while the corresponding 
figures for Sind were 2.3% and 12.4% respectively.
Tie regional variation was even more noticeable in 
the tendency of renting out of land by marginal and small 
owners ( 1 2  acres or less) accompanied by a growing number 
of owner-tenants in the largest size group of 50 acres or 
more. Using data for ownership and operational holdings 
(1971 and 1972 respectively), Khan'*' has shown that in the 
Punjab nearly 32% of marginal owners (holdings of less than
6.5 acres) rented out 26% of their land, while in Sind this 
new type of tenancy was less widespread affecting only 9% 
of marginal farms and 14% of their area. On the other end : 
of this size spectrum, in the large sized category (50 
acres or more), there was a tremendous increase in area
■*■ Khan (1981), p.93.
Table 6.11
Distribution of Operational Holdings in Pakistan and Provinces 1960-1972
Farmsize Region Number of Farms (000) Farm Area (000 acres)
1960 1972 %Change 1960 1972 %Change
Under 5 
Acres Pakistan 2404 1059 -55.9 4591 2563 -44.2
Punjab 1717 619 -63.9 3192 1503 -52.9
Sind 174 142 -18.4 529 • 424 -19.8
5 12.5 Pakistan 1340 1501 +12.0 10903 12338 +13.2
Punjab 894 926 + 3.6 7281 7619 + 4.6
Sind 265 387 +46.0 2180 3261 +49.6
12.5 25.0 Pakistan 729 794 + 8.9 12533 13061 + 4.2
Punjab 488 549 +12.5 326 8942 + 7.4
Sind 159 164 + 3.1 2776 2766 + 0.4
25 50 Pakistan 286 289 + 1.0 9468 9215 - 2.7
Punjab 180 209 +16.1 5903 6608 +11.9
Sind 61 39 -36.9 2044 1247 -39.0
50 150 Pakistan 88 103 +17.0 6539 7402 +13.2
Punjab 42 65 +54.8 3087 4569 +48.0
Sind 18 13 -27.8 1372 1013 -26.2
150 and 
over Pakistan 14 16 +14.3 4896 4482 - 8.5
Punjab 5 7 +40.0 1426 1789 +24.5
Sind 2 3 +50.0 797 748 - 6.1
All Sizes Pakistan 4860 3762 -22.6 48930 49061 + 0.3
Punjab 3362 2375 -28.6 29214 31030 + 62.
Sind 679 748 +10.8 9698 9460 - 2.5
Source: M.H.Khan, Underdevelopment and Agrarian Structure in
Pakistan, 1981.
Table 6.12
Change in Distribution of Operational Holdings and Area by Size and 
Tenure in Pakistan and Provinces - 1960-1972
Percentage Change Between 1960 and 1972
Owner Owner
Farm Size 
Marginal
Region Owner
Farms
Tenant
Farms
Tenant
Farms
Owner
Area
Tenant
Area
Tenant
Area
(<5) Pakistan -46.0 -54.7 -69.3 -28.9 -43.9 -60.7
Punjab -54.2 -61.1 -78.1 -38.3 -50.6 -71.8
Sind +28.9 +80.0 -35.4 -21.7 +66.7 -34.8
Small
(5 < 12.5) Pakistan +3.5 +30.0 +1.3 +12.9 +32.7 +3.9
Punjab +6.1 +28.1 +14.9 +4.0 +31.5 -12.5
Sind +47.7 +144.4 +36.9 +45.9 +139.5 -12.5
Medium
(12.5 < 25) Pakistan +12.7 +47.9 -12.9 +9.0 +46.1 -19.7
Punjab +5.6 +58.3 -11.4 +1.7 +57.5 -19.7
Sind +39.3 +52.6 -14.3 +36.4 +50.3 -18.7
Large
(25 < 50) Pakistan +18.1 +39.4 -34.7 +12.9 +38.5 +39.6
Punjab +23.0 +69.6 -23.0 +18.0 +68.1 -29.2
Sind 0.0 -16.7 -63.6 —6.2 -15.0 -64.6
Very Large 
(50 and
over) Pakistan +25.0 +57.7 -39.3 +1.1 +54.8 -41.7
Punjab +59.0 +125.0 -16.1 +32.8 +122.3 -25.4
Sind -9.1 -7.4 -46.5 -19.0 +1.8 -45.2
All Sizes Pakistan -21.5 +7.6 -36.1 +3.6 +37.7 -24.5
Punjab -29.1 +9.6 -46.6 +7.0 +53.9 -26.1
Sind +29.9 +61.7 -2.3 +3.2 +24.7 -12.4
Source: M.H.Khan, Underdevelopment and Agrarian Structure in
Pakistan, 1981.
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operated by owner-tenant farms. Ibis area increased by 
122.1% in the Punjab while the figure for Sind was only 
1.2%.
Ihe growing inequality in the access structure of land
resources, through the squeezing out of tenants and small
farmers off land, was manifested in the dramatic growth in
the incidence of landlessness over the intercensal period.
It has been estimated, on the basis of Census data, that the
nuntoer of landless households increased by 168%, nearly 43%
of the increase coming from other sectors of the rural
population. Another source places the estimated increase
in landless labour households even higher at 384% raising
the share of this group to nearly one-third of total rural 
o
household.
The tendency towards larger owner operated holdings 
continued through the seventies under the increased impetus 
of forces which had produced past changes such as land reforms 
and further spread of mechanization. Evidence of this trend 
is provided in Khan's study using data compiled by the 
provincial Land Reform Commissions for the years 1971 and 1976.
Hussain (1980), p. 183.
2 Naseem (1982), p. 175.
3 Khan (1981), p.92.
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Table 6.13
Changes in Self-cultivating Owners and Area in Punjab and Sind Between
1971 and 1976
Farm Size Percentage of Owners Self 
Cultivating
Percentage of Area Self 
Cultivated
Punjab Sind Punjab Sind
1971 1976 1971 1976 1971 1976 1971 1976
0-6.25 67.4 76.0 91.7 87.1 65.2 72.9 92.9 88.4
>6.25-12.5 67.9 71.4 88.7 84.2 63.7 68.6 90.3 84.7
>12.5-25.0 68.4 61.9 77.0 68.2 61.1 65.1 76.3 67.7
>25.0-50.0 58.3 63.0 52.2 45.8 52.9 61.7 51.0 44.1
>50.0-100.0 43.3 49.6 16.8 13.4 46.0 13.4 16.3 14.3
>100.0-150.0 35.5 39.2 5.8 6.8 33.7 46.0 5.6 6.5
Over 150.0 36.0 37.2 6.0 5.6 37.1 39.6 6.4 5.7
All Sizes 67.0 73.3 76.7 72.8 57.1 64.5 44.4 42.7
Source: M.H.Khan, Underdevelopment and Agrarian Structure in Pakistan, 
1981.
His findings reproduced in Table 6.13 show a signicant 
increase in self cultivating owners 'and in owned area 
self cultivated in the Punjab. This is specially marked 
in the case of large size holdings of 50 acres or more.
In the size category of holdings between 50 and 100 acres
the percentage of self-cultivating owners increased from 
43.3% to 49.6% while percentage of own area self-cultivated 
increase from 46% to 53% during the five year period from 
1971 to 1976. The change was even more dramatic for the 
larger size class of holdings between 1 0 0 and 150 acres 
in which case proportion of owned area under self- 
cultivation went up from 33% to 46%. In Sind, however, 
the practice of parcelling out small areas of land for 
cultivation by tenants is still dominant in most parts, 
hence, the distribution of operational holdings is 
considerably less skewed than ownership of land resources.
Empirical research on the distributional implications 
of the "green revolution" and the government incentive 
program points to the expectation of an increase in disparities 
in the agricultural sector.^ Although no direct evidence on 
rural income distribution is available for the seventies, 
it can safely be deduced, given the continued tendency to 
concentration of land use, tenant displacement and mechani­
zation that there was no reversal or slowing down of the trend
* Amjad (1972); Alavi (1976); Gotsch (1976); Falcon (1970); 
Nulty (1972); Kaneda (1969); Khan (1975).
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towards the deterioration of the relative position of the 
poor peasants. That government policies were not designed 
to curb this trend is reflected in the ineffectiveness of 
land reforms, further reduction in the ratio of direct 
taxes to agricultural income and the concentration of public 
resources in an incentive program whose benefits further 
buttressed the economic power of the large farmers.
Industrial Sector
Ihe industrial sector during the seventies was character­
ized by a fall in the rate of growth in output and investment 
which was unprecedented in the country's economic history.
Thus gross domestic product in large scale industry increased 
by only 7% (Table 6.18) over the six year period from 1970/71 
to 1976/77 in sharp contrast to annual average growth of 
9% (Table 6.17) in the preceding period from 1963/64 to 
1970/71. Private industrial investment fell dramatically.
In terms of current prices private investment showed a 
steep decline frcm a level of Rs. 1224 million in 1970/71 
to Rs. 697 million in 1973/74 (Table 6.15) followed by 
a recovery in latter years. However there was no reveral 
in the declining trend of real industrial investment in 
the private sector (Table 6.16.).
It is generally agreed that the main factor which 
precipitated the sharp deceleration in investment in industry
Table 6.14
Real Industrial Wages 1951-1975
Fiscal Year Industrial Wages Real Industrial Index of Real
(Rs. per Year) Wages (FY 60 Prices) Wages (FY 1961=100)
1951 742 917 93
1961 1142 1080 100
1970 1931 1329 123
1975 4953 1725 160
Source: S.Guisinger and H.Hicks, "Long Term Trends in Income 
Distribution in Pakistan", World Development, 1978.
Table 6.15
Industrial Investment in Current Prices 1969/70-1976/77 (million rupees)
Private Industrial Investment Public Total
Industrial Industrial
Large and Medium 
Scale
Small
Scale Total
Investment Investme
1960/70 1208.2 187.7 1395.9 179.2 1575.1
1970/71 1224.0 201.7 1425.7 68.2 1493.9
1971/72 1016.3 219.1 1235.4 98.5 1333.9
1972/73 763.1 255.9 1019.0 110.6 1129.6
1973/74 697.3 325.5 1023.3 382.3 1405.6
1974/75 990.4 446.5 1436.9 1064.9 2501.8
1975/76 1309.0 509.0 1818.5 3181.6 5000.1
1976/77 1209.7 585.3 1795.0 4553.8 6348.8
Source: Government of Pakistan, Finance Division, Economic Survey,
1978.
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Table 6.16
Industrial Investment 1970/71 to 1976/77 (million rupees, constant
1969/70 prices)
Private Sector Public
Sector
Total
Industrial
Large and Medium 
Scale
Small
Scale Total
Investment
1970/71 1166 192 138 65 1423
1971/72 876 189 1065 85 1150
1972/73 468 157 625 68 693
1973/74 335 157 492 188 680
1974/75 414 187 601 446 1047
1975/76 503 196 700 1224 1924
1976/77 438 213 650 1563 2213
Source: Government of Pakistan, Economic Survey, 1978.
Table 6.17
Real Growth in Industry (annual average percentage rate)
1963/64-1970/71 1971/72-1976/77 1971/72-1973/74 1974/75-1976/77
Industry 9% 2.9% 8.1% -0.4%
Source: Growth rate for 1963/64-1970/71 is taken from Guisinger (1977); 
all the other estimates are based on data from National 
Accounts, Ministry of Finance, Planning, Development and 
Provincial Coordination.
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was the uncertainty created by the nationalisation of some
industries. * The nationalisation program of 1972 was
limited to ten basic industries including iron and steel,
basic metals heavy engineering etc. Liberal compensation
was granted for taken over units. The extension of public
enterprise into basic industries was not in itself a
particular threat to industrialists since most of their
assets were concentrated in industries outside this
sector. However it was the manner in which it was carried
out, accompanied by a flourish ‘of militant rhetoric, 'which
undermined confidence in the business class. Since the
pre-election phase the main brunt of Bhutto's radical rhetoric
had been directed against the capitalists and had set the basis
2
of a relationship of mutual hostility and distrust. Their 
suspicions were confirmed with the take over in 1973 of the 
vegetable ghee industry which was outside the purview of 
the original nationalisation program. The government 
assurances of no further nationalisation lost all credibility 
and the industrialists started moving their assets out of 
industry at an accelerated pace.
Apart from political uncertainty created by themational- 
isation program, there were certain developments .
 ^ Sayeed (1981), p. 96; Burki (1980), p. 115.
2 Burki (1980), p. 11,4. .
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in the seventies which considerably eroded the rate of 
return to industrial investment. The domestic terms of 
trade moved sharply in favour of agriculture between 1972 
and 1977. Although relative prices had moved against the 
industrial sector in the sixties, their negative effect 
on returns was counteracted by a strict control on the 
activity of industrial labour and thereby the demand for 
higher wages and through the use of fiscal, monetary and 
exchange policies aimed at subsidizing the cost of 
capital. These policies included the overvaluation of 
domestic currency, provision of institutional credit at 
low interest rates, the Bonus Voucher scheme which ensured 
high returns to manufactured exports and a variety of 
fiscal concessions such as tax holidays, accelerated 
depreciation allowances, nominal tariffs on machinery 
inports etc.
The Bhutto government abolished most of these subsidies 
beginning with with devaluation of the rupee in May ' 72 
which led to a sharp increase in the cost of machinery and 
raw materials previously imported at the undervalued official
i
rate. Furthermore the bank rate was raised and the tax
2
holiday system was abolished. The removal of these economic
Government of Pakistan, Finance Division, Economic Survey 1972/73,p.60.
2
Government of Pakistan, Finance Division, Budget in Brief, 1972/73,p.36
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props left the pampered industrialists with an entirely 
different and unfavourable configuration of input and 
output prices.
Furthermore, in the seventies increases in food 
prices were quickly translated into higher wages in shaip 
contrast to the situation in the preceding years. Under 
Ayub's military regime, union activity was kept under 
tight control considerably limiting the bargaining strength 
of industrial labour. On the other hand industrial labour 
was a major constituency of the Peoples Party, therefore 
under Bhutto's regime there was a marked increase in the 
power and organisation of this group. The Bhutto government 
introduced legislation which in addition to ensuring larger 
benefits to labour with respect to medical coverage, education, 
insurance etc., also provided a system of automatic 
adjustment in wages in response to changes in the cost of 
living index. Three such adjustments took place between 
1973, when the latter refoim was enacted, and 1975 resulting 
in an increase in average wage of 88% compared to an increase 
of 60% in the food price index between 1972/73 and 1974/75 
(see Table 6.14). Given the large weight of food in the 
cost of living index, rising food grain prices were more than 
compensated by increase in money wages with consequent gains
 ^ Guisinger and Hicks (1978), p. 1275.
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in the real income of labour at the expense of industrial 
profits. It has been estimated that labour costs per 
man (including bonuses and non-wage benefits) tripled for 
most factories in the large scale manufacturing sector 
between 1972 and 1977^ while productivity declined due to 
strikes and labour unrest.
Relatively higher prices of agricultural comnodities 
not only raised costs indirectly through leading to an 
increase in wages but also contributed directly to industrial 
cost as in the case of cotton. The much heralded industrial 
growth during the sixties had not progressively released 
the industrial sector frcm its direct dependence on 
agriculture. As late as 1970/71, food, tobacco and cotton 
textiles contributed nearly sixty percent to value added 
in industry, the share of cotton textiles alone being as 
high as 30%. Given the high level of dependence, the 
declining trend in cotton output accompanied by rapidly 
rising prices was bound to have reprecussions on industrial 
performance.
Hie stronger positive trend in the prices of agri­
cultural raw materials as carp are d to manufactured output 
is reflected in the declining trend in the ratio of the
1 World Bank (1978), p. 38. 
^ Guisinger (1977), p. 24.
Table 6,18
Gross Domestic Product in Industry 1970/71-1976/77 at Constant Factor
Cost of 1959/60
70/71 71/72 72/73 73/74 74/75 75/76 76/77
Manufacturing 5268 5026 5514 5871 5834 5851 5791
Large-scale 4090 3813 4265 4585 4509 4486 4385
Small-scale 1178 1213 1249 1286 1325 1365 1406
Source:Government of Pakistan, Finance Division, Economic Survey 1978.
Table 6.19
Ratio of Price Indice of Cotton Manufacturing to Raw Cotton (base
1969/70=100)
Index Numbers of Index Numbers of
Wholesale Prices Wholesale Prices
of Cotton Manufac- of Raw Cotton
ture
(1) (2) (1) - (2)
1969/70 100.00 100.00 100
1970/71 103.59 122.70 84
1971/72 108.10 134.10 81
1972/73 116.43 162.20 72
1973/74 190.00 234.69 81
1974/75 221.39 209.04 105
1975/76 231.83 251.79 92
1976/77 271.48 321.83 84
1977/78 294.57 369.56 80
Source: Government of Pakistan, Central Statistical Office,
Statistical Bulletin, 1978.
index of relative prices of manufactures to that of 
raw cotton. As can be seen from Table 6.19 the index 
fell fran 100 in 1969/70 to a low of 72 in 1972/73 
improving somewhat in 1973/74 as a result of a temporary 
fall in raw cotton prices. However, with the exception 
of 1974/75, the index stayed at a lower level than had 
prevailed in the late sixties.
Given the large weight of cotton manufactures in 
industrial value added, the average growth rate and the 
considerable variation in industrial output reflected 
to a large extent the changes in production in this 
sub-sector. As can be seen in Table 6.17 almost the 
entire increase in industrial production was concentrated 
in the early years of the Bhutto government while in the 
later period beginning in 1974/75 industrial growth was 
either stagnant or negative. Output indices for selected 
industrial products presented in Table 6.20 reveal a 
rapid increase in the production of cotton manufactures 
in the early seventies attributable to record harvests 
of cotton crop and favourable demand conditions. The 
downturn in cotton manufactures although visible earlier 
in 1973/74 was accelerated in 1974/75 as a result of a 
severe setback in agricultural output. Between 1974/75 
and 1976/77 the output index of cotton yarn fell by 20%
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Table 6.20
Indices of Manufacturing Output 1970/71-1976/77 (1969/70=100)
Manufacturing Selected Items
Total
Cotton
Yarn
Cotton
Cloth Cement
Cigar­
ettes
Fert­
ilizers
Veg.
Products
1970/71 106.2 111.2 108.5 101.7 108.0 100.0 107.8
1971/72 105.7 122.9 103.6 98.1 97.3 159.7 128.4
1972/73 115.4 137.7 97.0 108.3 123.5 201.1 148.9
1973/74 122.4 138.9 97.6 118.4 122.8 218.2 178.5
1974/75 120.4 128.6 91.7 124.9 119.9 226.8 216.2
1975/76 119.4 128.0 85.8 120.2 122.8 235.4 220.5
1976/77 118.5 104.5 71.6 116.8 126.0 233.7 264.6
Scurce: Government of Pakistan, Finance Division, Economic Survey, 
1978.
Table 6.21
Output Indices for Sugarcane and Raw Cotton (1959/60=100)
Raw
Sugarcane Cotton
1969/70 248 185
1970/71 218 188
1971/72 179 245
1972/73 189 243
1973/74 226 228
1974/75 201 220
1975/76 240 176
1976/77 276 149
Scurce: Government of Pakistan, Finance Division, Economic Survey,
1978.
30?
while in the case of cotton textiles, production fell 
at an annual rate of 8.5% between 1970/71 and 1976/77 
(Table 6.21 ).
Ihe falling trend in output of cotton manufactures 
which comprised nearly one-third of value-added considerably 
dampened the rate of industrial growth. As can be seen from 
Table 6.22, the performance of various other important 
manufactures was quite in keeping with previous years with 
growth rates well above the low overall average. Thus 
the annual growth rate for fertilizers was 8.9% for sugar 
it was 7.3% while vegetable ghee output increased at an 
annual rate of 14.7%.
Another factor responsible for the low output growth in 
manufacturing was the nature of government undertakings in 
the sector. Public investment in industry had increased 
sharply from a mere 382 million rupees in 1973/74 to 
Rs. 3 billion in 1975/76 and Rs. 4.65 billion in 1976/77 
(Table 6.15). Ihe share of public investment in total 
industrial investment went up from 5% to 70% between 1970/71 
and 1976/77. However the output response of investment in 
the public sector was low since the bulk of investment was 
concentrated in long gestation, capital intensive projects 
such as the Karachi Steel Mill, which were not expected to 
contribute to output till the late seventies.'1'
 ^ World Bank (1978), p. 41.
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Table 6.22
Growth Rate of Output Indices of Selected Industrial Products
(1969/70=100)
Cotton Cloth Sugar Fertilizers Vegetable Ghee 
1970/71-1978/79 -8.5 7.3 8*9 14.7
Source: Estimating equation is Log Y=a+bt? data is taken from 
Economic Survey, Government of Pakistan, 1978.
Table 6.23
Investment, Savings, and Foreign Aid Ratios 
1960/61-1976/77
(current prices)
Gross I/GNP Gross Domes tic/GDP 
Savings
Foreiqj»/G
Aid/^nves
1960/61 16.1 8.5 49.0
1961/62 18.7 10.5 44.0
1962/63 21.7 13.9 36.0
1963/64 20.6 12.9 37.0
1964/65 23.2 12.8 40.0
1965/66 17.7 11.9 33.0
1966/67 17.9 11.8 34.0
1967/68 17.0 11.4 33.0
1968/69 16.8 13.5 20.0
1969/70 15.9 12.7 20.0
1970/71 14.0 8.7 44.0
1971/72 14.2 9.2 34.8
1972/73 12.8 10.1 28.0
1973/74 13.4 6.4 52.1
1974/75 16.2 4.9 69.7
1975/76 17.2 7.9 54.4
1976/77 18.3 7.7 57.9
Source: S.M.Naseem, Poverty and Inequality in Pakistan, 1982.
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Balance of Payments
The low levels of production in both agriculture 
and industry further limited the economy's capacity to 
earn foreign exchange. Specially damaging to export 
performance was the slump in the production of raw cotton 
and the recession in cotton textiles. At the same time 
the demand for imports increased sharply due to the 
ambitious public investment program with its heavy 
requirements of imported capital and intermediate goods, 
the large increase in foodgrain imports, and the exceptional 
rise in world prices of major imports such as fertilizers, 
wheat, oil etc. The trade deficit which was. 206 million 
dollars in 1972/73 increased sevenfold in four years to 
1.5 billion dollars (Table 6.27).
The crises in the balance of payments was controlled by 
the tremendous increase in remittances from expatriate 
Pakistani workers in the Middle East and a continued increase 
in foreign assistance not only from the traditional Consortium 
sources but also from new sources, mainly the OPEC countries. 
The ratio of foreign assistance to Gross Domestic Product 
reached a peak in 1974/75, surpassing the levels in the 
initial years of the Ayub regime (Table 6 .£ 3  ). However 
the assistance was available on less and less favourable
terms reflected in the considerable reduction of the 
grant component of aid (Table 6.29).
Domestic Resource Mobilization
The increasing reliance on foreign assistance 
reflected the most disappointing and damaging aspect of 
Bhutto's economic policies —  their inability to mobilize 
domestic resources for development. The saving rate 
in the economy thus far had not been impressive. In 
the period of high growth in the sixties, while 
investment had increased significantly the ratio of 
savings to GNP had been more or less stagnant at 
12% (see Table 6.23)andeven this low figure overstated 
the actual rate. The procedure of assessing savings 
as the difference between investment and foreign 
assistance, the latter being valued at the artificially 
low official exchange rate, biased upwards the estimate 
of domestic savings.
The seventies were marked by a further deterioration
in the savings performance. As can be seen from 
Table 6.23 since 1973/74 the savings rate has 
been less than 8%, falling as low as 4.9% in 
1974/75, a rate which was nearer the mid-fifties 
level before the planning process had got underway.
The exceptionally low savings for the Bhutto 
period can be explained firstly by the inability 
of the state to mobilize the surplus in agriculture, 
the dominant sector of the economy, either 
through terms of trade or an effective use of 
agricultural taxation. Secondly the political 
constraints on the government prevented squeezing 
the consumption of the working class in the manner 
which had been possible under the preceding 
military regime. Declining returns as a result of 
higher wages and input costs and most important 
the fear of nationalization robbed the corporate 
sector of any incentives to save. Finally the 
shortfall in private savings could have been 
counteracted by a serious effort to mobilize 
public savings. This was not done either through an 
attempt to enlarge the revenue base or through a 
curb on non-development spending.
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The increase in agriculture's terms of trade as 
well as carp arable growth rates for the output of the two 
sectors indicate a transfer of income in favour of the 
farm sector during the seventies. The propensity to save 
is generally considered to be lower in the rural sector 
due firstly to the lower per capita in cane in the sector 
and secondly due to the supposed tendency in large farmers 
to direct their surplus into luxury consumption or into 
real estate.
Unfortunately it is not possible to verify this 
generalization in the context of the Pakistan economy due 
to the lack of separate series for incane and savings by 
sectors. However evidence^- existing for India, a country with 
a roughly similar economic structure, indicates that the 
household saving rate in the urban sector is substantially 
higher than that in the rural sector. The estimates covering 
the period from 1950 to 1963 not only reveal a much lower 
saving rate for the rural areas but also show that the 
difference between the two rates has become greater over time. 
Thus while rural household savings income ratio was stagnant 
at around 2.3% during the period, the urban household saving
1
Reserve Bank of India Bulletin (1965), p. 327.
rate increased substantially trom 7.3% in the initial 
years to 17% in the early sixties.
Here it can be argued that since the estimates pertain 
to the period before the technological developments in 
agriculture they would not be applicable to the later period 
when the advent of the new technology with its high profit­
ability considerably increased the incentive to save in the 
sector. However even if there was a dramatic change in the 
saving behaviour associated with the adoption of the new 
technology it seems highly unlikely, given that in 1962/63 
the rural household saving rate was 2.3% as compared to 17% 
in the urban sector, that this would reverse the conclusions 
derived on the intersectoral differential in savings.
Moreover there is no ambiguity on the negative impli­
cations on public savings and thereby the overall savings 
rate of a shift in income through price movements to the 
group of surplus fanners vho are among the most lightly 
taxed class in the economy. This point will be discussed 
in greater detail later in this chapter.
The detrimental impact of unfavourable terms of trade 
on profits and savings in the industrial sector was over­
shadowed by-the even greater disincentive effect of the 
uncertainty created by the government's nationalization
policies. As has been discussed in greater detail 
in the preceding section, the Ayub regime had created 
a specially favourable environment for the industrialists 
through the use of various policies which ensured a high 
rate of return to industrial investment. Evidence on the 
saving behaviour of the corporate sector indicates that 
during the sixties the sector was retaining over 50% of 
its profits and if account is taken of tax paid out of 
profits the saving rate was as high as 8C%. ^  Although no 
information is available on the disposal of corporate 
profits in the subsequent period, it.can safely be deduced 
that the combination of factors ranging from falling profits 
and the extreme insecurity among the industrialists, would 
have considerably reduced the incentive to save and invest 
in this sector.
The shortfall in private industrial investment was 
controlled to a large extent by a significant increase in 
public investment in industry (Table 6.15 ). However 
the move towards direct government participation in 
capital formation was not accompanied by a complementary 
shift in the strategy for mobilizing public savings.
Under Ayub's government primary reliance had been placed
1 Any ad (1973).
on the private sector to sustain the level of investment 
and saving in the economy. Ihe role of government was 
restricted to creating a favourable environment for 
private initiative, fiscal, monetary and exchange policy were 
all used to attain this objective. Given this strategy the 
role of public savings was of minor importance. As a 
result of the policy of encouraging investment through 
fiscal concessions to the business community and high 
income groups the ratio of taxes to income rose very 
slowly over the sixties (Table 5.7).
With the public sector taking over the leading role 
in the seventies there were far more possibilities for 
pursuing a more dynamic policy with respect to public 
savings. However as the data in Table 6.24 shows public 
savings were negative for most of the period from 1970/71 
to 1976/77. Thus while the average tax rate was steady 
at a level of around 11%, non-development expenditure 
increased appreciably from 12% in the beginning of the 
period to nearly 15% in the mid-seventies.
The inadequacy of the public saving effort can be 
traced to a large extent to the unwillingness of the state 
to exploit the surplus accruing to the farm sector. The 
positive trend in agriculture's terms of trade since the 
late fifties onwards had served to augment the income
3 * 1 6
Table 6.24
Components of Revenue and Public Expenditure as Percent of GDP
70/71 71/72 72/73 73/74 74/75 75/76 76/77
Tax Revenue 9.61 10.04 10.97 11.75 10.70 11.14
Current Revenue 14.2 15.0 14.5 16.0 14.9 15.1 15.4
Non-Development
Expenditure 12.4 14.0 13.7 15.1 15.7 14.8 13.6
Development
Expenditure 5.5 4.6 5.7 7.4 9.6 10.2 11.2
Foreign Aid 2.5 1.6 5.0 4.5 7.9 7.2 5.4
Expansionary
Financing 1.0 2.4 2.3 0.6 1.8 3.0 3.9
Public Savings 0.7 -0.4 -0.5 -0.2 -0.6 -0.7 2.0
Source: Government of Pakistan, Ministry of Finance, Economic Survey, 
1978.
Table 6.25
Composition of Non Developmental Expenditures 1970/71-1976/77
(percentage)
70/71 71/72 72/73 73/74 74/75 75/76 76/77
Defence and In­
ternal Security 48.2 45.8 43.0 37.2 39.7 39.7 42.2
Debt Servicing 14.1 17.4 12.3 14.9 13.7 21.8 19.0
Subsidies 2.7 2.4 8.2 16.5 14.6 8.4 5.1
Education and 
Health 8.3 7.1 6.8 6.9 7.4 8.1 9.3
General Admini­
stration 10.8 8.6 7.7 7.4 6.5 7.0 8.0
84.0 81.3 78.1 83.0 81.9 85.0 83.6
Source: World Bank (1978).
accruing to surplus farmers. However incane originating 
in the sector which comprised more than one-third of 
total income in the early seventies was not liable 
to income taxation. In this context the most urgent 
reform necessary to widen the fiscal base was to 
bring the rising farm incomes under the purview of an 
effective direct tax. Apart from revenue considerations, 
there was also a strong case for a'progressive income tax 
on agriculture in terms of distributional objectives. It 
was generally agreed that the advent of the new technology 
and the incentive policies of the government during the 
sixties had conferred disproportionate benefits to the 
class of large farmers thereby further aggravating the 
incane disparities in the countryside. Evidence on 
inter-class tax burdens by sectors reveals that it was 
this upper strata of the rural sector which was greatly 
undertaxed not only vis a vis their urban counterparts 
but also relative to the lower income rural classes.
Despite the strong grounds for an effective direct 
tax of the farm sector, reforms of the agrarian tax 
structure undertaken by the Bhutto government were 
limited to minor, cosmetic changes of the existing land 
revenue system. These changes catered to the demands 
of both large and small farmers and resulted in the
318
further erosion of the already miniscule direct tax 
base. Thus small farmers were exempted from land revenue 
payments; The replacement of the sliding scale system 
of assessing revenue with the fixed rate method in the 
province of Sind made the system more rigid and less 
responsive to price increases. By 1976/77 only .37% 
of agricultural income was payed out in direct taxes 
(Table 5.11).
Moreover the inability to tax agriculture was only 
part of the fiscal story. The policy of catering to the 
price demands of surplus farmers as well as protecting 
the consumption of low income groups was responsible for 
the rising expenditure on food subsidies which further 
crippled investible surpluses in the public sector. Thus 
’while procurement prices of wheat were enhanced frequently 
the selling price was maintained at the previous low level 
leading to a drain of government resources. Tie setback 
in agriculture at a time when world wheat prices were 
exceptionally high further aggravated the picture and led 
to tremendous increases in wheat subsidies in the year 
from 1973 to 1975. The large quantities of wheat 
imported during the period at high world prices were 
sold through the public distribution system at very low 
issue prices. While issue prices had covered between 70-80% 
of the cost of domestically procured wheat, they barely
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Table 6.26
Government Subsidies in Non-Development Expenditure 1970/71-1976/77
(million rupees)
In Non-Development
Expenditure
70/71 71/72 72/73 73/74 74/75 75/76 76/77
Wheat 101 125 920 1917 2119 1546 1149
Edible Oil - - - 269 443 - -
Pakistan Airline 82 83 - 19 115 - -
Petroleum Products - - - 256 245 248 386
Others - - 10 4 51 70 8
Total 183 208 930 2465 2973 1961 1554
In Development 
Expenditure
Fertilizer 98 72 228 118 326 607 381
Plant Protection 30 54 128 63 112 241 306
Others - 1 25 22 16 69 74
Total 128 127 381 203 454 917 761
Total Subsidies 311 335 1311 2668 3427 2878 2315
Source: Wbrld Bank (1978).
Table 6.27
Balance of Payments 1972/73-1976/77
(million US dollar)
1972/73 1973/74 1974/75 1975/76 1976/77
Exports 767 1020 978 1162 1132
Imports 937 1647 2322 2341 2644
Balance of Trade -206 -627 -1344 -1179 -1512
Workers Remittances 130 138 213 335 578
Current Account 
Balance -130 -549 -168 -947 -1052
Source: Government of Pakistan, Finance Division, Economic Survey,
1977/78.
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1
covered 50% of the cost of inported wheat. As 
a result wheat subsidies increased from 125 million 
rupees in 1971/72 to over 2 billion rupees in 1974/75.
Ihe scope for public sector savings was further 
restricted by the substantial increase in non-development 
spending on other subsections most noticeably on defense 
and internal security.
Considerable scope also existed for raising the
direct tax burden on the non-agricultural sector. The
income tax was characterized by a high exemption limit and
liberal deductions granted in the foim of personal
allowances, earned incane relief, investment allowances,
education allowances, allowances for charitable donations
oetc. The Taxation Commission '71 had strongly recommended 
removal or reduction of many of these allowances. In its 
first budget the government announced a curtailment in 
the allowances for earned income, investment, and charitable 
donations. These changes were undone soon after to safeguard 
tax payers from inflation and encourage savings and 
investment. The exemption limit was doubled from 1973 
to 1975 while the investment allowance was enhanced by 
50%, personal allowance by 67%, and earned income relief 
by 2 0 0%. Turtheimoie tax holiday on capital gains and
 ^ World Bank (1978), p. 19.
2
Government of Pakistan, Interim Report of the Taxation
Commission. 1971, pp. 9-14.
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and housing was introduced. The last measure was 
specially unnecessary since an increasing amount of surplus 
was being diverted into luxury housing anyway (Table 6.31.). 
To further encourage this tendency through fiscal concessions 
was not justified either in terms of distributional 
objectives or in terms of the productive contribution 
of investment in the sector. Hie revenue implications 
of these changes have been summarized in a recent report 
as follows: "they have significantly reduced income
tax yields by enabling incanes as high as Es. 35000 or 
more taking advantage of legitimate deductions to pay 
little or no taxes at all; they have also prevented the 
tax base from growing with inflation and income growth, 
and have actually reduced the number of existing taxpayers 
since 1973."'*'
The objective of maintaining the consumption of 
low income groups constrained the growth of indirect taxes. 
To keep the price increases of essential items under 
control, excise duties on products like cotton fabrics, 
kerosene oil etc., were reduced. Similarly the sales tax 
was affected by exemptions for necessities and capital 
goods. Although the yield fron customs revenue increased
 ^ World Bank (1978 ) , p.6.
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substantially as a result of the more liberal import 
policy of the government, the revenue from import duties 
lagged behind the growth of imports. ^ Once again due 
to the government's efforts to keep davn domestic prices 
and provide cheap food and inputs a large number of items 
including wheat, edible oil, fertilizer, crude POL etc., 
continued to be exenpt while machinery and tractors were 
taxed at less than average rates. In 1971, 6% of imports 
were exenpt from customs duty as compared to nearly 33% 
in 1976/77.2
However despite the limited growth of indirect taxes 
the period was marked by an increase in their share of total 
revenue (Table 5.10). The fact that the government chose 
to rely on this more regressive means of generating revenue 
exposes the half heartedness of its redistributive claims.
A more effective use of the system of direct taxation would 
not only have been more equitable but it would also have 
formed the basis of a more elastic and flexible tax 
structure. 2
finally, the surplus potential of public enteiprises
^ World Bank (1978), .p. 10.
2 Ibid.
3
Empirical research shows that the tax structure of the
country is extremely inelastic and inflexible even in
comparison with other less developed countries (Jeetun, 1978a,p. 31).
523
failed to materialise. Hie financial performance of this 
sector was very poor and they barely contributed 8% from 
internal sources towards their investment expenditure.
Their inability to generate a surplus was attributable to 
a variety of factors ranging from the overall low level 
of efficiency to excessive labour costs and underpriced 
products.^
Hie failure to generate investible resources left 
the government with no option but to borrow heavily both 
at home and abroad. The reliance on borrowed funds reached 
a peak in 1974/75 when 83% of the public development 
expenditure was financed by foreign assistance while 
defecit financing covered the remaining outlay (Table 6.30.) 
Since then there has been sane reduction in the proportion 
of development spending financed by foreign borrowing 
which fell from a high of 83% in 1974/74 to 70% in 
1975/76 and 48% in 1976/77. However the contribution of 
domestic expansionary financing to the public investment 
program continued to increase, rising from 17% in 1974/75 
to 30% in 1975/76 and nearly 35% in 1976/1977. The value 
of expansionary financing which was 505 million rupees 
in 1970/71 had risen to 5.6 billion rupees by 1976/77.
Ihe output increasing impact of the deficit financed
1 World Bank (1978), p. 69.
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Table 6.28
1972/73 
1973/74 
1974/75 
1975/76 
1976/77
Source: Government of Pakistan, Finance Division, Economic Survey, 
1979/80, p. 156.
Table 6.29
Grant and Loan Component of Foreign Aid (percentage)
Grant Loan Total Assistance
(million US dollar)
Pre 1st Plan 64% 36% 337
1st Plan (1955-60) 54% 46% 1075
2nd Plan (1960-65) 38% 62% 2910
3rd Plan (1965-70) 24% 76% 2937
1970-71 11% 89% 873
1971-72 43% 57% 143
1972-73 9% 91% 543
1973-74 5% 95% 1268
1974-75 9% 91% 1166
1975-76 11% 89% 922
1976-77 17% 83% 1115
Source: Government of Pakistan Finance Division Economic Survey,
1977/78, p. 117
Distribution of Foreign Assistance 1972/73-1977/78
(million US dollar)
(Excluding Short Term Credits)
Consortium Non Consortium OPEC sources
(excluding OPEC)
292.9 48.9
309.2 23.7 30.0
488.3 30.8 410.0
527.7 75.9 421.1
582.6 49.7 227.8
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Table 6.30
Financing of Development Expenditures' (million rupees)
1970/71 - 1976/77
Development
Expenditure
70/71 
2779 
Financed by
Domestic Resources 1025 
Foreign Assitance 1249
Expansionary
Financing 505
71/72 72/73 73/74 74/75 75/76
2450 3819 6384 10612 13404
267 -1045 2020 -209 42
878 3357 3865 8786 9461
1305 1507 499 2035 3901
76/77
16313
2875
7827
5611
Source: World Bank (1978).
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development program was minimal. Public expenditure on 
irrigation and subsidies in the agricultural sector did 
not lead to a commensurate increase in farm productivity 
or cropped agreage. In industry public investment was 
mainly concentrated in long gestation projects. Of the 
total resources allocated to the sector nearly 70% were 
invested in projects, like the Karachi Steel Mill, cement 
and fertilizer factories which were not expected to yield 
benefits till the end of the 1970s or, in the case of 
steel, early eighties.'*'
Inflation
Ihe resulting imbalance between money demand and 
available output was reflected in an unprecedented rate of 
inflation in the economy during the period. The general 
wholesale price index, which had increased by less than 5% 
annually from 1959/60 to 1971/72,2 rose by 138% over the 
next five years with an annual average increase of 28%
(Table 6.33.). To a certain extent the rapid rise in 
prices was due to high prices in world markets transmitted 
through sharp increases in prices of crucial inputs like 
oil, food, fertilizers etc. However high rates of inflation 
persisted in the domestic economy after 1974/75 when the 
rising trend in world prices had subsided (Table 6*32) „
World Bank (197S) p. 41.
2 ^
Government of Pakistan, Central Statistical Office (1972), p.314.
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A recent enrpirical study^ has shown that while the 
general price level was strongly influenced by 
international inflationary pressures, more than half 
the increase in prices during the period could be 
ascribed to domestic factors.
The inflationary pressure which in the first place
was caused by the inability to curtail consumption in the
economy had further negative implications for future
saving efforts. Firstly, evidence provided in a recent
statistical analysis of the relationship between price
increases and savings for the period from 1950/51 to
1976/77 points to a significant negative association
2
between inflation and household savings. The strong 
adverse effect of inflation on household savings was 
attributed by the author to the negative impact of price 
increases on the rate of return to financial assets.
Secondly the expectation that inflation would divert 
investment away from productive sectors to sectors with 
low social returns was also borne but by Pakistan’s 
experience in the seventies. Data on fixed capital 
formation by economic sectors presented in Table 6.31 
reveal that the proportion of investment in comnodity
1 Pasha (1979), p. 14.
^ Qureishi (1981), pp. 390-391.
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Table 6.31
Private Fixed Capital Formation by Economic Sectors 1969/70-1976/77
(million rupees)
69/70 70/71 71/72 72/73 73/74 74/75 75/76 76/77
Agriculture * 476.1 463.4 535.2 612.1 737.9 845.7 1348.5 1506.8
Mining & 
Quarrying 17.5 18.8 18.0 19.0 22.7 30.2 33.2 36.5
Manufacturing 
(large Scale) 1208.2 1224.0 1016.3 763.1 697.3 990.4 1309.0 1209.7
Manufacturing 
(small scale) 187.7 201.7 219.1 255.9 325.5 446.5 509.5 585.3
Construction 61.0 4.4 28.1 23.7 26.7 62.3 49.9 68.5
Electricity and 
Gas 108.3 107.7 71.3 111.8 0.9
b
1.0 1.5 4.3
Transport and 
Communication 514.7 518.3 606.9 968.0 999.6 1016.4 1070.7 1779.0
Financial In­
stitutions and 
Insurance 51.5 52.0 33.2 34.5 9.8*
a
5.6 8.9 9.1
Ownership of 
Dwellings 502.3 555.6 603.9 493.8 500.3 1136.4 1341.2 1709.0
Services 366.0 385.5 413.9 444.4 519.3 673.3 813.2 1020.8
Total 3493.3 3531.4 3545.9 3726.3 3840.0 5207.8 6485.6 7950.0
a
excludes investment in nationalized banks 
Source; Government of Pakistan, Economic Survey, 1978. 
b f
includes only private share of investment of electricity 
companies divided on the basis of paid up share capital. 
The investment in gas companies is also shown under public 
sector.
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producing sectors fell from over 48% in 1969/70 to 
34% in 1976/77. The investible surplus was being diverted 
into services and luxury housing. Investment in ownership 
of dwellings which accounted for 14% of private capital 
formation in 1976/77 went up to 25% of private investment 
by 1976/77.
finally the price increases put pressure on the 
balance of payments by their unfavourable effect on exports.
The level of inflation in the country was higher than the 
rate of increase in world prices (Table 6,321) resulting 
in a deterioration in the competitive position of the 
country's exports while at the same time making domestic 
sales more lucrative. This was one of the factors 
contributing to the stagnation in the country's exports 
frcm 1973/74 to 1976/77.1
The high rate of price increase was also likely to
have adverse distributional consequences. The increase in
the food price index was larger than the increase in the
general price index. The negative effect of high food
prices on inccme is disproportionately greater on poorer
groups due to the larger weight of food expenditure in their
2
budgets. Household data for Pakistan shows that while
1
World Bank (1978), p . 86 •
2
Government of Pakistan, Central Statistical Office, Household
Income and Expenditure Survey (1970-71).
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Table 6.32
Export and Wholesale Price Indices, 1972/73=100
1972/73 1973/74 1974/75 1975/76 1976/77
(1) Export Price Index 100 143 146 151 169
(2) Wholesale Price Index 100 127 161 179 195
I f  2 100 113 90 84 86
Source: World. Bank (1978), p.86.
Table 6.33
Index Number of Wholesale Prices (1959/60=100)
General Food Raw Fuel, Lighting Manufactures
Material & Lubricants
1965/66 112 108.2 125.6 109.2 112.7
1966/67 124.2 126.9 126.2 121.0 117.0
1967/68 126 133.3 106.0 123.6 121.7
1968/69 129.5 134.0 113.2 127.4 129.8
1969/70 132.2 134.1 122.2 132.2 134.3
1970/71 137.3 136.5 133.2 137.1 142.3
1971/72 150.3 153.5 136.3 150.6 151.5
1972/73 179.7 189.1 157.8 182.2 170.8
1973/74 229.1 242.7 205.1 236.0 209.0
1974/75 288.9 302.4 232.1 314.2 284.9
1975/76 321.8 334.4 265.4 370.1 321.8
1976/77 357.1 368.9 312.2 377.2 355.3
Source: Government of Pakistan, Economic Survey, 1978.
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food spending comprises nearly 60% of total expenditure 
of income groups earning less than Rs. 250 per month, 
its share in the budget of household earnings more than 
Rs. 1000 is on average much less at 36%.
There are no available estimates on changes in 
income distribution during the Bhutto period. Infoimation 
on wages indicates that industrial labour was able to 
achieve substantial increases in real income. As mentioned 
earlier the bargaining strength of this group was 
particularly strong during the Peoples Party rule.
However it is difficult to imagine how less organized 
low income groups could have maintained their economic 
position in the face of such high rates of inflation and 
low levels of production.
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CONCLUSIONS
The economic policies pursued by both Ayub and Bhutto 
failed to address the issue central to a development strategy - 
the problem of mobilizing an investible surplus. In the context 
of a predominantly agricultural economy like Pakistan any serious 
effort at the mobilization of domestic resources would necessarily 
have entailed a significant contribution from the farm sector.
However, evidence for the 1970s presented in in 
thesis, on changes in the intersectoral terns of trade and in 
agricultural taxation, the two major instruments historically 
used to extract a surplus frcm agriculture, point to a reverse 
flow of resources into the farm sector.
Thus estimates of the terms of trade for the period 
refute earlier claims by Gotsch and Brown of a deterioration 
in the relative price ratio facing the farm sector. The 
findings of this thesis indicate not only a continuation of 
the rising trend in agriculture's terms of trade visible in 
the 1960s but also an acceleration in the rate of increase 
in favour of the farm sector, especially noticeable in the 
case of the terms of trade index for inteimediate goods.
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At the same time, the proportion of agricultural income 
paid out in direct taxes declined frcm 1.0% in 1970/71 to 
.37% in 1976/77. Ihe other side of the picture was the 
growing regressiveness of the agrarian tax structure. By 
1976/77 indirect taxes comprised 95% of the total revenue 
contribution of the sector as compared to 85% in 1972/73. 
Estimates of inter-class tax rates by sectors reveal the 
large differential in tax burdens in favour of the high 
income groups in the rural sector. "Whereas average tax 
rates for the low income ratio for the two sectors were 
roughly comparable, the tax incane ratio for the high income 
brackets in the rural sector was less than one-third that of 
their urban counterparts.
The direction of price and tax policy during the 1970s 
reflect the continuation of a trend which had been visible 
frcm much earlier. Hence the question of extending the income 
tax to agricultural incane was never seriously considered and 
land revenue remained the only direct tax on the sector. As 
a result of the inflexibility of the land revenue system and 
the substantial increases in the productivity of the farm 
sector the proportion of agricultural income paid out in direct 
taxes has fallen consistently. Estimates of intersectoral tax 
burdens for the late 1960s show that the contribution of the 
agricultural sector to revenue was less than justifiable in 
terms of the differential in average income of the two sectors.
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Although there is no evidence on inter-class tax burdens 
for the earlier period, the absence of an effective direct 
tax on agriculture clearly points to a much lower tax burden 
for the high income groups in the rural areas.
Agriculture's terms of trade, with the exception of the 
initial years, have shown a positive trend from the mid-1950s 
onwards despite the dramatic breakthrough in agricultural 
productivity in the 196Cs.
What have been the factors determining the movements 
in the intersectoral terms of trade? Lewis has explained the 
changes in the sectoral price ratio in teims of government 
policies and the changes in the relative scarcity of sectoral 
outputs. The fall in agriculture's terms of trade in the early 
1950s was seen as the result of the trade policy of import 
control and the overvaluation of domestic currency which raised 
the price of import substitutes, mostly manufactures, and 
lowered the prices of exports, which were mainly agricultural 
ccomodities. However, the subsequent improvement in the index 
was attributed to the disparities in the growth of farm and 
manufacturing outputs. Thus while industrial production increased 
at rates of over 16% in the fifties, the rate of increase in 
agricultural production of 1.2% lagged behind the population 
growth rate. Lewis, however, does not provide any satisfactory
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reason for the continued shift in terms of trade in favour 
of the farm sector in the 1960s despite the substantial increase 
in agricultural production. His explanation does not refer 
to the incentive strategy initiated by the Ayub government 
in 1959 whereby the system of compulsory procurement of 
foodgrains was replaced by voluntary sales at support prices 
and the substantial reduction on export duties on agricultural 
commodities.
Interpretation of changes in the terms of trade during 
the 1970s emphasize government price policy as the major 
determinant of changes in the sectoral price ratio. Whereas 
the Lewis explanation economic policies were motivated by 
development considerations, in more recent interpretations 
the influence of Lipton's urban bias is clearly visible.
Thus price policy is determined by the political objectives of 
furthering the economic interests of the groups in power who 
are representatives of the urban sector. Hence it it claimed, 
mainly on the basis of the Gotsch and Brown estimates of 
teims of trade which have been shown to misrepresent the 
trend for the seventies, that price policy has been motivated 
by the objective of maintaining artificially low prices 
of farm products to the benefit of indistrialists and urban 
consumers.
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However, evidence on the intersectoral terms of trade 
and the contribution of agricultural taxation to revenue 
goes contrary to the hypothesis that economic policies 
are designed to serve urban interests. Furtheimore, a 
detailed analysis of government decision on price setting 
in the 1970s does not show any tendency to maintain low 
prices of farm output. Information on fertilizer crop 
ratios, world prices and net returns to various crops, factors 
which serve as the basis for decisions on price policy, 
indicate that the enhancement in procurement prices during the 
period was more than warranted in terms of these considerations 
alone. Moreover, the tendency to set prices at levels higher 
than those recoimended by economists and planning agencies on 
the basis of costs and incentives was also noted in the Ayub 
period.
Similarly, the need to inpose an effective direct tax 
on agriculture has been strongly recoimended by various 
commissions and has been reiterated in every plan document.
Yet till 1977 no attempt was taken to implement this major 
fiscal reform despite the recurring shortfalls in public 
savings.
Thus the findings point to a bias in price and tax policy, 
but the bias is clearly not in favour of the urban sector, nor 
in favour of the rural sector as a whole, but in favour of
the class of large landowners who are the major beneficiaries 
of high prices and who stand to lose most frcm a progressive 
agrarian tax structure.
The state in Pakistan has not been dominated by urban 
interests but by this class of large farmers whose stronghold 
in the power structure has survived the various shifts in 
government. The political power of the landed elite was 
derived frcm the extreme concentration of land resources 
and thereby the control over the peasantry and the rural vote 
which ih a predominantly agrarian society was indispensable 
to electoral majorities.
Thus in the initial years the representatives of this 
class completely dominated the Sind and Punjab assemblies as 
well as various key ministerial posts. The fact that despite 
the highly skewed distribution of land there was no attempt to 
enact any ceiling legislation in the first ten years of the 
country’s history is an indication of their considerable 
influence on public policy.
Ayub’s regime, which was prompt in enacting land reform 
legislation, was viewed by many observers as signifying a 
restructuring of the power relations in the country. It was
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claimed that the locus of power had shifted from the 
landlords to the monopoly industrialists and middle 
farmers. However, evidence on the social background of 
the members of national and provincial assemblies does 
not reveal any significant reduction in the representation 
of large landowners in the legislature. The nature of the 
Ayub land reforms, the failure to tax agricultural incane, 
the primary reliance on an incentive policy in agriculture 
and government subsidies to tractor imports are further 
illustration of the undiminished ability of the landlord 
lobby to influence the direction of economic policy.
Bhutto came into power when the major power blocs 
were in disarray. Ihe military had suffered a humilating 
defeat in Bangladesh; the civil service had been the subject 
of great public criticism; while the largest of the landlords 
who had traditionally dominated politics were defeated by 
lesser known candidates of the Peoples Party. At that 
juncture Bhutto had far more leverage to shift the direction 
of economic policy than had been possible hitherto.
However, Bhutto had never contemplated a radical reorgan­
isation of the socio-economic structure. As has been pointed 
out by various observers his socialist platform signified 
mora a tactical response rather than a genuine ideological 
conmitment. Within the given structure he was fully aware of
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the volatile nature of the mass movement he had helped mobilize 
and was anxious to consolidate his position through 
establishing alliances with the landed elite, The large 
landowners of the Punjab who in the pre-election phase 
had refused Bhutto's attempts to seek their support now 
eagerly joined the Peoples Party for obviously opportunistic 
reasons. Thus soon after the elections the landed elite had 
regained their position as the dominant group in the ruling 
party.
Unlike the previous regimes Bhutto also had to contend 
with the demands of the smaller farmers and the poorer strata 
of the rural sector. That he did not want to lose his image 
as the champion of the poor was- reT-1 ected in the symbolic 
impact of his reforms and the radical flourish with which 
they were introduced. However, the generous ceilings and various 
exemptions and loopholes in the land reforms, the continued 
reliance on an incentive strategy in agriculture, and the 
growing regressiveness of the agrarian tax structure leave 
little doubt that the demands of the privileged strata in 
the countryside were the stronger of the contending pressures.
The link between the dominance of the rural elite and 
public policy may be critisized as overly simplifying a 
complex problem and thereby undermining the influence of 
nationalist aims as well as the conflicting objectives of
other power groups not the least of which were the monopoly 
industrialists. While this class had few contacts with the 
Peoples Party, they nevertheless had strong links with the 
civil-military oligarchy in the sixties. However, on the 
basis of the strong evidence which extends over a considerable 
period of time the determining influence of the class off 
large landowners on the formulation of price and tax policy 
cannot be denied.
Moreover, although there is a basic conflict of 
interests over price between suiplus farmers and the industrial­
ists the Ayub regime more than compensated the industrialists 
for the unfavourable trend in sectoral prices by the use 
of various government measures which greatly subsidized 
industrial investment while a strict curb on trade union 
activity kept the increase in wages well under control.
It was not the dominant classes, but the less privileged 
strata in the rural and urban sector who bore the cost of 
Ayub's economic policies. Ihus real wages of industrial 
workers declined while ih the rural sector the position of 
small farmer and tenants deteriorated vis a vis the large 
farmers who were the main beneficiaries of the government 
policies of price incentives and subsidized inputs.
Furthermore, the state had the option of foreign 
assistance which made it possible to maintain the level of
3b*\
investment in the economy without recourse to the politically 
unpleasant task of extracting a surplus from the farm sector. 
Ihe availability of foreign aid not only made it possible to 
sustain high rates of investment without a corresponding 
increase in danestic savings but it also released the economy 
from the foreign exchange constraint which had brought 
industrial investment to a standstill in the latter half 
of the 1950s. Ihe industrial structure which had evolved 
in the 1950s was dominated by consumer goods and the import 
quotient of investment was high. Since agricultural 
exports were the major source of foreign exchange earnings, 
the stagnation of the agricultural sector in the first 
decade was eventually reflected in a sharp reduction in 
foreign exchange resources. Ihus the demand for industrial 
investment in response to high profits was frustrated 
through an inability to transform rupee savings into capital 
inputs.
Ihe 1960s were marked by continued rapid industrial 
growth at an annual rate of over 9%. However, the industrial 
structure which emerged was a success only in terms of the 
criteria of high growth. It was not only highly inefficient 
and capital intensive but also continued to be dominated by 
consumer goods. Ihus by the end of the 1960s nearly '80% of 
the demand for capital equipment was met by exports.
3^ 2
The fragile base of the aid financed industrial 
structure was exposed in the initial years of the Third 
Plan when the curtailment of aid following the 1965 War 
and two successive bad harvests were accompanied by a 
sharp drop in investment and savings. As a result of the 
failure to develop domestic capacity in the capital goods 
sector and the inability to mobilize domestic savings the 
industrialisation process continued to be limited by 
external constraints.
Bhutto assigned high priority to developing a 
balanced industrial structure and the bulh of the nationali­
zation program was geared to the production of capital goods. 
However, he did not cane to teims with the corresponding 
problem of raising the rate of domestic saving and once 
again chose the easier option of relying on foreign aid and 
defecit financing.
Ihe savings rate since 1973/ has been less than 8 % 
of GNP, falling as low as 4.5% in 1974/75. The incapacity 
to accumulate stemmed directly from the political constraints 
on the government which in some ways were more binding than 
those of earlier regimes. On the one hand the ruling party was 
ccnrnitted to maintaining the consumption levels of the poorer 
strata including the increasingly organised and powerful
3^3
subsector of industrial labour. And on the other hand 
the importance of the political support of the landed gentry 
pie eluded any effort to bring their rising incanes under the 
purview of an income tax.
Ihus no attempt was made to extract the surplus in 
agriculture either through terms of trade or agricultural 
taxation. Falling returns as a result of high wages and 
input costs and even more important uncertainty caused by 
the nationalisation program dampened the incentive to save 
and invest in the corporate sector. Finally, the scope for 
increasing public spending was limited due to the sharp rise 
in non-development spending, most noticeably on food 
subsidies and on defence and internal security, and the 
poor financial performance of the public enterprizes.
Due to the inadequacy of the domestic saving effort 
the state had to borrow both at hone and abroad to finance 
its ambitious public investment program. Ihe high output 
response of investment in the sixties had made it possible 
to finance investment through borrowing without putting too 
much strain on the economy. Ihe Bhutto period, however, was 
marked by a dramatic deceleration in the rate of increase of 
both agricultural and industrial output. Growth rate of output 
of major crops fell frcm 6.7% in the decade from 1959/60 
to 1968/69 to 2% for the period from 1969/70 to 1976/77.
The slowdown in the tempo of manufacturing output was even
3kk
iflore pronounced. Gross domestic product in large scale 
industry increased by only 7% over the six year period from 
1970/71 to 1976/77 in contrast to annual average growth 
rates of 9% in the preceding period from 1963/64 to 1970/71.
External factors and fortuitous elements such as the 
oil crises and world recession on the international front and 
the severe drought in 197/75 on the domestic front certainly 
contributed to the dismal economic performance during the 
1970s.
Furthermore, the eocnomic structure set up under the 
Ayub regime may have been a success in the short run in terms 
of rapid output increase but it did not lay the foundation 
for long run sustained growth. In agriculture the spread of 
new seeds and tubewells made possible dramatic improvements 
in productivity without recourse to any institutional reform. 
However, the inposition of the new technology and the government 
incentive strategy on the unreformed agrarian structure 
under-scored the tendency towards dualistic development 
whereby the modernization process was limited to a small 
minority of large farmers.
Despite his commitment to a new redistributionist 
strategy the agricultural policies adopted by Bhutto displayed
a remarkable similarity to those of his predecessor.
Ihus the land reform stopped far short of any significant 
redistribution of land resources and primary reliance was 
placed on incentive through higher prices and subsidised 
inputs to raise the level of agricultural production. Ihe 
continuation of these policies perpetuated the adverse 
impact on the agrarian structure without leading to any 
improvement in farm productivity. Once the momentum of the 
bio-chemical technology had subsided, the continued neglect 
of structural factors and the reliance on an incentive 
strategy failed to raise the level of overall output.
However the incentive policies did result in a signficant 
increase in output of major crops but this was achieved not 
through higher yields but through shifts of acreage away 
frcm inferior cereals. T h e surplus accruing to the large 
farmers as a result of high growth rates in major crops and 
substantial price increases m s diverted into mechanical 
technology, mainly tractors, with little positive yield effects 
and further negative implication on rural employment and 
concentration of land use.
In industry, the rapid manufacturing growth of the 
preceding decade had not led to a diversified industrial base. 
Agro-processing industries, like cotton textile and yam, 
contributed the bulk of value added in the sector. The failure 
of cotton output and rising prices of the crop were reflected 
in the declining trend in the output of cotton manufactures.
3^6
Furthermore public investment in industry was 
concentrated in capital itensive, long gestation projects 
which were not expected to contribute to output till the 
late 1970s.
The resulting imbalance between the supply and demand 
for output was reflected in unprecedented inflationary 
pressures, worsening of the balance of payments and the 
diversion of the surplus to non-productive sectors leading 
to a further erosion of the development process.
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